- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes FALLCON-SDIoT, combining federated risk classification, post-quantum credentials, anomaly-based trust adaptation, and risk-triggered rekeying for smart-home IoT. The problem is relevant and the paper is clearly written, but the current evidence does not validate the integrated system.
Critical strengths
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The paper addresses an important problem, clearly distinguishes behavioral confidence from cryptographic assurance, states several assumptions and limitations explicitly.
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The writing and logic is clear and easy to follow.
Critical weaknesses
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The post-quantum security claim is only partially substantiated. Although the protocol employs standardized ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65, its recurring proof of possession is left parameterized and Theorem 1 assumes, rather than establishes, the knowledge soundness of the underlying Fiat–Shamir construction.
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Federated learning appears to determine only the initial risk class, while subsequent class transitions are driven by a separate local Isolation Forest. It is therefore unclear how federated risk learning actually guides the adaptive authentication lifecycle after enrollment.
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The contribution to federated learning is limited. The method mainly combines existing techniques—profile initialization, clipping, Gaussian noise, and Multi-Krum—without proposing a new FL algorithm or analysis. Its contribution is better characterized as system integration.
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The federated evaluation lacks necessary baselines and ablations. There are no comparisons with FedAvg, coordinate median, trimmed mean, standard Krum, adaptive clipping, or learnable aggregation.
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Theorem 1 assumes an already knowledge-sound Fiat–Shamir proof and essentially restates the resulting possession guarantee. No concrete proof protocol is instantiated or benchmarked. Moreover, the paper lists ProVerif targets without clearly reporting successful verification.
Questions for authors
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Official response to Reviewer 1N7q
We thank the reviewer for the careful assessment and for recognizing the distinction between behavioral confidence and cryptographic assurance. The concerns identify several areas where the contributions and evidence require clearer boundaries.
1. Post-quantum proof and Theorem 1.
We agree that Theorem 1 is conditional rather than a new proof of lattice-based knowledge soundness. It assumes a complete, knowledge-sound Fiat–Shamir proof for the bounded-witness relation in Equation (13), together with unforgeable certification and fresh, single-use nonces. Under these assumptions, it establishes the implication from accepted authentication to extractable possession of a witness for the certified public key.
The theorem does not establish the knowledge soundness of a concrete proof instantiation, quantum random-oracle security, or native post-quantum proof performance. ML-KEM-768 and ML-DSA-65 provide standardized cryptographic components, but their use does not remove these limitations. We will state this distinction more prominently.
2. Role of federated learning after enrollment.
The reviewer is correct. Equation (5) uses the manufacturer-initialized federated classifier to assign the initial risk class. Subsequent transitions are governed by local Isolation Forest anomaly evidence and the temporal trust rules in Equations (15)–(16).
The connection is therefore through a shared device-policy state: federated learning establishes the initial class, local monitoring adjusts that class, and Equation (4) coordinates class changes with authenticated key installation. The current design does not continuously feed federated predictions into every subsequent transition. We will clarify this two-stage architecture rather than imply continuous federated control of authentication.
3. Contribution beyond existing federated methods.
We agree that clipping, Gaussian noise, Multi-Krum, and Isolation Forest are established techniques. The methodological contribution is the coordination of manufacturer-informed risk assignment, credential verification independent of predictions, asymmetric trust adaptation, and authenticated class/key commitment. This is a system-level contribution, not a claim of a new federated learning algorithm.
4. Missing baselines and ablations.
The current experiments provide a manufacturer-profile initialization ablation: mean synthetic A/B/C risk accuracy improves from 78.05% to 91.58%. They also characterize two non-adaptive Byzantine-update settings and evaluate 81 temporal-policy configurations.
However, the paper does not include matched comparisons against FedAvg, coordinate median, trimmed mean, standard Krum, adaptive clipping, or learnable aggregation. We agree that these comparisons are needed to isolate the contribution of the aggregation configuration. In particular, changing participant counts across the Byzantine settings prevents a direct robustness ranking. We will clarify these limitations and distinguish the available ablations from the missing comparisons.
5. ProVerif verification status.
The reviewer correctly observes that Section 4.3 lists six symbolic verification targets without reporting successful verification results. These targets must not be interpreted as established protocol guarantees. We will explicitly separate the proposed verification queries, the conditional theorem, and properties requiring concrete verification.
Overall, FALCON-SDIoT should be evaluated as a proposed architecture linking risk learning to credential-bound authentication transitions, with component-level evidence and explicitly limited security guarantees. We appreciate these comments and will revise the manuscript to make this contribution and its limitations more precise.