- Rating
- 1
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
The paper argues that, when a user posts different pieces of text across platforms over time, per post anonymization techniques are insufficient as leakage of certain attributes can happen when evidence accumulates across posts.
Authors provide the following contributions:
- They define cumulative leakage and show that per post anonymization is insufficient;
- They propose a sequential anonymizer that rewrites the released posts if the addition of the new post leads to successful inference, following the iterative approach of Staab et al. (2025).
- They construct a benchmark SeqBench that specifically spreads information about target attributes across posts (1000 generated personas with median of 7 posts), and analyse the performance of sequential anonymization in the utility-leakage trade off.
Critical strengths
- The paper studies an important problem that, to my knowledge, has not been widely studied. Attribute leakage of text across longitudinal, cross platform posts is highly relevant, and currently not well addressed by text anonymizers or studied in related work.
- Authors create a synthetic benchmark to measure such leakage, and position their work in related to other benchmarks in the field (Figure 2).
- They use the state of the art iterative anonymizer as per post anonymizer, so that's a fair comparison.
Critical weaknesses
Overall, the paper does not read well. Sentences often take a long time to understand (very often too short or dense to make things clear), and are not thoughtfully connected. For instance, the paragraph starting online 171: I really struggle to understand what is evidence based or evidence monotone.
It personally really reads as mostly AI generated text (e.g., "a breadcrumb is the atom of the ground truth…" on line 246). While I do not have evidence for that, nor do I believe that's a reason in itself not to accept a paper, the fact that it does not read well remains a major weakness.
- The results do not compellingly show the benefits of sequential anonymization over per-post anonymization. If I understand it correctly, both the leakage and utility is within the same CI for both in the main results in Table 1. To me, this means that there is no additional benefit from using sequential anonymization in a dataset specifically designed to test leakage that accumulates over different posts, or how should I read this?
- Fundamentally, the sequential anonymizer assumes that previously released posts can be edited, which is an unfair assumption in practice. An real attacker surely can save original posts before they are edited, and still make attribute inferences based on the evidence accumulated in these.
- It's tough to validate how realistic the benchmark is, i.e., how it compares to attributes being leaked across posts in reality.
Smaller concerns:
- Figure 1 can be much better illustrated of accompanied by a better caption, it took me a while to understand it.
- I do not understand Figure 7.
- The appendix has a lot of information, but from just reading the main text I had a hard time understanding which specific pieces provide additional details or results for which arguments in the main text.
Questions for authors
Grammar/spelling/structure:
- Line 56: no single post need give
- Line 90: you provide a bullet point overview (I guess of the contributions), but no reference of what is listed.
Other questions see weaknesses.
3 comments
Response to Reviewer n9GT (2/2)
W4. It is hard to validate how realistic the benchmark is.
That is fair, and Section 7 says we ran no human study. SeqBench is a controlled instrument, as SynthPAI is for single-post inference. It tests whether a defence handles cumulative leakage when it is present, and makes no estimate of how common it is in the wild.
| Question | Answer | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Why not real data? | A cumulative target can only be scored with an answer key that says which posts jointly carry a value. Real corpora have none, and building one would need consented linkage of real people's accounts across platforms | l. 226–230 |
| Does the phenomenon exist in real text? | Prior work shows it: inference from a handful of ordinary posts; user-level cross-post leakage on social media; identifiers accumulating across one patient's records | Staab et al., 2024; SopriBench; i2b2/UTHealth |
| What keeps the corpus coherent? | One identity drives style, beliefs, posting rhythm and accounts together, events come from real news headlines, and the population is deliberately confusable | App. E |
| What stops a clue being too blunt? | The certifier does not admit a target as cumulative when one post gives the value away | Sec. 4.2, App. F |
Figure 1. / Figure 7.
| Figure | Panel | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Left | One fabricated person and the channels the generator fixes |
| 1 | Middle | Four of that person's posts over six simulated days |
| 1 | Right | What an attacker concludes. Each post rules out some cities, only all four together leave Manchester, and dropping any one reopens the set |
| 7 | Left | For a defence that reads only the last k posts, the share of clue sets too wide to fit in its view (35.8% at k = 8) |
| 7 | Right | The share of clue sets whose last clue has appeared by the author's D-th post (7.9% by post 20) |
Both panels of Figure 7 come from the generator's records, with no attacker involved. The revision says this in the text where Figure 1 is first cited and in the caption of Figure 7.
Which appendix supports which argument?
| Main text | Appendix |
|---|---|
| Related resources (Fig. 2); every term | A; glossary in Tables 2–3 |
| Edit scopes and the limits of the model (Sec. 3) | B |
| Proofs, the window result, span counts (Sec. 3, 6.1) | C |
| The anonymisation loop and its strength (Sec. 5) | D |
| Personas, corpora, sampling (Sec. 4) | E, Table 4 |
| Certifier probes and rules (Sec. 4.2) | F |
| Metrics and utility tiers (Sec. 6) | G |
| Edit sets and editing strength (Sec. 6.2) | H |
| Other attackers and corpora (Sec. 6.2) | I |
| Reproducibility, ethics, release, datasheet | J–M |
| Model versions | N |
The letters above are those of the submitted PDF. The revision folds the fourteen appendix sections into five (A related work and terms, B the formal model, C the benchmark, D the evaluation, E reproducibility and release) and puts this guide, in the new lettering, at the head of the appendix.
Line 56, line 90.
Line 56, "No single post need give an attribute away", means that no single post has to reveal the attribute; the revision uses the plainer wording. The bullets at line 90 are the contributions; the revision adds the lead-in "Our contributions are:".
What we ask you to weigh. You describe the problem as "highly relevant, and currently not well addressed by text anonymizers or studied in related work". The paper's contribution to it is the benchmark: a definition of leakage that no single post carries, a test that admits a target only against a concrete reader, and corpora in which the supporting posts are known. None of the six closest resources labels leakage post by post for one person across platforms (l. 071–073). The anonymiser comparison is a cost measurement, reported as a null. We hope the revised presentation lets the benchmark be judged on those terms.
Response to rebuttal
Many thanks for the detailed rebuttal. I have read the response and the other reviews/rebuttals, and believe the paper still needs substantial work to be accepted. I keep my score.
Response to Reviewer n9GT (1/2)
Thank you for the careful reading and for the concrete pointers. Line numbers refer to the submitted PDF.
We agree. The revision adds a plain-language reading of the reader assumption, defines each term where it is first used, and cuts statements that were made more than once (general response). What the two passages mean:
On why the text reads this way: to fit nine pages, an editing pass put the conclusion first in each paragraph and cut repeated statements, and we attached every qualifier to its claim so that no sentence overclaims. That removed the connecting text a first-time reader needs. The AI-use statement discloses that assistants restructured and edited the text; we reviewed it and take responsibility for it.
As you did. On these targets the two arms are equivalent in leakage.
Table 1 measures cost: whether a defence that reads the history and returns to released posts leaks more or damages more text. It cannot show a benefit, because it runs on six further corpora whose labels were assigned one post at a time (l. 079–081, 397–400), so every labelled clue is visible to both arms. SeqBench's designed multi-post targets are not in it. Section 3 (l. 216–221) says in advance that on such targets Proposition 1 predicts nothing and that "a null ... is uninformative, and so is a win". We wrote the result as a null for that reason.
The benefit claim rests on Proposition 1 and on how widely SeqBench's clue sets are spread: at 1,000 personas every designed set is wider than two posts, 79.3% are wider than four and 35.8% wider than eight (l. 380–384; App. C), so a per-post anonymiser never sees one whole. The comparison on certified cumulative targets is not in the submission, and Section 7 says the reported null cannot test the proposition.
Yes, and the paper says so (App. B, "A snapshot adversary"; Section 7, l. 469–471). An attacker who saves everything is the realistic scope of Definition 3, and for it Proposition 2(b) agrees with you: a released leak stays released. The abstract limits the revision claim to "a reader of the current archive".
We kept revision in the paper because sequential anonymisation has two parts, and only one of them changes a published post.