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Paper summary
This paper presents SilentWood, a BFV-based protocol for private inference over gradient-boosted decision forests that aims to protect client inputs and the server’s model. It combines node clustering to reuse comparisons, client-assisted Blind Code Conversion (BCC) for efficient SumPath-based score aggregation, and input encoding compression with homomorphic decompression. Evaluated on XGBoost models across 13 UCI datasets, SilentWood reduces average latency from 193.43 to 5.41 seconds relative to an RCC-PDTE-derived baseline under the CPU, 32-bit, 50 ms RTT setting, reporting a 35.7× speedup. The incremental ablation attributes the largest gain to BCC.
Critical strengths
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SilentWood addresses meaningful bottlenecks in private ensemble inference: redundant comparisons across trees, expensive score aggregation, and communication overhead from repeated SIMD encodings. Its three complementary techniques form a coherent system for extending private single-tree evaluation to boosted ensembles.
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BCC trades one additional round trip relative to noninteractive evaluation for reduced homomorphic computation, converting SumPath outputs into indicators for weighted score aggregation and avoiding MultiplyPath’s path multiplication overhead. Table 3 shows that adding BCC reduces average latency from 193.43 to 10.03 seconds, making it the largest contributor in the incremental ablation. Under the stated prime-field, depth, and masking assumptions, the plaintext-level argument that false-path costs remain nonzero is sound.
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The evaluation examines latency, communication, memory consumption, CPU/GPU execution, network conditions, model size, and validation-set size. Component ablations help explain the sources of improvement. For example, Table 10 reports that compression reduces average communication from 85.75 MB to 15.20 MB in the 32-bit setting, while Table 11 reports approximately 241 ms of average decompression overhead.
Critical weaknesses
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The security assumptions are not clearly connected to the evaluated implementation. Appendix D requires ciphertext sanitization for model privacy and an applicable funcCPA-secure instantiation or sanitization-based construction for input privacy against malicious servers. However, the implementation does not specify how these requirements are satisfied or whether their overhead is included. The authors should establish that the benchmarked system provides the claimed guarantees.
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Dataset preprocessing is insufficiently documented. Table 13 lists Steel with 33 features and two classes, whereas the original UCI dataset has 27 features and seven fault types; PenDigits is also listed as binary without explaining the transformation from ten classes. Steel’s feature count warrants checking whether other fault-indicator columns were retained as inputs. Exact feature lists and label mappings are needed; the manuscript alone does not establish label leakage.
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Accuracy-preservation claims exceed the evidence. Validation-based acceptance does not guarantee unchanged test accuracy. Relative to , Table 4 shows Breast decreasing from 0.67 to 0.59 at higher clustering intensities and Defect decreasing from 0.82 to 0.80 at the default setting. The authors should distinguish correct evaluation of the modified model from preservation of predictive quality and report paired per-dataset results across multiple random splits.
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Stronger, controlled comparisons are needed. The paper does not report measured SoK-GGG results on the same clustered models, leaving model-optimization and protocol benefits entangled. Section 5 also mischaracterizes BPDTE-CW, which introduces adapted SumPath rather than simply relying on MultiplyPath. Same-model comparisons and a matched adapted-SumPath or bounded-domain zero-testing baseline would better establish BCC’s advantage.
Questions for authors
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Does the evaluated implementation sanitize the intermediate and final ciphertexts as required for model privacy in Appendix D? Which algorithm and security parameters are used, and is the overhead included in the reported latency? Separately, how does the concrete BFV instantiation satisfy the conditions for input privacy against malicious servers?
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What are Steel’s 33 input columns, and how are the binary tasks for Steel, PenDigits, and Satellite constructed? Please confirm that fault-indicator target columns are excluded from Steel’s inputs and that all methods use identical preprocessing, label definitions, and actual train/validation/test partitions.
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Given the accuracy decreases in Table 4, can you report paired test accuracy, variability, and latency for the original and modified models, isolating the effects of approximate clustering and leaf-value reoptimization? How much of SilentWood’s advantage remains when SoK-GGG evaluates the same modified model under comparable precision and security settings?
We appreciate your exceptionally careful review of a technically challenging topic. Our focus had been on the security side, and your scrutiny of the data and evaluation (down to the column level) strengthened a part of the paper we had paid less attention to. The issues raised were real, and addressing them has made the paper stronger.
Q1. Is ciphertext sanitization implemented and evaluated? Explain how to handle a malicious server, and report the used security parameters.
Yes, it is. We provide an answer to this question in Q1 of the global comment section (Common Questions from Reviewers).
Q2. Dataset preprocessing (Steel, PenDigits, Satellite).
All 13 datasets were downloaded from OpenML and used exactly as distributed, with no manual feature selection. The differences from the UCI descriptions you pointed out arise because the three files in question are OpenML variants, not the UCI originals: PenDigits (OpenML 1019) and Satellite (40900) are binarized and anomaly detection versions, and Steel (1504, v1) is a binarized version that keeps the six fault indicators as input features rather than output classes (OpenML's later version 40982 removes them). We will add the OpenML IDs, feature lists and label mappings to Table 13.
Steel. OpenML 1504 contains the 27 UCI features (V1–V27) plus the six fault type indicators V28–V33 (Pastry, Z_Scratch, K_Scatch, Stains, Dirtiness, Bumps) as features, and uses the seventh fault type, Other_Faults, as the binary label. Since every plate has exactly one fault type, Other_Faults = 1 exactly when V28–V33 are all zero, so the label is a deterministic function of the inputs, which explains the 1.00 accuracy. You are right that the submitted Steel results used these indicators as inputs. We have removed V28–V33 and rerun Steel:
The corrected model has normal size and accuracy while latency and communication are essentially unchanged, so our conclusions stand. We will update every Steel entry in the paper accordingly.
PenDigits. OpenML 1019: the majority digit is labeled "P" (positive, 1,144) and the other nine digits "N" (9,848). The 16 pen trajectory features are unchanged.
Satellite. OpenML 40900 (Goldstein & Uchida, 2016): the four soil classes of Statlog Landsat are labeled Normal (5,025) and 75 samples from the two crop classes Anomaly. The 36 spectral features are unchanged.
Identical pipeline. One script makes the stratified 60/20/20 split and trains, quantizes and exports the XGBoost forest. Baseline, SoK-GGG and SilentWood evaluate this forest on the same test rows. Zama's Concrete ML trains on the same training rows and hyperparameters. The splits were unseeded. We now fix the seed and will release the split indices.
Q3-A. Further analyze node clustering’s effect on accuracy and explain how to better-preserve accuracy.
Due to space limit, please read our answer to Q2 of reviewer PbPj, who asked the same question.
Q3-B. Compare SilentWood's runtime performance (inference latency) with and without using node clustering. Also, compare SilentWood's runtime performance against SoK-GGG without using node clustering.
(a) Inference latency of the original vs. node-clustered model. This is already illustrated in Table 3 (ablation): the Base+B column evaluates the original forest and Base+B+K the clustered one, with everything else identical, so their difference (10.03s → 6.33s on average) is the latency effect of the model change alone (threshold clustering with leaf re-optimization, always applied jointly).
(b) Protocol-only comparison with SoK-GGG. We remove node clustering from SilentWood so both systems evaluate the identical original forest (32-bit).
On the original (non-clustered) model, SilentWood stays 1.67–2.77× faster than SoK-GGG (50–200 ms RTT) with malicious-server privacy vs. SoK-GGG's semi-honest model. Of the 1.83× speedup in Table 5 (50 ms), 1.67× is the protocol and 1.10× node clustering, whose gain is smaller than in Table 3 because compression already batches R thresholds per operation.
p.s. BPDTE-CW uses adapted SumPath (not MultiplyPath). We'll fix §5.