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Paper summary
This paper studies view-specific content injection into pretrained 3D Gaussian Splatting assets. HiddenSplat freezes the original scene and adds low-opacity Gaussians along target-camera rays. Target reconstruction, non-target preservation, spatial repulsion, and color dispersion objectives are combined to reveal designated content at a selected viewpoint while limiting its visibility elsewhere. The paper presents alpha-compositing analyses and experiments on three datasets, supplemented by nearby-view, pruning, overhead, multi-view, and preliminary defense studies.
Critical strengths
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The attack construction addresses a concrete asset-integrity problem. Adding standard Gaussians to a pretrained scene allows the payload to be displayed through the conventional rendering pipeline, without modifying the original scene parameters or requiring a separate decoder. This makes the proposed threat relevant to the distribution and reuse of 3DGS assets. (§§3.2–4)
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The submission provides substantial experimental coverage and inspectable source code. The paper investigates several important aspects beyond target reconstruction, including neighboring viewpoints, computational overhead, pruning, and preliminary defenses. The supplementary source makes the implementation accessible for inspection, which is valuable for assessing the method and its evaluation.
Critical weaknesses
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The released pipeline does not support interpreting the test-view results as held-out generalization. The training script places both training views and all non-target validation views into the non-target optimization pool and samples that pool for the stealth loss. The evaluation script subsequently evaluates those same non-target validation views. Thus, under the supplied pipeline, these views are available during attack optimization rather than held out from it. This limits what the reported test-view results establish about stealth at unseen viewpoints. The concern is the interpretation of generalization, rather than whether access to these cameras is allowed by the threat model.
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The implemented stealth objective differs materially from Equation (8). The manuscript defines a masked discrepancy between poisoned and clean renderings. For dataset cameras, however, the supplied implementation minimizes full-frame L1 against the original photographs; only interpolated cameras use clean-rendered reference images. These objectives can produce different gradients when the clean reconstruction contains errors, and the full-frame reduction also changes the relative weighting of the loss. Consequently, the supplementary implementation does not provide a consistent account of the objective underlying the reported results.
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The evaluation implementation and reported metric definitions are not fully consistent. Stealth PSNR is weighted by accumulated adversarial opacity, while SSIM and LPIPS use a bounding-box crop that can include unaffected pixels. These differ from uniformly evaluating the affected-pixel mask described in the manuscript. Target PSNR also averages over the entire patch after setting pixels outside the target mask to zero, which can inflate it relative to averaging only over valid target pixels. Separately, Table 2 reports for StealthAttack-Adapt. These discrepancies weaken confidence in the interpretation and comparability of the reported metrics.
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Appendix C.2 does not establish the claimed uniform perturbation bound. The occupancy analysis counts Gaussians only within a Mahalanobis radius of 0.5 and averages the count across pixels and scenes. Substituting this average into the pointwise bound of Theorem 2 cannot establish an “at most 3%” deviation, and contributions outside the counted region are omitted. The observed occupancy decay is informative, but interpreting it as a worst-case guarantee is stronger than the evidence supports. This concern addresses the analysis already provided in the appendix, rather than its absence.
Questions for authors
See weaknesses.