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Paper summary
The paper introduces BASIS - a sample selection strategy to strengthen existing targeted clean-label data poisoning attacks. The authors formulate the attack as a bilevel objective that jointly considers sample selection and perturbation - but acknowledge that it is intractable to optimize perturbations and retrain models over all possible subsets of candidate samples for each target. A heuristic proxy is proposed to select m candidate examples from the adversarial class as bases for poisoning. This is the sum of terms M and R, where a higher M is associated with candidates closer to a decision boundary and a higher R represents similarity between the target sample and candidate sample in feature space. The selected samples are then perturbed by an existing attack (BP, GM, or SAPA) without changing its perturbation optimization. BASIS achieves higher ASR than random selection on the CIFAR-10 dataset across varying poisoning budgets, differing model architectures and poisoning attacks, with additional results on CIFAR-100, SVHN and Tiny ImageNet in the appendix. They are able to do this while largely preserving clean test accuracy. The authors provide ablation experiments on model architecture mismatch between surrogate and victim models and the ensemble size of surrogate models used for selection, and compare against random selection under two victim-side defenses (Epic and Friends) and under victim-side data augmentation. They further compare BASIS with sample selection methods from backdoor attacks (Grad, Forget, FUS), ablations on the components of the score (R only, M only, and exact gradient alignment), and measure how closely BASIS agrees with exact gradient alignment in terms of selected samples.
Critical strengths
- The paper proposes sampling for targeted clean-label data poisoning attacks to improve attack success rates. Few (if any) works have attempted it in this exact setting.
- The heuristic is simple, seamless to integrate and fast in practice, as evidenced in the appendix experiments (specifically Appendix K). BASIS improves attack success rates over random selection consistently across 3 different attack settings. It achieves highest gains in the lowest sampling ratios.
- The paper prioritizes thoroughness with detailed ablation experiments to investigate their own approach against downstream defenses, data augmentation, etc. - which adds credibility to their results. The 20 surrogate ensemble particularly adds robustness to experiments.
Critical weaknesses
- Random is the only baseline in the main results. The quantity BASIS approximates in Section 3.2 - how a training update on one example changes a loss evaluated at a specific point is the same quantity computed by influence functions [1] and by the one-step meta-gradient in learning to reweight [2]. Those works use it for data cleaning and example weighting rather than attack, but the scoring machinery transfers directly: only the loss at the target changes. Gradient-norm selection has also already been used for base selection in (for instance) Sleeper Agent [3]. Adapting any of these would be a stronger comparison than random.
- Most of the results in this paper are centered around the CIFAR-10 datasets. Experiments on real-world datasets are left to the appendix. Attacks studied in this work have included experiments on larger datasets / models (eg. Witches Brew [4] on ImageNet). The only tiny imagenet experiment that exists is inconclusive and with a single class pair, model and budget.
- The related work section of this paper could benefit from literature including those from influence functions [1] in data poisoning, dirty label adversarial attacks and how sampling is used there, learning to reweight [2] and their formulation of the bilevel objective.
- Data Augmentation in victim defenses shrink gains in data poisoning ASR (Table 3).
References
[1] Koh, P.W. and Liang, P., 2017, July. Understanding black-box predictions via influence functions. In International conference on machine learning (pp. 1885-1894). Pmlr.
[2] Ren, M., Zeng, W., Yang, B. and Urtasun, R., 2018, July. Learning to reweight examples for robust deep learning. In International conference on machine learning (pp. 4334-4343). PMLR.
[3] Souri, H., Fowl, L., Chellappa, R., Goldblum, M. and Goldstein, T., 2022. Sleeper agent: Scalable hidden trigger backdoors for neural networks trained from scratch. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 35, pp.19165-19178.
[4] Geiping, J., Fowl, L., Huang, W.R., Czaja, W., Taylor, G., Moeller, M. and Goldstein, T., 2020. Witches' brew: Industrial scale data poisoning via gradient matching. arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.02276.
Questions for authors
- How correlated are the R and M terms ? I would be curious to see the overlap, and what that means for data poisoning.
- The relative usefulness of M and R may depend on the number of classes: M compares against a single strongest competitor and may become less informative as the class count grows, while R does not depend on the class count. The CIFAR-100 results (Table 11) show smaller and less consistent gains than CIFAR-10 and SVHN. Do the authors have any analysis of how the two components, and the choice λ = 1, behave as the number of classes increases?
- The paper would benefit from explicit limitations and future work discussion. Several caveats are noted in passing but never collected. The authors should comment on how or when they envision their work being used, the practical implications given the strong assumptions in their threat model, and what this means for defenses.
5 comments
Q1: Correlation and selection overlap between and .
We measure Pearson and Spearman correlations between and over all candidates on CIFAR-10 (dog→bird), and then average the results across ten targets. Both tables report mean ± SD across targets. In addition, we report the top- selection overlap, , for different poisoning budgets.
Score Correlation
\hline \text{Architecture} & \text{Pearson} & \text{Spearman} \\\\ \hline \text{ConvNet} & 0.128\pm0.083 & 0.117\pm0.095 \\\\ \text{ResNet20} & 0.444\pm0.135 & 0.418\pm0.150 \\\\ \text{VGG13} & 0.311\pm0.150 & 0.313\pm0.163 \\\\ \hline \end{array}$$ **Top-$m$ Subset Overlap ($\lvert S_R\cap S_M\rvert/m$)** $$\begin{array}{lccccc} \hline \text{Architecture} & \rho=0.1\\% & \rho=0.2\\% & \rho=0.5\\% & \rho=1\\% & \rho=2\\% \\\\ \hline \text{ConvNet} & 0.014\pm0.016 & 0.046\pm0.032 & 0.098\pm0.040 & 0.164\pm0.047 & 0.267\pm0.044 \\\\ \text{ResNet20} & 0.030\pm0.034 & 0.068\pm0.044 & 0.124\pm0.064 & 0.217\pm0.081 & 0.358\pm0.076 \\\\ \text{VGG13} & 0.072\pm0.069 & 0.074\pm0.069 & 0.138\pm0.067 & 0.209\pm0.069 & 0.355\pm0.071 \\\\ \hline \end{array}$$ The weak-to-moderate correlations and limited top-$m$ overlap show that $R$ and $M$ favor different samples. $M$ measures classification difficulty relative to the strongest competing class, independently of the target $x_t$, while $R$ measures representation similarity to $x_t$. This distinction matters for targeted poisoning as a difficult sample may generate a strong training signal but have little effect on the target while a highly similar but confidently classified sample may have too little influence to meaningfully shift the decision boundary. Combining $R$ and $M$ accounts for both sample difficulty and target relevance. For example, Table 5 shows that on ConvNet/BP at $\rho=0.2\\%$, BASIS achieves 70.0% ASR, compared with 22.5% for $R$ alone and 45.0% for $M$ alone. These results suggest that considering both properties can make a fixed poisoning budget more effective. --- ## Q2. Effect of class count on the selection components. We thank the reviewer for this insightful question. We examined the relative contributions of $R$ and $M$ and the sensitivity to $\lambda$ across datasets with different class counts using the GM attack, as shown in the following table. We used 8 targets $\times$ 5 victims per target on CIFAR-10, 4 $\times$ 4 on CIFAR-100, and 5 $\times$ 5 on Tiny ImageNet. $$\begin{array}{lllcccc|ccc} \hline \text{Dataset }(C) & \text{Model} & \substack{\text{Class Pair} \\\\ (y_{\text{adv}}\rightarrow y_t)} & \rho\\;(\\%) & \text{RAND} & R & M & \substack{\text{BASIS} \\\\ \lambda=0.1} & \substack{\text{BASIS} \\\\ \lambda=1} & \substack{\text{BASIS} \\\\ \lambda=10} \\\\ \hline \substack{\text{CIFAR-10} \\\\ (C=10)} & \text{ConvNet} & \text{dog}\rightarrow\text{bird} & 0.2 & 0.0 & 15.0 & 22.5 & 25.0 & \mathbf{40.0} & 37.5 \\\\ & & \text{dog}\rightarrow\text{bird} & 0.5 & 2.5 & 20.0 & 55.0 & 47.5 & \mathbf{77.5} & 75.0 \\\\ \hline \substack{\text{CIFAR-100} \\\\ (C=100)} & \text{ResNet18} & \text{sea}\rightarrow\text{willow tree} & 0.1 & 12.5 & 31.3 & \mathbf{50.0} & 43.8 & 37.5 & 31.3 \\\\ & & \text{wardrobe}\rightarrow\text{lawn mower} & 0.2 & 6.3 & 25.0 & 12.5 & 18.8 & 25.0 & \mathbf{31.3} \\\\ & & \text{bottle}\rightarrow\text{road} & 0.2 & 0.0 & \mathbf{50.0} & 12.5 & 12.5 & 31.3 & 12.5 \\\\ \hline \substack{\text{Tiny ImageNet} \\\\ (C=200)} & \text{VGG13} & \text{American alligator}\rightarrow\text{tarantula} & 0.05 & 36.0 & 84.0 & 60.0 & \mathbf{88.0} & 80.0 & 76.0 \\\\ \hline \end{array}$$ The results suggest a shift in relative usefulness. On CIFAR-10, $M$ outperforms $R$, whereas $R$ is stronger in most higher-class settings. One possible explanation is that the strongest competing class used by $M$ becomes less relevant to the specific target as the number of classes increases. However, these experiments also vary in architecture and class pair, so they do not isolate class count as the cause. The preferred $\lambda$ is likewise setting-dependent. Down-weighting $M$ helps with the evaluated Tiny ImageNet pair, but CIFAR-100 shows no consistent preference. The untuned $\lambda=1$ improves over random selection throughout these experiments, although it is not always optimal. Overall, these findings support the effectiveness of BASIS across different class counts while highlighting the setting-dependent contributions of its components. Since attackers typically cannot tune $\lambda$ using victim-model outcomes, we set $\lambda=1$ to balance both components and achieve consistent improvements across evaluations without setting-specific tuning. We have also included a new subsection 4.8 in the draft to cover this analysis.Q3. Limits and future work.
We agree and have added a Limitations and Future Work discussion immediately before the “Conclusion” in the draft to unify these points. Our threat model assumes access to the full clean training set and the ability to replace selected samples before victim training, which may be infeasible in constrained data pipelines. For defenders, our results show that robustness evaluations based only on randomly selected poisons can overestimate the protection provided by existing defenses. Future work will examine base selection under partial observability and investigate defenses that exploit the low-margin, high-similarity patterns identified in our analysis.
Dear Reviewer 5iY4,
We sincerely appreciate your comments, which have been invaluable in helping us improve our work.
W1: Comparison with additional baselines.
Beyond RAND and the comparisons in Table 4, we compare BASIS with the selection method used in Sleeper Agent [3] and with META-GRAD [2]. We evaluate dog→bird at \rho\in\\{0.2\\%,0.5\\%\\} using eight targets and five victim runs per target. The following table reports the results.
\hline & \text{Selection Method} & \substack{\text{BP} \\\\ 0.2} & \substack{\text{BP} \\\\ 0.5} & \substack{\text{GM} \\\\ 0.2} & \substack{\text{GM} \\\\ 0.5} & \substack{\text{SAPA} \\\\ 0.2} & \substack{\text{SAPA} \\\\ 0.5} \\\\ \hline \text{ConvNet} & \text{RAND} & 2.5 & 12.5 & 0.0 & 2.5 & 0.0 & 7.5 \\\\ & \text{META-GRAD [2]} & 62.5 & 75.0 & 37.5 & 62.5 & \mathbf{37.5} & \mathbf{62.5} \\\\ & \text{Sleeper Agent [3]} & 30.0 & 85.0 & 12.5 & 55.0 & 7.5 & 60.0 \\\\ & \text{BASIS} & \mathbf{70.0} & \mathbf{87.5} & \mathbf{40.0} & \mathbf{77.5} & 30.0 & \mathbf{62.5} \\\\ \hline \text{ResNet20} & \text{RAND} & 17.5 & 30.0 & 22.5 & 42.5 & 17.5 & 50.0 \\\\ & \text{META-GRAD [2]} & 22.5 & 30.0 & \mathbf{57.5} & 62.5 & \mathbf{52.5} & 77.5 \\\\ & \text{Sleeper Agent [3]} & \mathbf{35.0} & 30.0 & 45.0 & \mathbf{72.5} & 37.5 & \mathbf{85.0} \\\\ & \text{BASIS} & 20.0 & \mathbf{40.0} & \mathbf{57.5} & \mathbf{72.5} & \mathbf{52.5} & 77.5 \\\\ \hline \end{array}$$ As we can see, BASIS achieves the highest or tied-highest ASR in nine of twelve settings. These results support its effectiveness against stronger selection baselines. --- ## W2: Extension to large-scale datasets. Thank you for the suggestion. We expanded our Tiny ImageNet experiments to three class pairs and two poisoning budgets ($\rho\in\\{0.05\\%, 0.1\\%\\}$), as shown in the table below. The results consistently show that BASIS outperforms RAND under the GM attack, demonstrating that our gains persist on Tiny ImageNet. $$\begin{array}{lc|cc} \hline \text{Class pair} & \rho\\;(\\%) & \substack{\text{VGG13} \\\\ \text{RAND}} & \substack{\text{VGG13} \\\\ \text{BASIS}} \\\\ \hline \text{American alligator}\rightarrow\text{tarantula} & 0.1 & 72.0 & 96.0 \\\\ & 0.05 & 36.0 & 80.0 \\\\ \hline \text{Bullfrog}\rightarrow\text{dining table} & 0.1 & 48.0 & 92.0 \\\\ & 0.05 & 12.0 & 48.0 \\\\ \hline \text{Bullfrog}\rightarrow\text{beach wagon} & 0.1 & 16.0 & 40.0 \\\\ & 0.05 & 0.0 & 20.0 \\\\ \hline \end{array}$$ --- ## W3. Related Work extension. We thank the reviewer for these suggestions and have expanded the Related Work in Section 2, specifically the paragraph titled “Sample Selection in Adversarial Attacks,” to cover sample selection in dirty-label poisoning, the use of influence functions for poisoning attacks, and bilevel optimization approaches described in [2]. --- ## W4. Augmentation limitation. We thank the reviewer for pointing this out. Augmentation can reduce poisoning effectiveness, but our results show that improved sample selection remains useful under augmented victim training. In Table 3, BASIS outperforms or matches RAND in all augmented settings reported in Table 3, with substantial gains in several cases. For GM at $\rho=1\\%$, BASIS increases ASR from 5.0% to 63.2% on ResNet20 under RandAugment and from 60.0% to 90.0% on VGG13 under Crop+Flip. These results support our contribution of improving sample selection within existing poisoning attacks while showing that the magnitude of the benefit depends on the victim's training procedure.