- Rating
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- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
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- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
This paper proposes a two-stage framework named A-PAIR. In Stage I, adversarial training is implemented based on a pre-trained diffusion model, where the attack branch and localization branch are trained alternately to generate coarse adversarial maps. In Stage II, a perturbation refinement module is adopted to improve image quality while preserving attack performance. The paper demonstrates that the proposed method achieves superior cross-model transferability and attack capability across diverse attack scenarios (black-box, gray-box, and white-box), and the resulting adversarial images exhibit lower visual distortion.
Critical strengths
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This work demonstrates that pre-trained diffusion models can provide anti-forensic priors with generalization capability.
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A two-stage A-PAIR framework is proposed. It generates adversarial samples via attack-localization interaction, and the refinement stage supports attacker settings of black-box, gray-box, and white-box.
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Extensive evaluations on multiple datasets verify that A-PAIR outperforms several baseline methods in terms of attack performance, cross-model transferability, and image fidelity.
Critical weaknesses
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The problem addressed in this paper is not rigorously formulated, and an overview of the threat model is missing. For instance, Section 3.1 states that the target scenario takes a manipulated image x as input to generate an adversarial image x*. However, the subsequent generation and refinement processes actually require the ground-truth mask, rather than enabling blind attacks relying solely on x. Consequently, the applicability of the proposed method is restricted to parties that construct the manipulated image x (if my understanding is correct). These aspects should be rigorously clarified at the outset.
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Section 3.2 is poorly organized. It fails to specify the source of the diffusion backbone theta, whether it corresponds to a black-box or white-box setting, and how the LoRA parameters theta_b are obtained. Moreover, I do not observe the necessity of employing the diffusion sampling pipeline here. The authors should provide a reasonable justification for adopting the VAE encoder/decoder from diffusion models instead of alternatives such as GAN-trained modules. The current approach appears to retrofit diffusion sampling merely to follow research trends, with weak intrinsic connections to the core methodology.
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The motivation presented in Section 3.3 lacks valid justification. Why are the adversarial samples produced in the aforementioned Stage 3.2 coarse? Why can Stage II achieve refinement? Preliminary experiments are required to substantiate these claims, rather than relying solely on textual description.
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The assumption about m in Line 268 is unreasonable. How can m or m_1 be accessible during inference?
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Finally, reviewing the entire methodology section (Section 3), the authors do not introduce original algorithms or modules; the work merely assembles existing techniques (e.g., diffusion models, adversarial attacks, and iterative update strategies). Therefore, the technical contributions are insufficiently demonstrated.
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The experimental datasets are outdated. While the inclusion of classic datasets is reasonable, newer datasets (e.g., diffusion-based manipulation datasets) should also be incorporated.
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The attack algorithms selected for comparison are general-purpose, instead of methods specifically designed against IMLD. Targeted attack baselines such as the following references should be added for comparison: [*1] L. Zhuo, S. Luo, S. Tan, H. Chen, B. Li, and J. Huang, “Evading detection actively: Toward anti-forensics against forgery localization", IEEE TDSC, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 852–869, 2025. [*2] S. Fang and M. Stamm, “Attacking image splicing detection and localization algorithms using synthetic traces", IEEE TIFS, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 2143–2156, 2024.
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Given the numerous issues identified in this manuscript, I do not believe the current version can be adequately revised within a short rebuttal window. The authors are advised to carefully consider the comments above and conduct thorough revisions.
Questions for authors
Please refer to the weaknesses.