- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper proposes MiragePoison, a training data poisoning attack for AIGC detection models to induce real images to be misclassified as AI-generated. It optimizes the real image to maximize its cosine similarity to fake images while minimize its cosine similarity to real images in feature space, and preserves its budget. The poisoned image therefore looks like a real image but is similar to fake images in feature space. Then in the training stage, the AIGC detection model learns to classify real images as AI-generated.
Critical strengths
The paper is very clear and easy to follow. The idea of poisoning AIGC detection models is very interesting.
Critical weaknesses
(1) The contribution of this paper is very limited. The main idea of this paper is to optimize images to change its feature representation. This is very similar to adversarial attacks [1] on image classification models. I think the main contribution of this paper is limited to applying adversarial attack/examples to the AIGC detection model. However, the key component of the optimization process is not largely changed.
(2) Some baselines in the experiments are flawed. The goal of the proposed attack is to induce the model to classify real images to fake by training time poisoning. However, the proposed method is first compared to adversarial attacks and backdoor attacks. Adversarial attacks are conducted at inference time, and backdoor attacks can preserve the model performance when the trigger is absent. They have different attack goals and assumptions. The proposed method should be only compared to other poisoning attacks with the same attack goal and budget. No test modify and no trigger should not be regarded as an advantage of the proposed attack.
References
[1] Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples. ICLR 2015
Questions for authors
(1) What is the main difference between MiragePoison and prior works on poisoning/adversarial attacks? Could the authors further clarify their contribution?
(2) How robust is the proposed attack? Can the poisoned images survive any detection methods (e.g., detecting the consistence of image/feature and label) and purifications (e.g., noise/random crop)?
(3) Could the authors further clarify the difference from their poisoning attacks to backdoor/adversarial attacks?
(4) How is the surrogate model selected for the black-box setting? How does the attack perform when the surrogate changes?