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Paper summary
SkillJect places malicious operations in an auxiliary skill script, uses front-loaded instructions in SKILL.md to induce the agent to execute it, and iteratively revises the document using execution-trace feedback. The authors evaluate 100 ClawHub skills across two agent platforms, four main backend models, and four target behaviors. They report mean cumulative attack success rates of 82.1% on Claude Code and 80.5% on OpenClaw, compare with Skill-Inject, and study transfer and defenses. Success is defined by observed execution of the target script.
Critical strengths
- Automated attack pipeline. SkillJect keeps the payload fixed in an auxiliary script, uses front-loaded
SKILL.mdinstructions to induce its execution, and revises the documentation based on execution traces. This provides a concrete workflow for generating and refining poisoned skills. - Broad evaluation and a shared-payload comparison. The main experiments cover 100 skills, four target behaviors, two platforms, and four backend models. With the same benign skills and malicious scripts, SkillJect achieves 69.1% mean ASR, compared with 32.3% for Skill-Inject. This supports its effectiveness in the evaluated setting.
Critical weaknesses
- The incremental value relative to related methods is unclear. Table 4 compares SkillJect with Skill-Inject under shared skills and payloads, but the paper does not discuss Poise [1], Fujinuma et al. [2], SCH [3], AutoSkillHarm [4], or SkillTrojan [5]. Skill-document prompt injection, feedback-guided optimization, and malicious payloads embedded in executable skill artifacts each have precedents in this literature. Although Table 7 ablates components within SkillJect, the current analysis and experiments leave the added benefit of their combination over these related methods unclear.
- Task variation in the transfer experiment is unclear. Figure 4 tests 20 additional LLM-generated instructions per skill, but their generation, filtering, and semantic distance from the original task are not reported. This makes the scope of the cross-task transfer result difficult to assess.
Questions for authors
- How does SkillJect differ from Poise [1], Fujinuma et al. [2], SCH [3], AutoSkillHarm [4], and SkillTrojan [5], and what additional benefit comes from combining document inducement, auxiliary scripts, and feedback-based refinement? For methods with comparable settings, could you provide a comparison using the same tasks, attempt budgets, and success criteria?
- How were the 20 additional instructions per skill in Figure 4 generated and filtered? Please report the generation model, prompt, filtering criteria, and the distribution of semantic similarity to the original tasks, including how similarity was measured.
- Where did the “previously reported” percentages used in Table 3 come from? What were the original sample size, attempt budget, and success criterion? Why are the raw success counts unavailable, and are execution traces still available?
References
[1] Hao, H., et al. (2026). Poise: Position-Aware One-Instruction Skill Injection for Silent Execution on LLM Agents. arXiv:2606.07943.
[2] Fujinuma, Y., et al. (2026). Defenses & Enablers For Skill Injection Attacks on Terminal Based Agents. arXiv:2606.01567.
[3] Liu, X., et al. (2026). Exploiting LLM Agent Supply Chains via Payload-less Skills. arXiv:2605.14460.
[4] Ning, Y., et al. (2026). SkillHarm: Lifecycle-Aware Skill-Based Attacks via Automated Construction. arXiv:2606.02540.
[5] Feng, Y., et al. (2026). SkillTrojan: Backdoor Attacks on Skill-Based Agent Systems. ICML 2026. arXiv:2604.06811.