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- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
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Paper summary
The paper presents C-TQIM, a cost-aware diffusion model image watermarking technique that leverages the discrete cosine transform (DCT-II) and quantization index modulation (QIM) to embed a watermark. The diffusion model's terminal latent is used to embed the watermark to avoid diffusion inversion. Additionally, they rank candidate DCT directions using an MSE-based cost function and select the lowest-cost candidates to mitigate visual distortion.
Critical strengths
- The watermarking idea is interesting, and once understood, fairly elegant.
- The experimentation is thorough and extensive.
Critical weaknesses
- The writing needs significant improvements to ease the readability of the paper. The paper is dense with jargon that it does not explain or define, and the sentences are dense and hard to parse throughout. A preliminary section would help define core concepts and terminology.
- The mathematical notation is lacking. Many symbols are used but not defined. You cannot rely on a Figure to define terms, especially if that is not the figure's explicit purpose. , . Also, sometimes A is written as or , seemingly interchangeably, which can be confusing. and are only defined within Figure 2. and are not defined.
- Significant digits are sometimes mishandled, showing a lack of mathematical rigor, like in Table 2, where results use up to 6 digits of precision, when only 800 samples are used. Other offending tables are Tables 10 and 11.
- Only a single dataset and a single model means it is hard to argue that your results would generalize to other datasets/models.
Questions for authors
- Adaptive attacks are not considered, and the only transformations considered are JPEG, Resize, Blur, and Noise. Why did you not consider adaptive attacks or attacks tailored to QIM-based watermarking schemes, such as [1]?
- In your cost-aware carrier selection, you use MSE to compute the RGB distortion cost; however, MSE is not necessarily a perceptual metric. Why did you choose MSE over other metrics to define cost? Two perturbations can have the same MSE but drastically different visual impacts.
- It is not clear to me what the key actually is. It seems to combine the dither and the pilot, but an explicit definition of your algorithm would be helpful.
- You focus exclusively on watermarking diffusion-model-generated images, but wouldn't your method generalize to any image using a VAE auto-encoder to extract a terminal latent?
[1] Pérez-González, Fernando, et al. "Rational dither modulation: A high-rate data-hiding method invariant to gain attacks." IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing 53.10 (2005): 3960-3975.
7 comments
Mathematical notation and symbol definitions
Weakness 2: Mathematical notation and symbol definitions
We agree that the notation should be defined in the text and used consistently. The revised preliminary section now defines the text condition , initial noise, terminal latent , marked terminal latent , source projection , source scale , DCT directions , and the frozen VAE encoder and decoder. The embedding and detection algorithms also explicitly define their inputs and outputs.
We have now made the notation explicit at first use: denotes the image-space operator associated with transformation , whereas denotes the set of calibration transformations. We also state that in Algorithm 2 denotes the sampler's initial-noise input , while is the resulting terminal latent. These definitions are provided in the revised source rather than left to the figure.
Changes in the manuscript
- Section 3.1, “Frozen latent-diffusion pipeline” (p. 3): defines , , , and .
- Section 3.2, “DCT carriers and fixed-reader calibration” (p. 3): explicitly defines as the image-space transformation operator indexed by , and distinguishes an individual operator from the calibration set ; it also defines , , and .
- Supplementary Material, Appendix A.2, “Calibration and Deployment Algorithms” (p. 13): states that algorithmic is the sampler's initial-noise input , while is the terminal latent.
Cross-model generalization and adaptive/QIM-related attacks
Weakness 4: Generalization beyond one dataset and one model
We agree that the original SD3.5-only evaluation was insufficient to characterize generalization. The revised main text also places the method in a broader baseline context: seven adapted baselines are evaluated on the original shared 4,000-host cohort, while Stable Signature is reported separately because its later split includes development-exposed source IDs. A direct GROW comparison uses a separate 800-host shared test cohort with development PSNR matched within 0.2 dB. We distinguish these cohorts rather than treating them as one fully paired ranking.
We have also added an SD1.5 evaluation with model/VAE-specific recalibration, an SD3.5 abstract-prompt domain evaluation with both frozen and recalibrated settings, a native-512 evaluation, and external negative-source tests.
On SD1.5, the model-specific configuration obtains a macro TPR of 90.20% and a maximum observed FPR of 0.875% on 800 test hosts. On the SD3.5 abstract-prompt domain, the original frozen configuration has a maximum observed FPR of 3.75%; a separately recalibrated configuration obtains 1.50% on 200 test hosts. The native-512 configuration obtains a macro TPR of 92.96% and a maximum observed FPR of 1.50% on 200 hosts.
External negative-source tests include COCO real photographs, unmarked SD1.5 generations, Oxford-IIIT Pet images, and Z-Image-Turbo images. These tests characterize false-positive behavior on the corresponding negative sources; they do not constitute positive watermarking evaluations on every generator.
The revised manuscript therefore provides evidence of applicability across the evaluated SD1.5 and SD3.5 configurations after the required calibration, while distinguishing model-specific recalibration from zero-shot transfer.
Changes in the manuscript
- Section 6.3, “Comparison with Existing Watermarking Methods” (pp. 7–8; Table 3, p. 8): adds seven shared-cohort SD3.5 adaptations and separately qualifies Stable Signature.
- Section 6.4, “Direct Comparison with GROW” (p. 9): adds the 800-host development-PSNR-matched comparison.
- Section 6.6, “Cross-model, domain, resolution, and negative-domain tests” (p. 10): reports SD1.5, domain, resolution, and external-negative evaluations.
- Supplementary Material, Appendix C (pp. 18–19) and Appendix K.3 (pp. 37–38): provides the method adaptations and cohort-specific results.
Question 1: Adaptive attacks and QIM-related attacks
We agree that the original evaluation did not include adaptive removal or geometric transformations. We have added four attack settings that distinguish public-model access, detector feedback, and key disclosure.
With public VAE access but no key or detector oracle, a latent-drift attack under an RGB budget of 4/255 removes detection from 175/200 initially detected marked hosts (87.5%). Under an unknown key, the tested continuous-score oracle attack achieves 0/200 removals at 100 and 500 queries; the binary accept/reject oracle attack achieves 9/200 and 13/200 removals at the same budgets. With full key and detector access, the white-box attack removes 200/200 marked inputs and causes 200/200 clean inputs to be accepted after optimization.
We also add gain and contrast transformations, alongside crop, rotation, translation, VAE reconstruction, diffusion regeneration, and composed transformations. The cited Rational Dither Modulation (RDM) work is relevant to gain-invariant data hiding and motivates examining gain changes. We include gain transformations as stress tests, but do not present RDM as an adaptive attack or claim to have reproduced a dedicated RDM attack implementation. The new results are reported under their corresponding fixed-threshold or independently calibrated protocols.
Changes in the manuscript
- Section 6.7, “Geometric, regeneration, and external-operator evaluation” (p. 10): reports the three official WAVES operators and the separate T09-E evaluation.
- Section 6.8, “Adaptive attacks and cross-key behavior” (p. 10): reports the public-VAE, query-based, and full-key attacks, together with cross-key acceptance.
- Supplementary Material, Appendix K.4–K.5 (pp. 38–40): provides the corresponding transformation and attack protocols.
Readability, terminology, and numerical reporting
Weakness 1: Readability and undefined terminology
We agree that the original manuscript introduced several concepts before providing sufficient definitions and motivation. We have reorganized the presentation and added a dedicated Preliminaries and Problem Formulation section before the method.
The new section introduces the frozen latent-diffusion pipeline, the terminal latent, the VAE encoder/decoder, DCT carrier directions, the fixed affine reader, QIM lattices, the pilot-presence detection task, and the threat model. We also reorganized the method in the order of offline calibration, carrier ranking, keyed terminal embedding, and one-encoding detection. This makes the relationship between the terminal-latent interface, carrier calibration, QIM embedding, and analytic detection explicit.
The qualitative comparison is retained in full as Figure 4 (p. 8), and the revised text introduces and interprets each main figure and table rather than relying on figures to define technical terms.
Changes in the manuscript
Weakness 3: Significant digits and numerical rigor
We agree that the displayed precision should reflect both the sample size and the statistic being reported. In the revised main text, TP/FP counts are shown as integers, and count-derived rates are rounded to a precision appropriate to their denominators. AUC is treated separately as a ranking statistic rather than a direct sample proportion. Additional digits are retained only for frozen thresholds, configuration values, continuous AUC summaries, and historical aggregate values that must remain traceable to the submitted record.
For the new step-aware comparison, the three-budget results are recomputed on the same 200-host subset, and paired bootstrap differences are reported in percentage points. The manuscript specifies the host-level resampling unit and retains all 13 conditions within each resampled host.
Changes in the manuscript