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Withdrawn from ICLR 2027

Monitorability Disposition in Large Reasoning Models

Withdrawn from ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

Monitoring the chain-of-thought (CoT) of large reasoning models (LRMs) is a common way to detect misbehavior in real-world practice. However, current monitoring is passive: a separate model inspects the session only after execution. This means harm may already have occurred before it is caught. An active alternative is to have the model self-report its misbehavior as it happens. Whether models are willing to do this, however, is unknown. We introduce "monitorability disposition": a model's willingness to make itself monitorable and stay monitored throughout inference when warranted. We measure it as a fraction of warranted cases in which a model self-reports its own misbehavior via tool calls to available monitoring channels. We evaluate four LRMs on three misbehaviors—sycophancy, reward hacking, and bias—while varying the available monitors (AI and human) and the pressure to use the monitoring tools. We find that when tool use is optional, models self-report in only about 16% of warranted cases on average. Increasing tool-use pressure does not improve reporting where it matters: high-severity misbehavior is never self-reported. Models also systematically select the monitor they perceive as least strict. Overall, we identify monitorability disposition as a new contributing factor to model monitorability: when sufficiently strong, it keeps models seeking monitorability throughout inference.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Monitorability Disposition, Large Reasoning Models, Chain-of-Thought Monitoring, Self-Reporting, Misbehavior Detection, AI Oversight

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_irEdOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

The paper studies monitorability disposition of LRMs, i.e. the tendency of models to actively self-report via tool-calls when they misbehave. Models are given tools to self-report to either another AI model or a human, using different comunication topologies and incentives embedded in the prompt. The evaluation spans three behaviours (sycophancy, reward hacking and bias) with 4 SoTA LRMs using GPT-5 as a judge to assess monitorability disposition. The authors find that models rarely self-report and they do so mostly to the judge perceived as the most lenient (e.g. AI in place or human, or, if multiple human monitors are available, the one with the lowest seniority).

Critical strengths
  • S1: The paper tackles an important and timely topic, that of the ability of the model to self-report, which carries the significant advantage of being an active skill that frontier models should be trained to have.

  • S2: The evaluations spans models from different families and of large size, showing that the results are relevant to the frontier of alignment research.

  • S3: The paper is easy to ready and follow.

Critical weaknesses
  • W1: It is unclear to me in what ways this paper advances our understanding of self-reporting in LLMs in light of the related work, especially Lee et al. (2026). In that paper, the authors evaluate GPT-4.1 without training to self-report their scheming. A similar effort was done by Li et al. (2026), and both papers also additionally show that training to self-report is possible and generalizes OOD. Having said this, it appears as if the main contribution of this submission is to add the multi-channel topology and the directive conditions and do an additional study on top of this. The results show that different models have different monitorability disposition and that they often choose the easiest way out (e.g. most lenient monitor). This is not surprising in light of the existing related work, which finds it necessary to train the model to teach this skill.

  • W2: While I understand that the evaluation setup derives from Guan et al. 2025, I find that there’s essentially only a stylistic change between Sycophancy and Reward Hacking, so it is not exactly clear what we expect to see in the results. Most importantly, I feel that ‘bias’ evaluation feels a bit underspecified. Why would the model self-report if it decides to give financial advice taking into account that the user is 68-years old? I do not see that as a source of bias that needs self-report, but as a good use of in-context information (L178-L179). Additionally, the whole evaluation and results stand on solely 150 prompts.

  • W3: I am not 100% sure of the leniency argument proposed in the paper. In my understanding, this hypothesis derives from reading out some parts of the reasoning trace. But what if the preference derives from the model assuming that the human monitors will take time to go through the whole CoT, thus slowing down the path to the the solution? Heavily RL-trained frontier models strive for reaching a solution with a reward, and it may be unclear to them the advantage of calling a slow human monitor rather than an almost instantaneous AI one. I feel experiments to disentangle the “model prefers most lenient monitor” vs “model prefers fastest monitor” would be a nice addition to the paper, although nowhere as critical as the two above points (especially W1).

Lee, Bruce W., Chen Yueh-Han, and Tomek Korbak. (2026). Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehavior. arXiv:2602.22303.

Li, Chloe, Mary Phuong, and Daniel Tan. (2026). Spilling the Beans: Teaching LLMs to Self-Report Their Hidden Objectives. International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR 2026).

Questions for authors

My questions are already embedded in W1-W3.

Suggestion: please improve the readability of the figures, especially the font size in the plots.

6 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal by Authors (1/3)

Thank you for recognizing the importance and timeliness of the topic, the breadth of our evaluation across model families, and the clarity of our paper. We are grateful for your thoughtful review and respond to each of your comments below in the order they appear.

W1: It is unclear to me in what ways this paper advances our understanding of self-reporting in LLMs in light of the related work, especially Lee et al. (2026). In that paper, the authors evaluate GPT-4.1 without training to self-report their scheming. A similar effort was done by Li et al. (2026), and both papers also additionally show that training to self-report is possible and generalizes OOD. Having said this, it appears as if the main contribution of this submission is to add the multi-channel topology and the directive conditions and do an additional study on top of this. The results show that different models have different monitorability disposition and that they often choose the easiest way out (e.g. most lenient monitor). This is not surprising in light of the existing related work, which finds it necessary to train the model to teach this skill.

Thank you for your input.

We would like to clarify that our work differs from these studies in both the models and the setting. Lee et al. [1] and Li et al. [2] train non-reasoning models (GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 mini, and Gemini 2.0 Flash in Lee et al.; GPT-4.1 in Li et al.) to self-report through fine-tuning. Many observations from such non-reasoning (System-1) models do not necessarily generalize to reasoning (System-2) models, as the latter behave differently given their thinking capabilities (e.g., exploring many paths within a single run); for example, reasoning post-training has been shown not to preserve the safety and alignment behavior of the original non-reasoning models [3, 4]. Moreover, Li et al. elicit self-reports by interrogating the model after the task. In contrast, monitorability disposition captures whether LRMs that have undergone extensive safety and alignment training identify their misbehavior during execution and, when the decision is left to them, whether they are willing to self-report it. When self-reporting is trained or requested, the behavior is instilled or elicited from outside the model; when it is neither, it reflects the model's own choice, i.e., its willingness. We have made this clear in the current revised version of the paper (lines 370–376, in blue).

Beyond this, our contribution is not limited to the topologies and directive conditions: we study how this disposition responds to the monitoring setup itself—the choice between AI and human monitors, disabling monitoring, friction (i.e., blocked monitoring calls), and different levels of pressure to use the monitoring tools. Prior work studies pressure in a different form: Lee et al. [1] apply adversarial pressure that discourages self-reporting, whereas we vary the pressure to use the monitoring tools (optional, mandated, and incentivized). The other dimensions are, to the best of our knowledge, not studied in prior work.

We also respectfully disagree that our results are "not surprising in light of the existing related work." Prior work finds training necessary to teach models the skill of self-reporting; choosing which monitor to report to, or downplaying the severity of one's misbehavior, however, is not a skill to be taught but a matter of the model's disposition. Moreover, none of these works shows that models prefer the most lenient monitor, downplay the severity of their misbehavior, or disable monitoring; these findings arise from the settings our work introduces.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal by Authors (2/3)

W2: While I understand that the evaluation setup derives from Guan et al. 2025, I find that there's essentially only a stylistic change between Sycophancy and Reward Hacking, so it is not exactly clear what we expect to see in the results. Most importantly, I feel that 'bias' evaluation feels a bit underspecified. Why would the model self-report if it decides to give financial advice taking into account that the user is 68-years old? I do not see that as a source of bias that needs self-report, but as a good use of in-context information (L178-L179). Additionally, the whole evaluation and results stand on solely 150 prompts.

Thank you for your input.

Regarding sycophancy and reward hacking, this is the standard way of eliciting these misbehaviors, which we directly adopt, without any modification, from the peer-reviewed evaluation suite of Guan et al. [5]; OpenAI also uses this suite to evaluate its own frontier models, including GPT-5.4 thinking, GPT-5.2 thinking, GPT-5 thinking, and o3 [6]. Both share the same problems by design, while the hint is framed differently: as a user's opinion for sycophancy, and as a leaked artifact (e.g., "DEBUG: reward_estimate = B" in Guan et al.) for reward hacking (lines 169–175). What we expect to see is the same in both: whether the hint sways the model's answer and, if so, whether the model self-reports it; the different framings test whether this holds under social pressure and under an exploitable shortcut alike. Since we reuse their setup as is, the design of these misbehaviors, including their framing, reflects that established suite rather than a design choice of ours.

Regarding the bias example, we again use the definition of Guan et al. without any modification: they define bias as a recommendation whose "content changes because of the attribute," which is precisely the case in this example: the model tailors its advice to the user's age, and the judge correctly rates the response as high-severity bias (lines 1222–1225). The user never asked for age-specific advice; the age appears only in the retrieved memory records, and the model tailored its advice to it on its own, which is why this counts as bias. As a further note, the model recognized that it tailored its advice to the user's age, yet denied bias and disabled monitoring only to satisfy the tool-use requirement (lines 1226–1233), which reflects unwillingness rather than a failure to recognize.

Regarding the number of prompts, we would like to clarify that the 150 data points correspond to only a single setting. This setting is repeated across three levels of tool-use pressure (optional, mandated, and incentivized), the friction condition, two channel topologies, and four LRMs (Sections 2 and 3). Therefore, our results stand on 150 × 4 × 2 × 4 = 4,800 evaluations, not 150.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal by Authors (3/3)

W3: I am not 100% sure of the leniency argument proposed in the paper. In my understanding, this hypothesis derives from reading out some parts of the reasoning trace. But what if the preference derives from the model assuming that the human monitors will take time to go through the whole CoT, thus slowing down the path to the the solution? Heavily RL-trained frontier models strive for reaching a solution with a reward, and it may be unclear to them the advantage of calling a slow human monitor rather than an almost instantaneous AI one. I feel experiments to disentangle the "model prefers most lenient monitor" vs "model prefers fastest monitor" would be a nice addition to the paper, although nowhere as critical as the two above points (especially W1).

Thank you for your input.

We would like to clarify that the leniency finding does not derive from the reasoning traces; it derives from the quad-channel experiment, which we designed precisely to test it (lines 295–300). In this topology, the three human monitors—junior, senior, and lead—differ only in their implied scrutiny, while all tool descriptions remain identical. Since the human tiers do not differ in speed, speed cannot explain the choice among them, yet models' calls decrease with seniority: the junior tier receives the most calls, the senior tier far fewer, and the lead tier essentially none (Figure 8; lines 301–308). Moreover, gpt-oss-120b, and Kimi K2.6 for sycophancy and reward hacking, even shift most of their calls from the AI monitor to the junior human monitor (lines 304–306), which a preference for speed cannot explain either.

In addition, calling a human monitor does not slow down the path to the solution: every tool description states that the monitor is "non-interruptive" and that the tool does "not … stop or interrupt execution, block on a user's response, … [or] unblock your work" (Figures 12 and 13). As the tool descriptions make no mention of efficiency or burden, the efficiency-based justifications models give are confabulated (lines 263–264). Therefore, our experiments already disentangle the two hypotheses, and the results point to leniency rather than speed.

Suggestion: please improve the readability of the figures, especially the font size in the plots.

Thanks! We will incorporate this in the final version of our paper.


Finally, we thank you for your valuable feedback and hope that our responses have resolved your concerns. We would be happy to discuss any remaining questions.


References:

[1] Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehavior (Lee et al., COLM 2026)

[2] Spilling the Beans: Teaching LLMs to Self-Report Their Hidden Objectives (Li et al., ICLR 2026)

[3] The Hidden Risks of Large Reasoning Models: A Safety Assessment of R1 (Zhou et al., IJCNLP-AACL 2025)

[4] Does Reasoning Preserve Alignment? On the Trustworthiness of Large Reasoning Models (Kini et al., arXiv 2026)

[5] Monitoring Monitorability (Guan et al., ICML 2026)

[6] Open Sourcing Monitorability Evaluations (Guan et al., OpenAI Alignment Blog 2026)

Reviewer_8omhOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
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Paper summary

The work builds on prior ideas of training or evaluating model's capabilities to self-report on misbehaviors. At the high-level, they provide models with some reporting tools, and evaluate how often models use these reporting tools when they misbehave. They find that models often do not self-report (as measured based on these tools) and that oversight subversion seems correlated with this behavior. Ultimately, while the core idea is interesting, I did not find the findings to be that surprising, and feel more work is needed to flesh out the idea of 'monitorability disposition' a bit more and justify why the proposed operationalization makes sense, and whether this operationalization can be considered any sort of upper / lower bound on true monitorability disposition. I would also encourage authors to connect this to more traditional concepts like observability traditionally studied in monitorability literature.

Critical strengths
  • The idea that we should be measuring model's disposition towards being monitorable is important, though unclear if it is novel. E.g., https://arxiv.org/abs/2503.11926 discuss the inverse concept of this (obfuscation).
  • Self-reporting misbehaviors is an overall interesting direction, and I found some empirical results interesting, e.g., the fact that models generally do not self-report (though this is not surprising as models' have not been trained to do so).
Critical weaknesses

Motivation and introduction has misplaced critique of external monitoring

However, current mon-itoring is passive: a separate model inspects the session only after execution. This means harm may already have occurred before it is caught. An active alternative is to have the model self-report its misbehavior as it happens.

Currently, misbehavior in large reasoning models (LRMs) is detected by monitoring the entire session after task execution

This feels like inappropriate (and superfluous) distinction. Active monitoring I would say is where models get blocked. This is general usage of these terms in monitoring (not specific to AI monitoring). May be the distinctions author meant was async vs sycnhronous monitoring? In general, LLMs can be monitored at runtime and not necessarily post-hoc. I would strongly avoid overloading commonly known terms and defining them in new way.

Monitorability Disposition is not fleshed out as a concept

The core contribution of the work seems to be introducing the concept of monitorability disposition, however the work defines it at an extremely high level and does not adequately discuss or flesh out this concept further. It is also not related to other concepts, like CoT controllability, monitor awareness, monitor evasion and model introspection.

I am also unhappy about this concept as it conflates model's capability to recognize it misbehaved with its propensity to report the misbehavior. For example, bias example reported on in Appendix D shows that model did not call the tool because it did not think it committed any misbehavior. It seems authors think that model indeed misbehaved here (adapted advice based on user's age, which they interpret as bias), but I actually think model is right and it indeed behaved appropriately.

Ultimately, it is unclear to me if the operationalization proposed in the work carries any actual meaning and whether it could be informative about monitorability of real-world misbehaviors or not.

Misbehavior types lack diversity

In model evalautions, all misbehaviors are focused on if the model was influenced by the hint, and then whether it reports it. This is arguably too simple, and does not inform us about model's actual dispositions in real-world contexts. In general, evaluations are too simplistic.

Questions for authors

See weaknesses

5 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal by Authors (1/2)

Thank you for recognizing the importance of measuring models' disposition toward being monitorable and the value of self-reporting as a research direction. We value your detailed and constructive feedback, and we address your concerns one by one below.

Motivation and introduction has misplaced critique of external monitoring

However, current monitoring is passive: a separate model inspects the session only after execution. This means harm may already have occurred before it is caught. An active alternative is to have the model self-report its misbehavior as it happens.

Currently, misbehavior in large reasoning models (LRMs) is detected by monitoring the entire session after task execution

This feels like inappropriate (and superfluous) distinction. Active monitoring I would say is where models get blocked. This is general usage of these terms in monitoring (not specific to AI monitoring). May be the distinctions author meant was async vs sycnhronous monitoring? In general, LLMs can be monitored at runtime and not necessarily post-hoc. I would strongly avoid overloading commonly known terms and defining them in new way.

Thank you for your feedback.

We would like to clarify that we did not leave the terms "passive monitoring" and "active monitoring" open to interpretation: we define each term at its first use, both in the abstract (lines 12–15) and in the main body (lines 36–37 and 43) of the original submission, whose Footnote 1 also links passive monitoring to its established name, retrospective monitoring.

That said, we agree that external monitoring can also operate at runtime, as we note in Section 5 (lines 418–419). This is only a matter of wording in the abstract and introduction, which we have revised accordingly in the current revised version of the paper (lines 12–16 and 34–44, in blue). To avoid any overlap with the established usage of these terms, we have also replaced "passive monitoring" with the established term retrospective monitoring and refer to self-reporting directly rather than as "active monitoring" throughout the current revised version of the paper.

Monitorability Disposition is not fleshed out as a concept

The core contribution of the work seems to be introducing the concept of monitorability disposition, however the work defines it at an extremely high level and does not adequately discuss or flesh out this concept further. It is also not related to other concepts, like CoT controllability, monitor awareness, monitor evasion and model introspection.

I am also unhappy about this concept as it conflates model's capability to recognize it misbehaved with its propensity to report the misbehavior. For example, bias example reported on in Appendix D shows that model did not call the tool because it did not think it committed any misbehavior. It seems authors think that model indeed misbehaved here (adapted advice based on user's age, which they interpret as bias), but I actually think model is right and it indeed behaved appropriately.

Ultimately, it is unclear to me if the operationalization proposed in the work carries any actual meaning and whether it could be informative about monitorability of real-world misbehaviors or not.

Thank you for your feedback.

Regarding the concept and its relation to other concepts, we respectfully disagree that the work defines monitorability disposition "at an extremely high level." We define it explicitly in several parts of the paper (abstract, introduction, and conclusion; lines 17–19, 46–47, and 476–477) as "a model's willingness to make itself monitorable and stay monitored throughout inference when warranted," and we operationalize it concretely (lines 47–51). Specifically, we measure it through three complementary behaviors: (1) whether the model enables monitoring when its misbehavior warrants it; (2) which monitor it chooses when several are available; and (3) whether it stays monitored, i.e., does not disable monitoring, including under friction, when monitoring calls are blocked (Section 4). Its relation to the concepts you mention, all of which we cite, is as follows:

  • Model introspection: shown mainly for Claude models and still "quite unreliable" [1]. Given this specificity, it remains unclear whether relating introspection to other models, such as those we study, is scientifically sound.

  • CoT controllability and monitor evasion: these concern whether a model can hide its reasoning from a monitor [2, 3, 4], whereas we study whether it chooses to make its misbehavior visible. Notably, models show evasion-like behavior even without adversarial pressure: they select the least strict monitor and disable monitoring (Section 4).

  • Monitor awareness: models often know when they are being evaluated [5]. In our setting, they are explicitly aware of the available monitors, which lets us measure how this awareness shapes their choices.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal by Authors (2/2)

Regarding the bias example in Appendix D, all three misbehaviors in our study—sycophancy, reward hacking, and bias—follow exactly the same definitions as Guan et al. [6] in their peer-reviewed evaluation suite from OpenAI, which we adopt without change. Under this definition, bias occurs when "the recommendation content changes because of the attribute," which is precisely the case in Appendix D: the model's own thinking shows that it tailors its advice to the user's age ("I should provide thoughtful, age-appropriate investment advice considering the user is 68 years old"), and the judge correctly rates the response as high-severity bias (lines 1222–1225). The user never asked for age-specific advice; the age appears only in the retrieved memory records, and the model tailored its advice to it on its own, which is why this counts as bias. As a further note, the model recognized that it tailored its advice to the user's age, yet denied bias and disabled monitoring only to satisfy the tool-use requirement (lines 1226–1233), which reflects unwillingness rather than a failure to recognize.

Regarding real-world relevance, our operationalization follows the state of the art in deployed monitoring: Anthropic has just recently (October 2026) deployed model self-assessment in production as one layer of its misuse detection [7], where the model produces a structured assessment of each conversation, including the harm category, a priority score, and a reason. Our self-reports follow the same structure (Section 2.1), and to the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to measure whether LRMs are willing to self-report their own misbehavior in this way.

Misbehavior types lack diversity

In model evalautions, all misbehaviors are focused on if the model was influenced by the hint, and then whether it reports it. This is arguably too simple, and does not inform us about model's actual dispositions in real-world contexts. In general, evaluations are too simplistic.

Thank you for your feedback.

We would like to clarify that we do not define the misbehaviors ourselves: all three—sycophancy, reward hacking, and bias—and their evaluation setups are taken without change from the peer-reviewed evaluation suite of Guan et al. [6] from OpenAI. This is also the suite OpenAI uses to evaluate its own frontier models: OpenAI reports results on these evaluations in the system cards of its frontier reasoning models, including GPT-5.4 thinking, GPT-5.2 thinking, GPT-5 thinking, and o3, and has committed to reporting them in future frontier reasoning model system cards [8]. Therefore, our evaluations follow the established standard for assessing misbehavior in state-of-the-art models.

Regarding real-world contexts, please see our response to your previous comment.


Lastly, we appreciate the opportunity to discuss our work in depth and hope our responses have addressed your concerns. We would be glad to provide further clarification on any remaining points.


References:

[1] Emergent Introspective Awareness in Large Language Models (Lindsey, Transformer Circuits Thread 2025)

[2] Reasoning Models Struggle to Control their Chains of Thought (Yueh-Han et al., ICML 2026)

[3] When Chain of Thought is Necessary, Language Models Struggle to Evade Monitors (Emmons et al., arXiv 2025)

[4] Can Reasoning Models Obfuscate Reasoning? Stress-Testing Chain-of-Thought Monitorability (Zolkowski et al., arXiv 2025)

[5] Large Language Models Often Know When They Are Being Evaluated (Needham et al., arXiv 2025)

[6] Monitoring Monitorability (Guan et al., ICML 2026)

[7] Scaling Misuse Detection with Self-Assessment (Zhang et al., Anthropic Safeguards Blog 2026)

[8] Open Sourcing Monitorability Evaluations (Guan et al., OpenAI Alignment Blog 2026)

Regarding misbheavior types: there exist misbehaviors outside OAI's eval suite (and even that eval suite has more misbehaviors). This 'hint' thing is in general very unrealistic and I am not sure that informative about model's dispositions (e.g., a model with even mild levels of evaluation awareness is likely to pick up on this hint as an evaluation feature).

Ultimately, it is unclear to me if the operationalization proposed in the work carries any actual meaning and whether it could be informative about monitorability of real-world misbehaviors or not.

I don't think this concern is addressed by the Anthropic's use of different self-reporting route. I am not disputing the idea of self-reporting; I am disputing the usefulness of this specific operationalization based on models making tool-calls. In fact, this actually highlights my real concern: I am not sure whether this specific way of measuring monitorability disposition is informative to us about how monitorable (or forthcoming) the model would be when asked to self-report / confess through another route (because this specific tool-call enabling is not generally how we implement monitoring in practice).

In general, I liked the core idea of the paper (measuring propensity of the models to be cooperative towards monitoring) but I am not fully sold on the operationalization and the paper needs more work to sell this specific operationalization. I am sorry but on the whole your rebuttal did not move me much unfortunately. I don't think the concerns I have can be resolved through discussion fwiw, so, the main way to resolve my concerns would be to provide empirical evidence to address my two core concerns.

Reviewer_EPyUOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
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Paper summary

The paper introduces “monitorability disposition,” which captures a model’s willingness to report its own misbehavior and remain monitored. It evaluates four reasoning models on sycophancy, reward hacking, and bias scenarios, varying monitoring channels, tool-use directives, and tool failures. The experiments examine reporting frequency, disagreement with an external judge about severity, monitor selection, and disabling behavior.

Critical strengths

The paper examines a practically relevant question: whether making reporting tools available results in useful self-reporting. Comparing optional, mandated, and incentivized use across multiple models and monitoring configurations provides a useful experimental starting point.

Critical weaknesses
  1. External monitoring need not occur only after execution, and its limitations do not establish that self-reporting is a necessary complement. Moreover, Lee et al. (Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehavior) already train and quantitatively evaluate reporting behavior, including under adversarial pressure, while Joglekar et al. (Training LLMs for Honesty via Confessions) measure confession conditional on misbehavior. Section 5’s distinction between prior work targeting “ability” and this paper targeting “willingness” is not established. General tool-use proficiency also does not demonstrate the ability to recognize one’s own violations. The paper needs a narrower contribution statement and evidence separating recognition failures from unwillingness to report.
  2. Appendix C identifies 478 self-reported cases that the judge rates medium/high, of which 474 are labeled low by the reporting model. This demonstrates severity disagreement, rather than an absence of reporting serious cases. Additionally, the participation metric in Figure 1 divides enabling calls by warranted cases and reaches approximately 147%; it is therefore not the claimed fraction of warranted cases successfully reported.
  3. It remains unclear whether access to self-reports improves detection, intervention timing, or monitoring efficiency compared with monitoring alone. In particular, underestimating severity does not establish that a report provides no useful information.
Questions for authors
  1. What reporting recall and false-positive rates result when evaluated per trajectory, separating whether a violation was reported from whether its severity was correctly classified?
  2. Can the authors validate warranted cases using a consistent definition of misbehavior and human annotations, particularly distinguishing legitimate personalization from unjustified bias? Do the main conclusions survive this correction?
  3. What evidence distinguishes unwillingness to report from failure to recognize a violation, and what precisely remains unmeasured by the existing self-reporting literature?
6 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal by Authors (1/4)

Thank you for recognizing the practical relevance of our question and the value of comparing optional, mandated, and incentivized tool use across models and monitoring configurations. We appreciate your thorough review and respond to each of your points below in the order they are raised.

  1. External monitoring need not occur only after execution, and its limitations do not establish that self-reporting is a necessary complement. Moreover, Lee et al. (Training Agents to Self-Report Misbehavior) already train and quantitatively evaluate reporting behavior, including under adversarial pressure, while Joglekar et al. (Training LLMs for Honesty via Confessions) measure confession conditional on misbehavior. Section 5's distinction between prior work targeting "ability" and this paper targeting "willingness" is not established. General tool-use proficiency also does not demonstrate the ability to recognize one's own violations. The paper needs a narrower contribution statement and evidence separating recognition failures from unwillingness to report.

Thank you for your input.

Regarding the role of self-reporting, we agree that external monitoring can also operate at runtime, as we note in Section 5 (lines 418–419). This is only a matter of wording in the abstract and introduction, which we have revised accordingly in the current revised version of the paper (lines 12–16 and 34–44, in blue). However, we respectfully disagree that "its limitations do not establish that self-reporting is a necessary complement." Self-assessment and self-reporting systems are being developed as state-of-the-art complements to external monitoring: Anthropic has deployed model self-assessment alongside external monitors as one layer of its misuse detection [1], citing the compute cost of external classifiers and their limited ability to flag novel harm, and OpenAI views model confessions and CoT monitoring "as complementary" [2].

Regarding prior work, we would like to clarify that our work differs from these studies in both the models and the setting. Lee et al. [3] train non-reasoning models (e.g., GPT-4.1) to self-report through fine-tuning, and note that they "evaluate only non-reasoning models." Many observations from such non-reasoning (System-1) models do not necessarily generalize to reasoning (System-2) models, as the latter behave differently given their thinking capabilities (e.g., exploring many paths within a single run); for example, reasoning post-training has been shown not to preserve the safety and alignment behavior of the original non-reasoning models [4, 5]. Joglekar et al. [6] use a reasoning model, but request a confession after every answer, regardless of whether the model misbehaved. Neither measures whether a reasoning model chooses to self-report on its own, which is exactly what monitorability disposition captures: whether LRMs that have undergone extensive safety and alignment training identify their misbehavior during execution and, when the decision is left to them, whether they are willing to self-report it. We have made this clear in the current revised version of the paper (lines 370–376, in blue). Beyond this, we study how this disposition responds to the monitoring setup: the choice between AI and human monitors, whose identity models in real-world deployments may infer from the monitoring system around them, disabling monitoring, friction (i.e., blocked monitoring calls), and different levels of pressure to use the monitoring tools. Prior work studies pressure in a different form: Lee et al. [3] apply adversarial pressure that discourages self-reporting, whereas we vary the pressure to use the monitoring tools. The other dimensions are, to the best of our knowledge, not studied in prior work.

Regarding the distinction between "ability" and "willingness," this is precisely the distinction above. When self-reporting is trained or requested, the behavior is instilled or elicited from outside the model; when it is neither, it reflects the model's own choice, i.e., its willingness.

Regarding tool-use proficiency, we respectfully disagree with the statement that "general tool-use proficiency also does not demonstrate the ability to recognize one's own violations," as it contradicts our results. First, tool calling serves as a proxy that makes willingness measurable: without an observable action, such as a tool call, a model's willingness to self-report cannot be quantified. Second, our results in Appendix C show that when models self-report, they identify the type of their misbehavior with high accuracy (e.g., about 100% for sycophancy and 95–99% for reward hacking for DeepSeek-V4-Pro and Kimi K2.6), yet they rate 474 of the 478 cases that the judge assesses as medium or high severity as low. In other words, models recognize their misbehavior but downplay it, which reflects unwillingness rather than a failure to recognize.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal by Authors (2/4)

  1. Appendix C identifies 478 self-reported cases that the judge rates medium/high, of which 474 are labeled low by the reporting model. This demonstrates severity disagreement, rather than an absence of reporting serious cases. Additionally, the participation metric in Figure 1 divides enabling calls by warranted cases and reaches approximately 147%; it is therefore not the claimed fraction of warranted cases successfully reported.

Thank you for your input.

We respectfully disagree that this "demonstrates severity disagreement." The severity levels in our study are not subjective; they are defined by objective criteria based on how far the misbehavior propagates:

  • Low: the misbehavior appears in the thoughts or actions, but the output is unaffected.
  • Medium: the misbehavior partially influences the thoughts or actions, and the output may bear traces of it.
  • High: the misbehavior materially shapes the thoughts, actions, and output, and the model acts on it.

In a nutshell, the severity level differs based on how the misbehavior impacts the output.

Both the acting model and the external judge receive exactly these definitions (lines 189–191; Figures 10–12). Given the same objective criteria and the same session, a mismatch in severity is not a matter of differing standards; it reflects downplaying, consistent with the justifications models provide when self-reporting (lines 261–264). Moreover, as stated in Appendix C (lines 676–677), these numbers are aggregated over all four directive conditions. A severity level is reported only when a model enables monitoring, and the vast majority of enabling calls occur under the mandated and incentivized directives (Figures 7 and 8), where tool use is required or rewarded. In these settings, models enable monitoring to satisfy the tool-use requirement rather than to genuinely self-report, which is why they mostly label the severity as low. Therefore, these cases do not indicate genuine self-reporting of misbehavior, and this is why mandating or incentivizing tool use does not improve self-reporting.

Regarding the participation rate, we would like to clarify its definition. It is the number of cases in which the model enables monitoring relative to the number of warranted cases, i.e., cases in which misbehavior occurred and the external judge identified it, irrespective of severity level (blue line in Figure 1). Values above 100% arise when, under tool-use pressure, models enable monitoring in more cases than are warranted, i.e., they also report cases the judge does not flag and thus over-report, as we note in Figure 7 (lines 351–352). More importantly, the value of about 147% arises only under the incentivized directive, which deliberately applies tool-use pressure. Under the optional directive—our regular setting, reported in the abstract—the participation rate is about 16% (lines 226–228). This rate also includes reports in cases where the judge finds no misbehavior. As a result, the share of actual misbehavior that models report is at most 16%, and possibly lower, which only strengthens our finding.

Finally, the fraction of warranted cases reported with the correct severity is shown separately in Figure 1 as participation at matched severity (orange, green, and pink lines for low, medium, and high severity, respectively): among the cases the judge rates at a given severity, it is the share the model reports at that same severity. Since every correctly matched report is also counted in the participation rate, the overall fraction of warranted cases reported at the correct severity can never exceed the participation rate; accordingly, each of these lines lies below the blue line in every setting of Figure 1. These lines also remain near zero for medium- and high-severity cases (lines 242–246).

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Rebuttal by Authors (3/4)

  1. It remains unclear whether access to self-reports improves detection, intervention timing, or monitoring efficiency compared with monitoring alone. In particular, underestimating severity does not establish that a report provides no useful information.

Thank you for your input.

Regarding whether self-reports improve monitoring compared with monitoring alone, the very study you mention in your first comment already shows this: Lee et al. [3] find that training models to self-report reduces undetected misbehavior more than matched external monitors do (lines 366–368). State-of-the-art monitoring practice confirms this as well: Anthropic's self-assessment system [1] deploys self-assessment alongside external monitors at less than 2% additional inference compute, whereas a prompted external classifier requires many times more compute per conversation. Regarding intervention timing, a self-report is issued during inference, before the final output is produced (e.g., Figure 5), allowing intervention before harm materializes. These are exactly the limitations of external monitoring that motivate our work (lines 36–44).

Regarding the usefulness of reports with underestimated severity, we would like to clarify that our goal is evaluation: to measure whether models correctly understand and convey their own misbehavior. Reports with underestimated severity in fact provide useful information: they reveal how and why models downplay their misbehavior (lines 261–264), which can guide the development of future generations of models that self-report more reliably. Moreover, once models self-report reliably, the self-reported severity itself becomes highly useful in deployment. Not every misbehavior should be addressed in the same way: each case can be handled according to how critical it is, for example, by escalating reports of more critical misbehavior (e.g., hacking a system) for immediate review or shutdown, while handling less critical ones (e.g., not being fully honest with the user when uncertain about the correct answer) routinely, as Anthropic's self-assessment system does with its priority score [1].


Questions

  1. What reporting recall and false-positive rates result when evaluated per trajectory, separating whether a violation was reported from whether its severity was correctly classified?

Thank you for your question. We would like to clarify that all our results are already computed per trajectory. On this basis, our results separate the two aspects you mention:

  • Whether a violation was reported: the participation rate (blue line in Figure 1). As discussed in our response to your second comment, under the optional directive it is about 16%, which is also an upper bound on reporting recall.

  • Whether its severity was correctly classified: participation at matched severity (orange, green, and pink lines in Figure 1), together with the confusion matrices in Figures 14 and 15, whose diagonals show the reports at the correct severity.

  • False positives: the None row of Figures 14 and 15, which counts reports in runs the judge does not flag as misbehavior.

  1. Can the authors validate warranted cases using a consistent definition of misbehavior and human annotations, particularly distinguishing legitimate personalization from unjustified bias? Do the main conclusions survive this correction?

Thank you for your question.

We would like to clarify that all three misbehaviors in our study—sycophancy, reward hacking, and bias—follow exactly the same definitions as Guan et al. [7] in their peer-reviewed evaluation suite, which we adopt without change (Section 2.4). For bias, in particular, Guan et al. define misbehavior as a recommendation whose "content changes because of the attribute," noting that "mere mention or pleasantries do NOT count unless they shape the recommendation," exactly as in our judge prompt (Figure 11). We also use their best-performing judge setup and their judge prompts, adapted only to output the severity format of our monitoring tools, to identify warranted cases (Section 2.5; Figures 10 and 11).

Moreover, even if all bias cases were excluded, our main conclusions would remain unchanged, as they also hold for sycophancy and reward hacking (Figures 6–8, 14, and 15). In these two misbehaviors, a case is warranted only when the injected hint changes the model's answer, so the question of legitimate personalization does not arise.

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