- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The paper studies how to update a stable matching when some utilities change and evaluation feedback is delayed. It proposes algorithms that reuse valid historical data, schedule new evaluations under matching constraints, and stop once there is enough evidence to certify the updated requester-optimal stable matching. The authors bound the required evaluation rounds and show that additional certificate checks can allow earlier stopping. They also prove asymptotic optimality for a special class of markets.
Critical strengths
None
Critical weaknesses
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The setting combines announced utility invalidations with delayed feedback, making it fairly specialized. If this is intended as a theory paper, these modeling choices make its theoretical message unclear.
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RLR builds largely on the standard doubling trick. While handling delayed feedback requires additional care, I find the overall algorithmic novelty somewhat limited.
BTW, the writing is poor, and it is hard for me to believe the authors’ AI use statement. For me, I really do not care whether the author uses AI to assist their proofs, the assessment only depends on the quality of the manuscript itself.
Questions for authors
None