W1. The central “benign in isolation” premise is not sufficiently established, and the reported vetting results require clarification.
The threat model states that each constituent passes standalone vetting and does not exhibit the target malicious behavior when executed in isolation (Section 3). RRS explicitly discards candidate compositions containing a skill that fails vetting, and Equation (11) imposes this as a hard constraint. Section 6.1 identifies SkillSafe as the constraint engine. However, Table 2 reports a mean SkillSafe pass rate of only 93.8% after optimization, with some categories reaching only 90.0%. The original skills also have a mean pass rate below 100%.
Under the same deterministic evaluator and acceptance criterion, a hard vetting gate should yield a 100% pass rate for the skills admitted through that gate. Scanner stochasticity, configuration changes, or differences in the evaluated populations could explain the discrepancy, but the manuscript does not establish which explanation applies. Please report the fraction of evaluated pairs for which the attack succeeds AND both constituent skills pass the stated vetting procedure. Marginal skill-level pass rates do not establish that the successful attacks satisfy the threat model.
More fundamentally, scanner acceptance, failure to complete a particular target in isolation, and behavioral benignity are different properties. The empirical evidence primarily establishes scanner acceptance, whereas the theoretical analysis assumes that the entire standalone capability space lies within the safety space. The paper should distinguish these claims and provide direct evidence for the stronger “benign in isolation” premise.
W2. Important results cannot currently be reconciled across figures and tables.
Figure 2(a), labeled Strict Benign, uses a radial scale with an upper limit of 6. Section 6.3 likewise emphasizes low success under this condition. In contrast, Section 6.6 explicitly states that Table 3 uses Strict Benign prompts, yet the MPC averages in that table are 17.0% for DCA and 52.3% for ACA Both. Different models, skill populations, or optimization settings could explain the difference, but these distinctions are not adequately specified.
Similarly, Table S1 reports 100.0% successful optimization for Credential Exfiltration, whereas Table 1 reports ACA Both success rates of 88.6% and 40.0% for the two primary models. These numbers are not necessarily contradictory, but the manuscript does not identify the configurations and denominators needed to relate them.
Please provide the exact model, prompt condition, evaluated population, denominator, and execution protocol for each result. In particular, distinguish success over all selected pairs, optimization success conditional on initial failure, success at least once within a search budget, and success on an independent execution of the final edited pair. These distinctions affect the central conclusions, especially the risk under benign task inputs.
W3. The controls do not isolate a composition-specific effect or the benefit of skill refinement.
The claim that the target behavior occurs only when both skills are present requires matched evaluations with no skills, Skill A alone, Skill B alone, and both skills. The manuscript does not report this complete comparison under the same task prompt, environment, tools, and permissions. The “ACA Skill A” and “ACA Skill B” columns in Table 1 vary which skill is optimized; both skills are still used during execution. They therefore do not substitute for single-skill execution controls.
This matters because the underlying agent retains its existing tools and permissions. A capability being absent from a skill description does not, by itself, establish that the agent cannot perform the corresponding operation using its underlying tools. The proposed controls are necessary to distinguish cross-skill interactions from ordinary tool use or the exploitability of one constituent.
There is also a search-budget confound. RRS generates up to five candidates per round for up to five rounds, but the paper does not report a matched-budget baseline that repeatedly executes the original skill pair. Success within an adaptive search budget is a legitimate attack metric, but it does not by itself establish how much improvement comes from editing rather than additional opportunities to succeed. Please include matched-budget retries and independent reruns of the final edited skills. A prompt-only optimization baseline would also help establish the added value of modifying the skills.
W4. The authorization boundary and malicious-outcome criteria are underspecified.
The threat model gives the attacker ordinary access to skill selection and task inputs, but it does not sufficiently define the relationship between the attacker, the data owner, and the system administrator, or the security policy the agent is expected to enforce. Keeping tool permissions unchanged does not establish whether a resulting operation is authorized.
The examples in Appendix C illustrate this ambiguity. Installing a script as a git hook is not inherently a persistent backdoor; the classification depends on the script, its provenance, and the relevant authorization. Likewise, when an Explicit prompt directly requests transmission of a complete configuration, the evaluation must explain why fulfilling that request violates the applicable security policy.
The Facilitated credential-exfiltration example provides a clearer potential boundary: it requests only a pass/fail or connectivity check. Sending secret values despite that restriction would be a meaningful violation. The paper should make similarly explicit distinctions for all eight behaviors and specify the exact SRC predicates that separate prohibited outcomes from legitimate task completion.
W5. Key algorithmic details and the capability-preservation claim are not operationalized sufficiently.
MPC defines capability coverage in terms of C(s) and the requirements κ₁ and κ₂, but the manuscript does not sufficiently specify how capabilities are extracted from real skills, how target requirements are constructed, or how coverage and complementarity are combined into a ranking. RRS similarly introduces the progress function Bτ(ρ) without an operational definition. The candidate-generation procedure, editing prompts, and enforcement of bounded modifications also need more detail.
The claim that RRS only improves interactions without introducing new capabilities requires more than a small number of added tokens. Appendix A describes introducing an executable wrapper and modifying how extracted secrets are represented and incorporated into downstream requests. Such changes may be substantial in security semantics even when they are short. Moreover, counting added tokens does not measure deletions, replacements, or total edit distance.
Please provide original and modified skill contents for representative cases, explicit editing constraints, and standalone functionality and safety tests. Reproducibility would also benefit from corpus snapshots, collection and deduplication procedures, selected skill-pair identifiers, model and scanner configurations, and the executable outcome checks. My assessment here concerns what is specified in the supplied PDF; I do not infer that no separate artifacts exist.
W6. The theoretical contribution is limited under the current definitions, and the empirical novelty needs sharper positioning.
The set-theoretic statements in Section 4 are valid under the stated definitions, but they largely follow directly from those definitions. In particular, Equation (6) follows from defining Eᵢⱼ as the portion of the composed capability space outside the union of the standalone spaces. This establishes that the additional unsafe arrangements are absent from the modeled standalone behavior spaces; it does not establish a general impossibility result for scanners that reason about potential compositional misuse.
The implication that composition safety entails constituent safety also relies on the modeled composition preserving all standalone behaviors. That assumption should be made explicit when relating the abstraction to systems with scheduling restrictions, state changes, or additional execution constraints. I regard this section primarily as an explanatory formalization rather than a substantive characterization of detection limits.
Section 2.2 already describes related work on risky skill configurations and path-dependent composition risks. The paper should therefore more clearly isolate the incremental contribution of target-driven retrieval and vetting-constrained refinement. The Random and Semantic baselines are useful, but capability-matched selection controls and matched-budget optimization controls would better identify the contributions of MPC and RRS beyond target relevance and additional search.