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Paper summary
This paper investigates representation transitions in multi-turn LLM agents and finds that harmful behavior is associated with accumulated shifts in internal representations. To address benign representation drift, the authors propose a denoised safety direction and introduce DART, a runtime defense framework that detects emerging risks, attributes them to contributing context, and intervenes through targeted reminders. Experiments across six models and two multi-turn benchmarks show reduced attack success rates with limited utility loss and low runtime overhead.
Critical strengths
1.DART uses the acting agent's internal representations without requiring an auxiliary model or gradient-based training. Its low runtime overhead makes the method practical for integration into existing agent systems.
2.The paper identifies benign drift as a source of error in cumulative detection. The experiments show that removing the benign mean and dominant variation directions substantially improves detection on ASEval. The evaluation also covers six models and different multi-turn attack settings.
Critical weaknesses
1.The detection results do not fully support the claimed emerging safety risks. The cumulative score simplifies to , measuring the displacement between the current and initial representations. Although the current representation contains historical context, it doesn't explicitly model the risks arise from interactions across turns. And importantly, Table 13 in Appendix F.2 shows that 98% of benign imperative injections are flagged. This may suggests that the detection signal merely capture injection. So the reported trajectory-level separation can't establish that DART detects emerging compositional risks.
2.Missing key comparisons and ablations. The paper compares DART with ToolShield and AgentSpec, but lacks direct comparisons with existing trajectory-level safety monitors. Though the denoising component is well studied, the necessity of cumulative scoring is not adequately examined. Comparisons with per-step detection and simple prefix-level representation classifiers are needed to determine whether the proposed accumulation offers an advantage. The effectiveness of attribution for multi-turn decomposition attacks also lacks direct validation.
Questions for authors
1.Given that the cumulative score is equivalent to the displacement between the current and initial representations, what evidence shows that DART captures compositional risks instead of merely the general representation changes?
2.Table 13 shows that DART flags 98% of benign imperative injections. If the threshold is adjusted to reduce these false alarms, how much malicious injection detection performance is retained?
3.Can the authors provide comparisons with trajectory-level monitors and simpler detection baselines?