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Paper summary
The paper studies data-sharing among firms competing on prediction quality. It characterizes Pareto-optimal sharing and proposes a contract that gives firms equal proportional profit gains. Under a concave learning curve, the contract discourages under-reporting of data holdings. Experiments use Expedia data to estimate learning curves and calculate potential profit gains.
Critical strengths
The equal-gain contract offers a clear solution to the tension between cooperation and competition. The Pareto characterization helps explain which sharing arrangements leave room for mutual improvement. The withholding analysis accounts for firms retaining their undisclosed data.
Critical weaknesses
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The strategy-proof guarantee applies to continuous allocations. Rounding can make under-reporting profitable: a firm may receive the same rounded allocation while reducing its competitor's allocation. Small average utility changes after rounding do not establish that truthful reporting remains optimal. Definition 9 also needs to reflect the retained private data used in the proof.
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The empirical claim of strategy proof is insufficiently supported. Monotonic interpolation does not establish the concavity required by the theorem. Some experimental holdings also fall below the stated calibration range. The reported profit gains depend on assumed customer behavior; the Expedia experiment measures prediction accuracy.
Questions for authors
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What incentive guarantee survives the actual rounding rule, and can Definition 9 be made consistent with the proof?
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Does the fitted learning curve satisfy the theorem's concavity assumption, and how are holdings below the calibration range handled?
3 comments
Thank you for correcting Definition 9 and explaining the extrapolation below the calibration range. These answers clarify the treatment of retained private data and the below-range holdings. Please include the extrapolation procedure in §5.2.
The new Proposition 6 provides a useful answer to my rounding concern under concavity. Please state that assumption explicitly and distinguish the bounded gain from under-reporting from exact strategyproofness.
My remaining concern is the applicability of the incentive guarantee to the fitted precision functions. The concavity analysis you refer to documents violations, whereas §5.2, lines 365–368, still states that the assumptions of Theorem 5 are satisfied. Decreasing secant slopes at larger windows do not establish concavity over the full domain. Please reconcile these statements and clarify which incentive guarantee, if any, applies to the fitted-and-rounded implementation. For now, I maintain my weak-rejection recommendation.
Thank you for your additional remarks. Please find below our supplementary answers.
Regarding the applicability of the incentive guarantee to the fitted precision functions, please refer to the answer to reviewer CfSG and to the new Section 5.4 of the revised paper, where we provide an empirical calculation of the maximum gain from under-reporting in our experimental setting.
We remark that the new included experiment required an extrapolation of the function between and datapoints. In order to obtain these values, we have changed the method explained in our previous answer by fixing and simply performing the interpolation on as we did in the full calibration range . Intuitively, represents the fact that a firm with no training data never has any of its offers accepted as such a firm has no way of training an ML model. We included this procedure as a footnote in §5.2.
Finally, the revised article presents a corrected version of Proposition 6 with concavity stated as a required assumption.
Thank you for your comments and remarks. Please find our answers below.
First, regarding the facts that strategyproofness does not exactly hold with rounded allocations and that the fitted precision functions are not entirely concave, please refer to points (1) and (2) of the answer to reviewer CfSG, where we respectively explain a new result on bounding the utility gain from under-reporting and rounding, and discuss the concavity of the fitted functions.
1. Correcting Definition 9. Regarding the mistake in Definition 9, we thank the reviewer for spotting this typo. We have corrected the definition in the revised article. Having in mind that, given a declared initial endowment n^, Q(n^)∈R+m denotes the amounts of additional data received by each firm under a contract Q, the new version of Definition 9 reads :
Let Γ be a data-sharing instance. A data-sharing contract Q is strategyproof if for any i∈F and any declared initial endowment n^, it holds, ui(n+Q(ni,n^−i))≥ui(n+Q(n^i,n^−i)), where n^−i:=(n^j)j∈F∖{i}.
Still, we remark that the proof of strategyproofness already used the correct definition so the original article presented no issue regarding the correctness of the result.
2. Extrapolation for holdings below the calibration range. We thank the reviewer for pointing out that some experimental holdings fall below the calibration range; after a thorough check, it happens only for three points, corresponding to the three values of k for the pair (δ,m)=(0.6,10). For this pair, the smallest point ni is equal to 81; for these three points (one for each value of k), the values were simply extrapolated automatically using the interpolation method (piecewise cubic Hermite spline) and extrapolating based on the nearest edge interval (i.e. the interval starting above 100). In total, extrapolation was therefore required in 3 out of 81 points computed for Figure 2.