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- Confidence
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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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- Soundness
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Paper summary
When an LLM performs monitoring, if the content being evaluated was generated by the model itself, it may "go easy" on its own output—assigning a low risk score—which compromises the accuracy of the assessment. Therefore, the authors suggest that each monitoring task must begin with a "clean slate."
Critical strengths
1.Sound experimental setup with a wide range of models. The authors measure the effect across 10 models in code correctness, code harmfulness, PR creation, and computer use, with ablations on explicit authorship and reasoning budget.
2.Broad coverage. The study tests both coding and computer-use scenarios.
Critical weaknesses
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The code is not released. The GitHub link leads to a "404 Not Found" error, making the work difficult to reproduce.
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Lacks sufficient novelty. Similar work already exists, and the analysis regarding interpretability is inadequate. Also, researchers can simply avoid this bias by using a monitoring agent with new context. Therefore, the overall impact is limited. The primary contribution is that the authors focus on the agentic monitoring situation. There is already extensive existing research on the biases that arise when models evaluate their own generated content. This is not enough to warrant acceptance at a conference like ICLR.
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Outdated models. The models used only cover those available up to around August 2025; the study lacks the latest models, resulting in poor timeliness. It is possible that these findings would manifest differently when tested on the most recent models.
Questions for authors
1.The two heatmaps in Figure 5 are not labeled to indicate which setting or model they correspond to. It would be better if the authors could clarify this.
2.The units for the horizontal axis in Figure 2 (right part) are not explicitly specified in the caption. I would like to know what these values represent.
3.The text mentions that ablation studies were conducted using simpler toy settings and Section 4.1 refers to other non-code-related settings reported in Appendix B. However, this information does not appear in appendix B. I would appreciate it if the authors could indicate where these results can be found or provide the relevant content.
4 comments
W3. Outdated models [Comment 2/2]
W3. Outdated models
- A panel of 14 current (2026) models (Table A10; computer use with fixed actions, previous turn vs new context, 1–10 scale). 7 of 14 rate an action as less risky when it sits in their own turn, for example Gemma 4 31B +1.14 [+0.50, +1.89], Qwen3.8-2.4T +1.06 [+0.47, +1.67], DeepSeek V4 Pro +0.92 [+0.47, +1.39], and Kimi K3 +0.75 [+0.31, +1.22]. Two show the reverse and five show none. The shift does not track capability: across the 10 models with a SWE-bench resolve rate, the Spearman correlation is +0.14 (p = 0.70).
- The mechanistic study uses a current open-weight model, Gemma 4 31B (§4.4).
- Coding settings. We have also evaluated Qwen 397B, Kimi K3, and GLM 5.3 on code correctness and code harmfulness. The observed on-policy rating shifts are +4.3 ( 95% CI [+3.6, +4.0]), +3.2 ( 95% CI [+2.5, +3.4]), and +2.1 ( 95% CI [+1.8, +2.7]), respectively. We will add these models to the cross-model plots in the camera-ready version.
So the bias persists in current models, and its size varies by model. This is why the paper recommends validating each monitor on-policy, in its deployment format.
Questions
Q1. Figure 5 labels. Left: computer use, same turn. Right: agentic misalignment, previous turn. Each panel pools all models in that setting; per-model counts for computer use are in Table A7. The revised caption states this. While checking, we found that the submitted left panel was labelled as the previous turn when it shows our same-turn format. The revised figure corrects this, and Figure A3 shows both computer-use conditions (General response, Corrections).
Q2. Figure 2, right panel. It shows how often the model approves the prompt-injected patch after creating a PR, as the share of patches approved, in a new context (baseline) and when self-attributed; higher means approved more often. The left and middle panels show mean ratings on the rubric scales (harmfulness 0–10, plotted as 10 − harmfulness; correctness 1–10), parsed from the model's output. The prompts are in Appendix A.2. The revised caption states the units of each panel.
Q3. Toy and non-code settings. Thank you for identifying this omission. The non-code and simpler toy-setting experiments were run but left out of the submitted appendix by mistake. The revised Appendix B.1 restores them (Figure A9), including per-model results that show where self-attribution bias does and does not appear. We also removed the unsupported claim about actions written by humans.
We hope the new mechanistic study, the results on current models and these clarifications address your concerns. If they do, we would be grateful if you would consider raising your score.
I thank the authors for the detailed response and the additional experiments. After reading the rebuttal and the revised version, I have the following remaining concerns.
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Overclaim in the novelty argument. In the reply to my review, the authors state: “(2) The bias is largely absent off-policy and emerges specifically on-policy. This would be invisible to both prior works, which never generate actions on-policy. This means standard static evaluations actively mask the failure.” However, in the replies to Reviewers XPAo and Khhb, they acknowledge that in Gemma 4 31B the shift comes from the role of the turn, with no detectable added effect of authorship. The revised abstract also restricts this claim to the API models, which narrows the main distinction from prior work to a subset of the settings studied. Since the authors themselves accept that the on-policy effect is not general, presenting it as the main distinction from prior work is an overclaim.
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Reliability of reported results. Beyond the errors corrected in the rebuttal, the revised version still contains inconsistencies. For example, Table A3 reports 100 passing and 150 failing patches, while the rebuttal states 101 and 149 in four places; in the reply to my review, the Qwen result is reported as +4.3 with a 95% CI of [+3.6, +4.0], which does not contain the point estimate. Taken together, these make it difficult to trust the reported numbers.
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Shift in the central story. The new results shift the paper’s central story from authorship to the role of the turn: §4.4 concludes that in Gemma 4 31B “the role header, not the patch’s origin or style, accounts for the shift”. However, the title, §2, §4.3 and §6 still attribute the effect to self-attribution. I suggest revising the title and framing, integrating the new results into a major revision, and resubmitting.
Follow-Up and Request for Score Reconsideration
We have made substantial revisions to the paper, conducted several new experiments, and worked carefully to address the concerns raised during the review process. We hope these additions and clarifications have strengthened the paper and addressed your main concerns.
We would greatly appreciate it if you could take another look at our responses and the revised manuscript, and consider updating your scores in light of the new evidence.
Thank you again for your time and consideration.
W2 . Code release; W2. Novelty, interpretability and the new-context mitigation [Comment 1/2]
We thank the reviewer for the careful reading and for noting the breadth of the experimental setup. We answer each weakness and question, and give the change in the revision.
W1. Code release We reaffirm our commitment to release the code as mentioned in our abstract. The repository is not yet public because releasing code during review could de-anonymise us. We will make it public with the camera-ready.
W2. Novelty, interpretability and the new-context mitigation
We cite relevant related work. The most relevant prior work is the Wataoka et al. (2410.21819) and Chen et al. (2502.06655). Wataoka et al. study self-preference in the context of benchmark contamination specifically, whether a model favors its own style when choosing between two alternative outputs in a pairwise comparison. Chen et al. study model bias in Agents-as-an-Evaluator pipelines, again motivated by benchmark contamination, where their "model bias" is a between-model distributional effect arising from shared stylistic tendencies across model families. Both works operate entirely in static, off-policy settings and are motivated by benchmark fairness concerns.
Our paper differs from both along the following axes: (1) The phenomenon is different. We study how the rating of a single fixed artifact changes solely due to implicit authorship attribution. (2) The bias is largely absent off-policy and emerges specifically on-policy. This would be invisible to both prior works, which never generate actions on-policy. This means standard static evaluations actively mask the failure. (3) Prior work's implications concern leaderboard reliability. Our concern is whether a deployed agent will approve its own unsafe actions with documented cases of 9→0/10 risk reversals on document disclosure tasks and 5× higher approval rates for prompt-injected code. (4) We are the first to connect this failure mode to AI control and alignment concerns, showing that collusion-like monitor failures can arise in non-scheming systems
The results also bear on AI-control concerns about monitor collusion: collusion-like failures, usually discussed for scheming models, can arise in models that are not scheming (§2). If we have missed related work, we would be grateful for pointers.
Interpretability. The revision adds a mechanistic study in an open-weight model (§4.4, Appendix C; General response, point 2). A token-aligned minimal pair shows that the role header alone produces the shift, and activation patching traces the signal from the role header to the answer position. A linear probe and a steering test complete the analysis.
"Use a monitor with a new context." We agree that this is the most effective mitigation, and the revised §6 recommends it. Three points keep the problem practically relevant:
Many agent scaffolds ask the agent to review its own work within the same conversation, for simplicity or to reuse its KV cache. The failure is invisible to standard static, off-policy monitor evaluations, so developers get no signal that they need a new context. What matters is where the action sits, not only whether the context is new. In Gemma 4 31B the role header alone produces the shift: other models' patches placed in the model's own assistant turn still shift by +2.37 [+1.61, +3.19] (§4.4). The action must be placed in a user turn.