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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

From Clues to Sensitive Disclosure: Measuring Multi-Turn Privacy Risk and Preventing Privacy Leakage in LLMs

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Abstract

Multi-turn LLM assistants can expose sensitive information even when no sin- gle historical message states it: individually weak clues can jointly support a new person-level conclusion. Existing privacy checks rarely explain which ear- lier interactions support such a conclusion or enforce protection before the first external release. We introduce PRIVACT, a framework that distinguishes source- explicit disclosures from Novel Sensitive Claims (NSCs), measures historical sup- port through a temporally ordered Privacy Trajectory, and buffers candidate output while forecasting disclosure risk and selecting a pre-release action. On SynthPAI, the observed NSC rate for Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct rises from 3.92% with shallow history to 25.92% with full history. On 1,000 TOP-Bench cases, historical attribu- tion achieves 0.803 Exact Support. In the matched SynthPAI protection compari- son, PRIVACT achieves 100% detection precision and 79.31% prevention; across evaluated generators, prevention reaches 86.14% on Mistral-7B, with a measured end-to-end latency increase as low as 1.32% on Qwen2.5-7B. These results show why multi-turn privacy protection must account for both how a claim forms and when it becomes externally observable.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
large language models, multi-turn privacy, privacy leakage, privacy inference, AI safety

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_z7dnOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
1
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper introduces PrivAct, an approach to prevent privacy leakage in LLMs when processing several historical contexts of a user to make inferences of sensitive attributes. The proposed framework is compared to several existing baselines using multiple models.

Critical strengths

The topic that the paper is addressing is quite interesting and relevant; often frontier LLMs start recalling personal information about us when we are chatting with them over multiple sessions, and this could indeed lead them to infer new sensitive attributes by analyzing all these individual disclosures across the context history. I do find this direction valuable; however the paper suffers from clarity and execution issues which I describe in the weaknesses section below.

Critical weaknesses
  • Some parts of writing lack clarity and need further revisions. For example, on line 040 the paper states “The familiar Target pregnancy-prediction case illustrates the underlying aggregation risk outside LLMs Duhigg (2012).”. It seems to be referring to some story as a motivating example but without mentioning more details which for readers that are not familiar, including myself, make it more difficult to understand the point the paper is trying to make. As another example, line 80 of the introduction begins a paragraph that summarizes a lot of results suddenly without prior context, making for a bad reading experience. This also applies to the description of the proposed method in Section 3 which is difficult to fully understand.

  • It is unclear what the takeaways from the results are. Most of the paragraphs describing the results just report the individual numbers of different models with great specificity but do not describe overall trends. There are also too many baselines with no explanations of what they are (e.g. see Table 7), it is difficult to make sense of these results and the paper does not do a good job at it.

Questions for authors

I don't have particular questions, please see the main issues in the weaknesses section.

2 comments

Dear Reviewer z7dn,

Thank you very much for your valuable time and effort in reviewing our paper. Your comments are greatly appreciated and have been helpful in improving the quality of our work.

As the author-reviewer discussion period will end in approximately one day, we would kindly ask you to review our rebuttal and reconsider whether we have adequately addressed your concerns and questions.

Thank you again for your time, consideration, and constructive feedback.

Best regards, The Authors

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Supplementary Clarification to Reviewer z7dn: Research Motivation and Baseline Comparisons

We sincerely thank the reviewer once again for the valuable suggestions regarding the paper's research motivation, methodological presentation, and interpretation of experimental results. Following our previous responses, we would like to provide two further clarifications.

(1) Regarding the Target example and PRIVACT's research motivation. The New York Times Magazine reported that the retailer Target analyzed patterns in customers' purchases of different products to infer whether they might be pregnant. We cite this example to illustrate that ordinary information that does not directly reveal a sensitive attribute when considered individually may nevertheless disclose a new sensitive conclusion when correlated and combined. This phenomenon is an important motivation for PRIVACT.

Existing representative LLM privacy protection methods primarily focus on identifying known sensitive information, preventing privacy leakage from model memorization, or controlling access to existing sensitive content. However, in multi-turn interactions, LLMs can integrate scattered clues from different historical turns to infer sensitive attributes that were not explicitly disclosed by any individual historical source. This means that privacy risks arise not only from the repeated disclosure of existing sensitive facts, but also from Novel Sensitive Claims formed during the model's reasoning process. PRIVACT is designed to address this problem by combining sensitive claim identification, historical source analysis, and selective protection before the first external release, thereby addressing both the disclosure of existing sensitive information and the formation of new sensitive conclusions.

(2) Regarding the selection of baselines and experimental results. The methods compared in Table 7 represent different technical approaches to LLM privacy protection. For example, DEPN and PATCH primarily focus on sensitive information memorized by models and the mechanisms responsible for its leakage, reducing privacy leakage through model-internal editing. AirGapAgent mainly employs access-control mechanisms, while SumLeaks-CoDef focuses on privacy leakage prevention in multi-agent interactions. Although these methods have different original research objectives and threat models, they represent important technical directions in existing privacy protection research and therefore help evaluate PRIVACT's protection mechanism from different perspectives.

To improve the interpretability of the comparisons, we adapted these methods to a unified evaluation interface and compared them using the same samples and evaluation conditions, while explicitly distinguishing the results of the adapted experiments from the full performance of each method in its original deployment setting. Our central conclusion is not that PRIVACT outperforms existing methods on every metric, but rather that different defense mechanisms exhibit different trade-offs among privacy prevention coverage (Prevention), detection precision (Precision), unnecessary interventions on safe outputs (Safe FI), and task information preservation (Task Preservation). PRIVACT further incorporates historical source novelty into privacy assessment and implements selective protection before the first external release, thereby providing an approach to newly formed sensitive claims in multi-turn interactions that differs from traditional protection against known sensitive information.

We thank the reviewer again for the constructive feedback. We hope that further clarifying the connection between the Target example and our research problem, explaining the technical roles of different baselines, and highlighting the overall trends reflected in the experimental results will make PRIVACT's research motivation, methodological contributions, and experimental findings clearer and easier to understand.

Reviewer_G2p9OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

The paper studies multi-turn privacy leakage in LLM assistants, where harmless clues spread across turns can together support a sensitive inference. It proposes PrivAct, which separates newly inferred sensitive claims (NSCs) from restated ones, attributes each claim to earlier turns by leave-one-out, and buffers output so a risk predictor can choose Continue, Rewrite or Hold before release. It also introduces an adaptive multi-turn attack, StoneSoup.

On SynthPAI and TOP-Bench, Qwen2.5-7B's NSC rate rises from 3.92% to 25.92% with more history, and attribution reaches 0.803 Exact Support. Against 13 existing defenses, PrivAct reports 100% precision and 79.31% prevention, with 1.3–2.6% added latency.

Critical strengths
  1. A useful way to break the problem down. The paper splits a sensitive claim into three questions: source novelty, historical support, and release timing. This is a clean way to think about privacy in assistants with memory, and it goes beyond PII or explicit-field leakage. The NSC vs. source-explicit distinction rests on a real observation: NSCs are common in three of four models on SynthPAI (25.9–39.6%), and for Qwen2.5-7B they grow with history depth (3.92% → 25.92%). This is the main reason I see value in the paper.
  2. Enforcing at the point of release. With streaming output, a detector that runs afterwards cannot take back tokens already shown. Deciding before the first external release is therefore the right goal. The reported overhead is small (mean buffer of 1.9–5.6 tokens, +1.3–2.6% wall-clock time at B=1), which suggests the idea could be deployed.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The core decision functions, including the evaluation judge, are never specified. The predicates that define what is sensitive, novel and unauthorized (S, B, U, C, LocalExplicit), the claim extractor and the future-window predictor appear only as symbols, with no implementation. The paper also does not describe the judge that labels generated outputs as leaks, yet Table 3 reports a perfect 100.00 against “independently labeled” claims. This is decisive for my assessment: the paper’s contribution lies in these functions, so the method cannot be reproduced, and I cannot verify that the evaluation is independent of the method’s own criterion.

  2. The headline protection results rest on about 29 positive cases and show no clear advantage over the strongest baseline. The Table 15 percentages appear to correspond to 23/29 prevented disclosures for PrivAct versus 25/29 for DEPN. PATCH matches PrivAct’s 0/91 false interventions and 100% precision, prevents 20/29, and preserves the task better. No confidence intervals are reported. Since PrivAct’s claimed superiority over prior defenses comes down to about three cases, the experiments do not support the paper’s main empirical claim.

Questions for authors
  1. Implementation of the decision functions. How are S, B, U, C, LocalExplicit and ExtractClaims implemented: rules, a classifier, or an LLM judge, and with which model and prompt? For the future-window predictor p_ψ, what are its inputs, architecture, training data and labels, and what signal does it use on API-only models (Table 6)? Is Rewrite a text-level edit of the buffer (§3.3) or a hidden-state update (Fig. 2)? Will code be released? A concrete, reproducible specification would largely address my first critical concern.
  2. Independence of the evaluation. Is the judge that labels generated outputs as leaks (A.4) the same implementation as PrivAct’s runtime detector (A.3)? Who labeled the 384 claims in Table 3, under what protocol, and with what inter-annotator agreement? If the judge is independent and agreement is high, this concern would be resolved. If the judge is shared, I would need to see an independent evaluation.
  3. Sample size and uncertainty. How many independent cases underlie Table 15, and how do they relate to the 1,200 outputs listed in Table 14? Please report confidence intervals or significance tests comparing PrivAct with DEPN and PATCH. If the comparison involves well over 29 independent positives and the gap stays significant, my second critical concern would be resolved.
  4. Per-origin breakdown. Can you report prevention and Safe FI separately for NSCs and for source-explicit disclosures, for PrivAct and for each baseline? This should be computable from the existing runs. It is the direct test of the paper’s motivation that existing defenses miss newly formed claims.
  5. Authorization. How is U(c, q, Π) instantiated in the experiments: what is Π, where does the requester’s identity come from, and how are PERMIT cases constructed? If authorization is inferred from the request text, how does PrivAct handle a requester who claims to be the subject?
14 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Q1: Implementation of Core Decision Functions, Future-Window Prediction, and Rewrite (Part 1/5)

We sincerely thank the reviewer for raising specific questions regarding the implementation details of PRIVACT's core components. We agree that clearly specifying the implementation, information sources, and relationships of the individual modules is important for understanding and reproducing the method. At the same time, we would like to further clarify that PRIVACT does not reduce privacy protection to a single sensitive-information classifier. Instead, it addresses the formation and disclosure of sensitive conclusions in multi-turn interactions by integrating claim-level privacy assessment, historical evidence attribution, future disclosure risk prediction, and selective intervention before the first external release. These modules address three distinct questions: "what information should be protected," "which historical information supports a sensitive conclusion," and "when and how an intervention should be made." Our design is motivated by the fact that a sensitive conclusion may never have been explicitly disclosed in any individual historical message, yet the model may infer it by combining existing clues. Therefore, checking only sensitive terms registered in the history, or filtering an answer after generation, cannot adequately cover this type of risk.

(1) Implementation of ExtractClaims and S, B, U, C, and LocalExplicit. PRIVACT first performs claim extraction (ExtractClaims) on an answer awaiting release, decomposing the natural-language answer into semantic claims with identifiable subjects, attributes, and specific contents, while retaining the corresponding textual evidence and forms of expression. The goal is not simply to extract sensitive keywords, but to identify what the answer actually states about a person. For example, "a person receives training at a hospital" and "a person is employed by that hospital" are not the same claim. Similarly, "may have a certain disease," "definitely has that disease," and "does not have that disease" cannot be treated as equivalent disclosures merely because they contain the same disease name.

On this basis, the sensitivity predicate S determines whether the attribute involved in a claim falls within the current privacy protection scope; subject binding B determines whether the claim refers to the correct protected subject; authorization predicate U determines whether disclosure is permitted to the current recipient according to the requester's identity, protected attribute, access purpose, and disclosure scope specified in the trusted policy; and semantic commitment C distinguishes whether the model actually expresses the corresponding conclusion, including negation, quotation, hypothetical statements, and uncertainty. LocalExplicit further compares the fixed claim with each historical source to determine whether any source has already directly expressed a semantically equivalent conclusion. If no individual source explicitly expresses that conclusion, but the model forms the sensitive claim from the available information, we categorize it as a Novel Sensitive Claim (NSC). Importantly, NSC is defined by source novelty and does not require every NSC to be inferred jointly from multiple sources; implicit inference from a single source and inference that necessarily combines multiple sources are two distinct cases that should be distinguished.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Q1 (Part 2/5): Semantic Analysis and Policy Rules

These decisions combine natural-language semantic analysis with explicit policy rules, rather than requiring one model to produce a general "safe" or "unsafe" judgment. In the implementation described in the paper, we use Qwen2.5-7B to analyze claims in complete answers and their semantic relationships with historical sources. The model instructions constrain two types of tasks separately: first, identifying "who is being discussed, which attribute is involved, and what is specifically expressed" in a candidate answer, together with the corresponding original text; and second, keeping the target claim fixed while comparing it with each historical unit to determine whether the source directly expresses the same conclusion.

The corresponding decisions must also be combined with explicit definitions of protected attributes and trusted authorization rules. In particular, authorization cannot be established automatically merely because a requester states "I am the subject" or "I have obtained permission" in natural language.

Separating semantic judgments from trusted policies has a clear design rationale: involving a sensitive attribute does not necessarily constitute an unauthorized disclosure, and directly stated sensitive information and newly formed sensitive inferences should be governed by consistent authorization-based protection principles, while retaining their distinct source-origin categories for analysis. The current executable implementation has specified the inputs, outputs, and calling relationships of these tasks; the complete verbatim prompts, model versions, and decoding configurations should be provided together with the corresponding versioned code.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Q1 (Part 3/5): Historical Attribution and Future-Window Prediction

(2) Historical attribution and the future-window predictor. We would like to clarify that although these two modules both use historical information, they do not perform the same task. Historical attribution primarily addresses the question of "which historical information supports an already formed sensitive conclusion." For a fixed claim, PRIVACT uses Full-context Leave-One-Out (LOO) to compare the model's support for the same claim under the complete history and after removing each historical source in turn. This estimates the contribution of different historical sources and, together with their historical order, forms the Privacy Trajectory. This is a privacy-contribution measure based on attribution analysis, rather than a demonstration of strict causal relationships. It is primarily used for retrospective explanation and therefore does not require complete historical attribution to be recomputed for every online release decision.

In contrast, the future-window predictor addresses the question of "whether a sensitive disclosure may occur during the subsequent generation process." Its inputs consist of the currently available history (D), request (q), trusted privacy policy (\Pi), and already generated text prefix. Its prediction target is whether a disclosure satisfying the corresponding protection conditions may occur within a predefined future window (H). The most important constraint is that online prediction can use only information available at the current time; it cannot access tokens that have not yet been generated or the ground-truth sensitive attribute values used for offline evaluation.

In the paper-consistent executable implementation, we use a Qwen2.5 encoder to extract a 896-dimensional representation and a lightweight feedforward network to output a future-window risk score. The prediction network is trained using AdamW, with prediction thresholds and probability calibration determined on development data. Training examples are constructed from actual generation trajectories, including histories, requests, and different generated prefixes. The corresponding supervision labels are constructed from the subsequent windows observable offline and their disclosure references, while preventing prefixes from the same generation trajectory from crossing training and test splits. We separately use programmatically verifiable sensitive-field references.

For models accessible only through APIs, we do not assume access to the server-side language model's hidden states. Instead, we use the history, request, trusted policy, and generated text prefix that are actually observable to the server, providing a predictive signal through a separate text-encoding and risk-prediction path. Therefore, PRIVACT's first-release protection principle does not require access to the generating model's internal weights.

Reviewer_F5cDOpenReview ↗
Rating
3(+1)
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2(+1)
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes PrivAct, a framework for multi-turn privacy in LLM assistants. It (i) defines a protected claim c = (subject, attribute, value) and a Novel Sensitive Claim (NSC) as a protected claim not stated explicitly in any single historical unit; (ii) attributes support for a fixed claim to historical turns via full-context leave-one-out (presented as an approximation to Shapley) and orders the contributions into a "Privacy Trajectory"; (iii) adds an online future-window risk predictor and a private output buffer with Continue/Rewrite/Hold actions chosen by a cost-minimisation subject to a risk threshold. It also introduces an adaptive multi-turn elicitation attack ("StoneSoup"). Experiments on SynthPAI and TOP-Bench with Qwen2.5-7B and six other models report NSC formation rates rising with history depth, 0.803 Exact Support for attribution, 100% precision / 79% prevention in a matched comparison against twelve adapted baselines, and 1.3-2.6% end-to-end latency overhead.

Critical strengths

-The paper evaluates different generators and compares them against many prior defenses.

Critical weaknesses

-The method is not specified well enough to be reproduced or even understood. For example, how claims are extracted from generated text, how sensitivity, subject binding, authorization, and commitment are decided, and what the attacker's query generator A is, are all left undefined.

-The baseline comparison is not meaningful. Most compared methods target different problems (DEPN, PrivacyScalpel, and PATCH edit memorized PII; AirGapAgent is access control; SumLeaks is multi-agent), and they were "adapted" to a matched interface by the authors.

Questions for authors

Q1. What exactly runs in the 3.52 ms privacy check? A 7B forward pass alone takes longer than that; is the checker a small classifier head, and if so, on what was it trained?

Q2. How is Rewrite performed and what is "Rewrite Safe" judged by? Table 18 shows Hold is selected 41-53% of the time; what does the user see in those cases, and how does that square with 100% Task Preservation in Tables 6 and 8 and 95.15% in Table 7?

Q3. How were multi-turn histories constructed from SynthPAI's Reddit-style comments, and what is the requester/authorization structure that makes a disclosure "unauthorized" there?

Q4. In Table 7, why does PrivAct prevent only 79% while four baselines prevent 100%? If the answer is "those baselines over-block", then Safe FI of 17.58% is the relevant cost, and the paper should present the trade-off rather than claim dominance.

4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Q1: Privacy Checking Latency and Implementation

We thank the reviewer for raising questions regarding runtime latency and the implementation of the checker. We would first like to clarify that the 3.52 ms reported in Table 16 is the median latency (p50) of the privacy-checking component in the matched experiment, rather than the end-to-end runtime that includes 7B model generation, complete semantic analysis, Rewrite, and safety rechecking. Therefore, we do not claim that a complete forward pass of a 7B model can be completed within 3.52 ms.

In terms of implementation, PRIVACT distinguishes semantic claim analysis from runtime risk assessment, rather than including the entire generation and protection pipeline in the timing of a single checking component. In the recovered executable implementation, we also identified a lightweight detection branch using representations encoded by Qwen2.5-0.5B, with its constructed samples divided into 549 training examples and 194 development examples.

To address this concern, we have explicitly distinguished component-level checking latency from the actual runtime of the complete generation–detection–intervention–rechecking pipeline in our independent supplementary material. The measured latency of the complete local execution pipeline is on the order of seconds. This distinction provides a more accurate account of the computational costs of PRIVACT's individual modules and avoids interpreting the speed of a local checking component as the throughput of the complete privacy protection pipeline.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Q2: Rewrite, Hold, and Task Preservation

We thank the reviewer for raising these important questions regarding the Rewrite mechanism and Task Preservation. We would like to clarify that PRIVACT performs Rewrite by editing or regenerating candidate content at the text level within a private text buffer before the first external release, rather than directly modifying the model's hidden states.

The rewritten text must undergo claim extraction and privacy checking again, and only content that satisfies the release conditions is sent to the user. Therefore, “Rewrite Safe” measures the proportion of content selected for Rewrite that is judged to be safe under the corresponding rechecking conditions. It does not constitute an independent semantic safety guarantee for all final outputs.

Regarding Hold, it is necessary to distinguish internal intervention actions from the content ultimately received by the user. Hold means temporarily withholding the release of the current candidate content and does not necessarily mean that the entire request ultimately receives no answer. If subsequent content passes the safety checks, the system can continue releasing it; if safety cannot be confirmed, the corresponding content will not be externally released. Therefore, task utility should be evaluated based on the actual final output, rather than inferred solely from the number of internal Hold actions.

We also examined the historical action records in Table 18. In the recoverable Qwen records, the 1,200 action events consist of 162 Continue actions, 39 Rewrite actions, and 999 Hold actions. Some percentages in the original table are inconsistent with the actual counts. In our independent supplementary material, we have distinguished action-level statistics from final request-level outputs and documented the corresponding corrections.

Regarding Task Preservation, this metric is primarily calculated based on the degree of textual content preservation. We have further incorporated actual externally released text and necessary task information as supplementary evaluation evidence to more accurately assess the impact of privacy protection on users' actual tasks.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Q3: Multi-Turn History Construction and Authorization

We thank the reviewer for raising these questions regarding multi-turn history construction and the definition of authorization. SynthPAI provides synthetic personal profiles and associated Reddit-style comments. We group the relevant texts by synthetic data subject and organize them into historical information units with explicit ordering and source identifiers. These units are used to simulate how a model gradually encounters different clues and forms sensitive conclusions across successive interactions. We would like to clarify that this ordering represents an experimentally constructed service-history sequence, rather than an authenticated timeline of real user interactions.

Regarding unauthorized disclosure, PRIVACT does not automatically treat every output containing sensitive information as a violation. Whether a disclosure is unauthorized also depends on the data subject and protected attribute involved in the candidate claim, as well as whether the requester has the corresponding disclosure permission.

In the executable synthetic authorization experiments, we use a trusted server-side policy Pi, independent of user text, to specify the requester identity, data subject, attributes that may be accessed, and authorization scope, and to construct DENY and PERMIT scenarios. The request text is used only to express task requirements and cannot itself grant access permissions to the requester. A disclosure is considered unauthorized only when the relevant sensitive claim is actually released externally and the corresponding requester lacks the permission required by the trusted policy.

Therefore, PRIVACT explicitly separates sensitive-information identification from authorization assessment, allowing the formation of Novel Sensitive Claims and their legitimate disclosure conditions to be studied within a unified framework. We have further clarified the history construction process, source identifiers, simulated authorization policies, and their trust boundaries in our independent supplementary material to improve the reproducibility of the experimental setup.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Q4: Prevention and Privacy–Utility Trade-offs

We thank the reviewer for highlighting this important issue. We agree that Prevention measures the coverage of sensitive-disclosure blocking, but cannot independently represent the overall quality of a privacy protection system. PRIVACT does not aim to increase Prevention by blocking as many outputs as possible. Instead, it aims to identify unauthorized sensitive claims while minimizing unnecessary interventions on safe content and legitimate tasks.

Table 7 illustrates different trade-offs between prevention coverage and detection selectivity. In the same matched experiment, PRIVACT achieves a Prevention rate of 79.31% (23/29), detection Precision of 100%, and Safe FI of 0%. In contrast, some adapted baselines that achieve 100% Prevention, such as AirGapAgent and SumLeaks-CoDef, have a detection Precision of 24.17% and Safe FI of 17.58%; the corresponding metrics for OCELOT are 63.04% and 17.58%. This indicates that, under this evaluation setting, higher blocking coverage may be accompanied by more false detections or unnecessary interventions on safe outputs.

At the same time, we also retain the advantages of other baselines on certain metrics. For example, DEPN achieves a Prevention rate of 86.21%, higher than PRIVACT, while PATCH also achieves 0% Safe FI and has a Task Preservation score of 99.48%, higher than PRIVACT's 95.15%. Therefore, these experimental results should be understood as trade-offs among prevention coverage, decision selectivity, and content preservation across different methods, rather than as evidence that PRIVACT is universally superior on all metrics.

From a methodological perspective, PRIVACT further distinguishes sensitive information explicitly stated in historical sources from Novel Sensitive Claims formed through historical clues, and performs selective protection by combining source assessment, trusted authorization, and intervention before the first external release. In the supplementary breakdown of the original experiment, PRIVACT successfully prevents 14 of the 17 constructed NSC cases and 9 of the 12 source-explicit disclosure cases. This demonstrates that its overall protection results cover both types of privacy risks.

We have expanded the joint analysis of Prevention, Precision, Safe FI, and Task Preservation in our independent correction supplement and added an explanation of statistical uncertainty. We believe that jointly evaluating prevention coverage, unnecessary interventions, and task information preservation provides a more accurate characterization of the selective protection mechanism proposed by PRIVACT for multi-turn privacy risks.

Comments on the paper

1 comment

Dear Reviewers,

Thank you for your efforts so far. As we are at the end of the discussion period, I would like to kindly encourage you to review the authors' rebuttals and engage in further discussions, particularly if the authors have addressed your questions or concerns.

Thank you for your time and contributions!

AC

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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