- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper focuses on backdoor attacks in federated learning. The authors observe that client heterogeneity affects attack stability and refer to this phenomenon as Attack Collapse. They further attribute this instability to the misalignment between poisoned features and the target-class distribution. To address this issue, the authors construct stable anchors using EDL, guide poisoned samples toward feature regions compatible with the target class, and meanwhile maintain appropriate semantic separation from non-target classes. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Critical strengths
The authors observe that increasing client heterogeneity can lead to significant ASR fluctuations, which they characterize as Attack Collapse. I find this phenomenon interesting and believe it has a certain degree of novelty and practical significance.
The experimental evaluation is relatively comprehensive, the overall results are strong, and the authors also provide the corresponding code.
Critical weaknesses
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I find the phenomenon identified by the authors interesting. However, I believe the main issue is that the current analysis does not yet establish a complete and sufficiently substantiated chain of reasoning. Why does stronger client heterogeneity lead to more severe Attack Collapse? Figure 1 shows that ASR becomes increasingly unstable as heterogeneity increases, but it remains unclear whether this instability is indeed caused by feature misalignment. More convincing evidence is needed to support this claim.
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The authors introduce EDL to enable more reliable anchor selection, and the motivation is reasonable. However, the paper does not provide sufficient quantitative or qualitative experiments to demonstrate the necessity of this module.
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The paper lacks direct quantitative validation of its “distribution-preserving” property. The current Acc, ASR, AQ, and t-SNE results mainly demonstrate attack effectiveness and stability, but do not sufficiently verify that poisoned samples indeed remain within the target data distribution.
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Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 require anchors to satisfy threshold conditions on concentration and conflict, respectively. However, the algorithm selects anchors solely by ranking the product of the two, i.e., ADS. Therefore, it remains unclear whether this selection strategy can guarantee that the conditions required by the theoretical analysis are satisfied.
Questions for authors
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Could the authors provide stronger evidence to support the claim that more severe Attack Collapse under higher client heterogeneity is mainly caused by feature misalignment, rather than simply showing the corresponding ASR fluctuations?
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Could the authors provide additional quantitative or qualitative evidence to demonstrate the necessity of EDL for reliable anchor selection, for example by comparing it with simpler confidence-based or probability-based anchor selection strategies?
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Could the authors provide direct quantitative evaluation of the “distribution-preserving” property to verify that poisoned samples indeed remain close to the target-class distribution?
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Could the authors clarify how the ADS-based ranking used in the algorithm ensures that the selected anchors satisfy the separate concentration and conflict threshold conditions required by Lemma 2 and Theorem 1?