- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
Read review
Paper summary
This paper introduces a new prompt injection attack scheme, which is called "cross-surface prompt injection". The basic idea is separating the attack into two stages, including Stage I (jump instruction injection) which misleads the agent into a attacker-controlled page, and Stage II (attack page optimization) where the actual attack happens with the whole compromised page. Evaluation was conducted on a self-constructed benchmark with 117 mobile test cases from 39 source apps across eight domains and 6 risk categories, showing clear improvement of attack success rate.
Critical strengths
This paper introduces a simple but effective attack scheme with potentially higher success rate, which is potentially helpful for future design of agent models and harness.
Critical weaknesses
- The approach is too straightforward as a research paper, lacking sufficient technical depth.
- The attack may be easily mitigated by restricting and monitoring page jumps.
Questions for authors
- What is the main technical challenge tackled in this paper?
- Could you briefly discuss the takeaway messages for mobile agent/system designers? For example, what could they do to avoid such attacks?
3 comments
Dear Reviewer vV8X,
Thank you for your constructive feedback. We would like to briefly summarize how the rebuttal addresses your questions about the technical challenge and the implications for mobile agent designers.
- We clarified the technical challenge of diagnosing failures across two interfaces with different constraints. The revised discussion explains how the evaluation measures navigation and post-navigation outcomes separately (W1, Q1).
- We evaluated your suggestion to block external navigation. Complete blocking prevented all compromises in the evaluated trials, but it also prevented completion of all 108 clean tasks that required an external step (W2, Q2).
- For workflows that require external pages, we evaluated selective navigation with pre-action authorization. This reduced compromises and retained completion on 77 of the 108 clean tasks that required an external step (W2, Q2).
We would be happy to clarify any remaining questions. If the revisions address your concerns, we would appreciate your reconsideration of the rating.
Best regards,
The Authors
Thank the authors for the rebuttal. I still think this technical contribution is too straightforward to meet the bar of ICLR. How to balance contextual continuity and attack success rate might be a good place for innovation, but the current investigation into this is too shallow. I'd keep my rating.
We thank Reviewer vV8X for the constructive feedback. All revisions are highlighted in blue in the updated PDF.
W1 & Q1: Main technical challenge tackled in this paper.
The core challenge is constructing an executable attack path under asymmetric interface control (§4.1), where naive redirection fails due to three coupled tensions:
ConsII) with a clean, executable UI route. Figure 5 (Minimal-Low 41.67% vs. Structured-High 70.37%) and Table 20 (removingConsIIdrops completions from 73 to 61) show that both are necessary.ASR = 0) is ambiguous. Editing the destination cannot fix a missed jump, and editing the jump cannot fix a post-jump refusal. Decoupling arrival (JSR) from post-arrival (ASR) diagnosis directs refinement to the responsible artifact.Empirical results confirm this difficulty. CrossSurf outperforms Generic Cross-Surface by +9.7 pp average ASR across five agents (30.9% vs. 21.2%, Table 1). Table 3 ablations show that removing Stage I drops JSR/ASR by 7.6/7.5 pp, while removing Stage II drops ASR by 8.0 pp at similar JSR. Matched controls (§5.5, Tables 11 & 14) further show continuity × structure interaction on form-complete pages and a +6.48 pp advantage for deferred disclosure at equal destination functionality and budgets.
W2 & Q2: Mitigation via restricting page jumps and takeaways for mobile agent/system designers.
In closed workflows that never require external pages, blocking all browser and WebView transitions structurally eliminates the attack (S⊆J). However, in realistic open workflows where users expect agents to follow external links, naive jump blocking destroys benign utility. This motivates our selective navigation (
D2) and pre-action authorization (D3) controls (Section 5.5, Table 5; Table 19):Takeaways for mobile agent and system designers (§5.5, Appendices A.5–A.7):
D1eliminates attacks (0/216 original and adapted) with minimal clean loss on non-external tasks (87/108 vs. 88/108).D1drops clean completion to 0/108), selective navigation alone leaves high risk (50/216 original; 66/216 adapted). Adding pre-action authorization (D3) cuts compromise to 16/216 (original) and 38/216 (adapted) while retaining 77/108 external-step utility.