- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The paper deals with generative geolocation models, which produce a geo location for a given image. Adding adversarial perturbations to the input images can attack the underlying network and produce a different outcome. The paper shows different ways to add these perturbations, demonstrated on Riemannian Flow Models, split between different optimization targets such as the encoder or directly on the flow model itself. The paper shows superior results compared to GeoShield, which demonstrates these perturbations on VLMs.
Critical strengths
- The decomposition of the difference to magnitude and direction is clear and important, and helps understand the importance of for optimizing on the direction alone, as the paper proposes.
Critical weaknesses
- The paper collects previous methods that were not proposed specifically for RFM, and adjusts these to operate on such models for a geographic setting. This collection is presented as a “unified framework …”, when this is merely the adaptation of known methods to this architecture. Moreover, throughout the paper (e.g., Tab. 2) these methods are shown as “Ours-GeoFA…”, which is misleading and lets the reader think that these adaptations are different variants of the authors method. As a result, Tab.2 seems as an ablation for different methods, rather than presenting the actual method’s result. This makes the paper hard to follow, as it is hard for the reader to understand the last two rows of the “Ours” block are the authors actual method.
- Apart from the readability, I think this points on to a problematic comparison to other known methods. GeoShield is a black box model that achieves far inferior results to all the white-box adapted settings. But, these adapted settings even show better or on par results to the paper's method (e.g., Sampling on YFCC4k). Currently, it seems that the paper have implemented known attack methods on the geographic RFM checkpoints of Dufour et. al., and the new suggested method does not significantly improve the results compared to the known methods. Therefore, I think at the current state the paper does not include enough novelty for publication, but I do think that the formulation of adversarial perturbation on RFM model in general can be important and useful, possibly with the paper’s supplied loss term, but demonstrated not only on a narrow benchmark of Geographic attacks on a single model, but on other types of RFM models as well. The current white-box setting, demonstrated on one specific approach for geographic flow model is not enough as it stands, together with the fact that it is not fully shown that it is actually better.
Minor comments: The appearance of the paper should be improved, there are at least a few instances where two words are missing a space in between (e.g., L85), the text itself can feel too repetitive (e.g., L75-59 and L207-210)
Questions for authors
-Can the GeoFA-TD loss be further analyzed to show its significance on other domains? Even toy examples would substantially help to visualize how this approach is tailored for RFM and why it is better than other perturbation methods (if that is even the case).
- Apart from qualitative examples for the images differences as shown in Fig.2, can the author's supply also quantitative measures such as PSNR, LPIPS on the datasets? It is important to understand that the different optimizations, even when bounded with , resemble the original image.
3 comments
Response to GCLw (2/2)
3. Other weaknesses:
Black vs white box attacks' comparability
We have expanded our black box evaluation of GeoFA-TD in order to make the comparison with geoShield and RTA [1], a newly added baseline, fairer. Full results are given in point 2 of our answer to reviewer vEoU.
We highlight that black box evaluations of RTA [1] are limited to retrieval methods that use the same image encoder as the method the attack is trained on, e.g. CLIP (or a variation of it). This is close to our black box evaluation of GeoFA-TD in Figure 5, which evaluates GeoFA-TD against a geographic diffusion variant of RFM (thus evaluating a generative architecture transfer, not an encoder transfer).
Novelty compared to known attacks adapted from the literature
We aknowledge that naming the attacks we adapted from the literature with a "GeoFA" prefix can cause confusion. We deliberately kept the initial names of the attacks (ex: GeoFA-DPA, now DPA-G, comes from DPA=Diffusion Policy Attack), this was not meant to confuse the reader in thinking these attacks were fully novel. One of our work's contribution is organizing prior work in terms of where and what it attacks, and adapting it to geographic RFM. To the best of our knowledge, prior work on adversarial attacks against a diffusion model on another modality than images does not do that [2, 3].
For clarity purposes, we changed the naming of attacks adapted from the literature to [Attack name]-G to show they were adapted to our setting. We keep the GeoFA prefix for -TD and -.
References:
[1] Niccolo Niccoli, Federico Becattini, and Lorenzo Seidenari. Defending from GeoLocalization through adversarial road trips. In Paolo Favaro, Zuzana Kukelova, Atsuto Maki, Anna Rohrbach, Konrad Schindler, and Federico Tombari (eds.), Computer Vision – ECCV 2026, volume 17054 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 611–629, Cham, 2026.
[2] Yipu Chen, Haotian Xue, and Yongxin Chen. Diffusion policy attacker: Crafting adversarial attacks for diffusion-based policies. In A. Globerson, L. Mackey, D. Belgrave, A. Fan, U. Paquet, J. Tomczak, and C. Zhang (eds.), Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, volume 37, pp. 119614–119637. Curran Associates, Inc., 2024b.
[3] Erik Imgrund, Thorsten Eisenhofer, and Konrad Rieck. Adversarial observations in weather forecasting. In Proceedings of the 2025 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS ’25), 2025. doi: 10.1145/3719027.3765076.
Summary of the rebuttal
We thank the reviewer again for your detailed and constructive review. We hope the additional results and analysis address your concerns. Specifically,
- Clarity of contributions: attacks adapted from the literature are now named [Attack]-G (e.g. DPA-G). The GeoFA prefix is kept only for our two new objectives
- Analysis of the TD loss (App. E): rotation moves predictions 3× more than scaling (548 vs. 182 km); TD rotates more than L² (114° vs. 91°), in the same direction 97% of the time, and shifts predictions further (14,609 vs. 9,849 km).
- Image quality: GeoFA-TD beats GeoShield at every budget:. PSNR 40.1 vs. 34.0 and LPIPS 0.026 vs. 0.117 at 8/255 (Table 12, App. F.2.5).
- Black-box: GeoFA-TD with no model access stays >99% (OSV-5M) / >91% (YFCC4k), above GeoShield and RTA at every budget. Transfer across encoders is limited for all methods and now stated explicitly.
- Advantage over adapted attacks: GeoFA-TD is cheaper than Sampling-G (Table 3), works in the black box setting (Table 2) and transfers across generative paradigm (Figure 5)
We hope these additions address your concerns. If they do, we would be grateful if you would consider updating your assessment. We are happy to clarify anything further.
Response to GCLw (1/2)
Dear reviewer,
Thank you for your thorough review of our work. Below, we adress each your questions and pointed weaknesses
1. Significance of GeoFA-TD loss
We add a toy experiment and velocity deviation measurements of the real model attacked by GeoFA-TD and GeoFA-L^2 in Appendix E to allow a better understanding of the GeoFA-TD loss.
Toy model.
The toy model consists in a two mode riemannian flow matching model. We perturb velocities either by scaling ψ by (1+s) or by rotating it by θ each step. We show that scaling the velocity essentially accelerates the speed of sampling but only poorly deviates the trajectory. At equal L2 cost per step s=∥ψ~−ψ∥/∥ψ∥, the table below gives the mean shift of the endpoint over 2,000 uniform starts. It considers both a time independent and a time conditioned velocity field so as to better compare to our geographic RFM:
Table 1: results of scale/angular perturbations on our RFM toy model
Scaling the velocity has no effect under a time independent velocity field, and a weak effect on the time dependent one compared to rotations.
Real model measures (YFCC4k, 100 images).
We test pertrubating RFM S2's clean velocity on YFCC4k images via scale and angular perturbations. Here again, rotating velocities has a much stronger effect than scaling it, which is coherent with our toy experiment.
Table 2: results of scale/angular perturbations of the real model's velocities on 100 YFCC4k images
These perturbation strategies may seem artifical, since we add a fixed invariant perturbation at each step. Especially for rotations, one might argue that rotations could compensate each other if they do not have the same sense over many steps. We therefore measure the effect of GeoFA-TD and GeoFA-L^2 on sampling dynamics on 100 images in Table 3, which compares attacked and clean velocities ψδ=ψ(xk∣c+δ), ψc=ψ(xk∣c) at each point xk (θk is the angle between the two guided velocities)::
Table 3: Comparison of clean and attacked velocities for GeoFA-TD and GeoFA-L^2 on 100 YFCC4k images.
GeoFA-L2 inflates the velocity more (ratio 1.48 vs. 1.20 at 8/255). GeoFA-TD deviates its angle more and its predictions move further. We also check that the GeoFA-TD's rotations keep the same sense over steps. This is the case of 97% of steps, meaning that the deviations add up along sampling. This justifies using same sense angular rotations in our toy example.
GeoFA-TD compared to other methods
We stress that GeoFA-TD:
2. Quantitative measures of image quality
We measure PSNR and LPIPS for GeoFA-TD and GeoShield on YFCC4k as in [1]. GeoFA-TD consistently outperforms GeoShield in PSNR and LPIPs, which is coherent with our qualitative observations. Only at low budget 1/255, the two attacks are close. This is the regime in which GeoShield almost completely fails (see Table 2 of the udpated PDF), while GeoFA-TD remains strong.
Table 4: Quantitative image quality comparison of GeoShield and GeoFA-TD on YFCC4k.