- Rating
- 2(+1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper presents a κ-free deterministic truncation protocol for n-party semi-honest honest-majority MPC with Shamir secret-sharing over Galois rings. By directly integrating modular wraparound correction into the truncation formula, the protocol removes the statistical security parameter κ and only requires one online secure comparison, avoiding the downsides of two existing baselines: oversized rings from RMFE-style protocols and two sequential comparisons from Escudero-style κ-free schemes. Benchmarks on primitive micro-benchmarks and private neural-network training over MNIST demonstrate improved runtime and communication overhead compared with prior RMFE framework.
Critical strengths
- It achieves a favorable theoretical trade‑off for deterministic truncation under Galois-ring Shamir sharing: eliminating statistical security parameter κ while keeping only one online secure comparison, resolving two main bottlenecks of prior deterministic truncation constructions.
- The work is not limited to a standalone truncation primitive. It fully adapts the new truncation for RMFE SIMD-packed computation, and designs complete supporting operators including packed fixed‑point multiplication and gradient aggregation that can plug‑and‑play into the existing RMFE training pipeline.
Critical weaknesses
- The contribution of this paper is limited. Shamir sharing and truncation have been vastly studied in PPML.
- Although the paper provides rigorous theoretical derivation and end-to-end implementation, several practical boundary assumptions and experimental validations remain insufficiently explored.
- All end-to-end private neural network training experiments are only performed on MNIST. It remains unclear whether the observed performance gains and numerical stability hold for more complex datasets.
- Comprehensive hyperparameter sweeps are absent. The paper lacks full comparisons across varied packing density and multiple ring width combinations, so the parameter sensitivity of the proposed RMFE-native operators is not well characterized.
- It would be helpful to discuss the feasibility and overhead penalty when adapting and its supporting operators to malicious security MPC settings.
Questions for authors
- All end-to-end private training experiments are restricted to the MNIST dataset. Could the authors report key training results on at least one extra dataset such as CIFAR-10, to rule out the risk that reported performance gains are artefacts specific to MNIST?
- The protocol relies on strict ring-width constraint with only one-bit margin between input bit-length and ring bit-width. In practical DNN training, intermediate activations and gradients may occasionally exceed pre-estimated bit-length bounds. Could the authors quantify correctness or accuracy degradation when this one-bit margin constraint is violated?
- Could the authors supply additional experimental results over a broader range of hyperparameters, including diverse packing density and multiple ring width combinations, to better demonstrate parameter sensitivity of the proposed RMFE-native operators?
2 comments
Thanks for the responses. I have changed my ratings accordingly.
We sincerely thank the reviewer for their valuable time and thoughtful feedback. Below, we address the key concerns raised in the review.
Regarding technical novelty, our contributions lie in two aspects. First, we derive a unified exact truncation relation by directly characterizing modular wraparound over a broader class of moduli N. When specialized to Z2k, this formulation enables κ-free deterministic truncation with only one online secure comparison. Second, we develop two RMFE-native operators specifically tailored to private neural network training: ΠMulRescale for fixed-point multiplication and ΠAggRescale for gradient aggregation. In particular, ΠMulRescale introduces a novel full-ring random masking construction that enables direct truncation of degree-2t intermediates without separate degree reduction. Regarding malicious security, established MPC techniques could be employed to extend our constructions. This work focuses on establishing an efficient foundational framework in the semi-honest, honest-majority setting.
Q1 & Q3. We would like to emphasize that our primary contributions lie in fundamental MPC primitives, namely efficient deterministic truncation and RMFE-native fixed-point operators, rather than neural network architectures or training methodologies. The MNIST experiments serve to demonstrate the practical integration and efficiency of these primitives in private neural network training. Their correctness and security are established theoretically under the stated assumptions and do not depend on specific datasets or network architectures. Furthermore, we evaluate protocol-level performance and scalability across 3 to 15 parties. While larger datasets would broaden the empirical evaluation, they are not necessary to establish the underlying protocol contributions.
Q2. We would like to clarify that requiring only ℓ≤k−1 is an advantage of our protocol rather than a limitation. Existing truncation approaches relying on the statistical security parameter κ require a substantially larger gap, resulting in larger algebraic structures and increased computational and communication overhead. Our protocol eliminates this dependence while preserving exact truncation. The signed ℓ-bit input range is a standard correctness assumption in fixed-point MPC, rather than a limitation specific to our protocol. In our experiments, we set ℓ=60 and k=64, and verified through plaintext fixed-point tests that intermediate values remain within the required range. When this assumption is violated, the correctness guarantee no longer applies, rather than merely introducing bounded approximation errors.