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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

SCTL: State Conditioned Temporal Ledgers for Long Horizon LLM Teams

Abstract

Long-horizon tasks give teams of large language model (LLM) agents many chances to drift from a cooperative plan. Existing methods fix each agent's share of the team's result before execution, although the work that remains changes as the task proceeds. We show that whether LLM agents stay on the plan depends on when each agent's share of the team's cost is charged, even when the total stays the same. We introduce the State-Conditioned Temporal Ledger (SCTL). At each checkpoint it estimates the cost that each group of agents would still bear from the observed state and splits the team's cost with the Shapley value. Each agent then sees how much it has paid and how much it still owes. Unlike classical time-consistent payment schedules, which are defined only along the agreed plan, SCTL makes each payment depend on the time and on the state. An agent that deviates keeps its unpaid balance as a penalty and pays it to the team when it returns. SCTL works on top of existing workflows without retraining. On nine long-horizon multi-agent LLM benchmarks and CoopEval, SCTL beats the strongest baseline fixed in advance in eight of ten settings, with a median long-horizon gain of 3.6%. On a controlled benchmark with exact values, it reduces the normalized gap in team cost by a median 37.1% relative to charging the same total in equal parts, and the advantage grows with the length of the task. Keeping the unpaid balance as a penalty cuts the cost gap of a delayed schedule from 0.611 to 0.166.

Primary area:
foundation or frontier models, including LLMs
Keywords:
multi-agent LLM systems, long-horizon coordination, LLM agents, Shapley value, cooperative dynamic games, inference-time coordination

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 2%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.33 over 3 reviews, above 2% of the others.
Reviewer_6LHNOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
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Paper summary

This paper introduces State-Conditioned Temporal Ledgers (SCTL), an inference-time coordination layer for long-horizon LLM teams. At each checkpoint, SCTL estimates coalition continuation values, allocates the team value using the Shapley value, and updates each agent’s ledger according to the current state. The proposed mechanism also retains unpaid balances following deviation. The paper combines controlled games with exact coalition values and evaluations on nine long-horizon benchmarks plus CoopEval across seven LLMs. It reports improvements over the pre-specified comparator in eight of ten settings and uses controlled interventions to study how payment timing relates to deviations from cooperation.

Critical strengths
  1. An interesting perspective on the persistence of cooperation. Studying when agents cease to follow a cooperative plan is a useful angle on long-horizon multi-agent coordination. The focus on changing continuation obligations and the timing of departure raises an interesting question beyond whether a team can initially establish cooperation.

  2. Extensive experimental coverage with recent models. The evaluation is broad, spanning controlled games, multiple external benchmarks, and numerous ablations. The paper examines payment schedules, information presentation, allocation rules, rollout budgets, horizon scaling, and recovery after agent loss. The model panel is also notably current, including GPT-6 Astra and Claude Fable 5.1, both released in September 2026.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The methodological novelty is insufficiently distinguished from the integration of existing ideas. SCTL combines coalition valuation, Shapley allocation, temporal accounting, state-dependent recomputation, and prompt augmentation. While this combination may be practically useful, the paper does not clearly establish which component or interaction constitutes a substantive methodological advance. The contrast with classical payment schemes is also broader than justified: the related work in Appendix A.5 already discusses subgame consistency and node-consistent allocations. A more precise comparison is needed to identify what SCTL adds beyond adapting these ideas to rollout estimates and LLM prompts. As written, the conceptual framing appears stronger than the demonstrated novelty.

  2. The payment-based interpretation is not established by the main LLM experiments. The motivation and method are framed around payment timing, outstanding obligations, and penalties that discourage deviation. However, Appendix G explicitly states that the ledger fields in the LLM benchmarks do not create a binding incentive. These experiments therefore test the behavioral effect of additional numerical information in the prompt, without establishing that the ledger changes agents’ actual payoffs. Improved task scores can support the usefulness of this information, but they do not directly demonstrate the effectiveness of a payment mechanism or show that retaining unpaid balances establishes incentive compatibility. The paper needs a clearer separation between evidence for an informational coordination aid and evidence for an economic incentive mechanism.

  3. Accounting consistency does not establish the sustainability of cooperation. The identity in Equation (6), that settled charges plus the remaining balance equal the initial allocation, follows from the telescoping update in Equation (5). It does not by itself imply individual rationality or stability against strategic deviations. Additional conditions are needed to ensure that recomputed shares remain acceptable to each agent, and Shapley allocation alone does not provide this guarantee in a general coalition game. Moreover, Appendix K acknowledges that a forward-looking agent faces an optimal-stopping problem, so the current-step comparison between the remaining balance and the immediate deviation cost need not determine the optimal time to exit. The paper does not sufficiently bridge these accounting properties and the stronger interpretation that the mechanism sustains cooperation.

  4. The ablations provide limited support for the necessity of the central mechanism components. The paper acknowledges that most of the improvement comes from exposing rollout estimates. Table 32 shows that replacing Shapley allocation with equal splitting changes external-benchmark scores by at most 0.33%, while the comparisons against proportional and equal-savings allocation in Appendix N.6 do not yield confidence intervals excluding zero on any LLM benchmark. SCTL also significantly outperforms StructuredTeamValue on only three of nine tasks, and SameInfoSummary on only three of ten settings. These results do not rule out useful component effects, but they suggest that the incremental contribution of the specific allocation and ledger representation is small or task-dependent. The evidence therefore supports the value of continuation information more clearly than the necessity of the full proposed mechanism.

Questions for authors

See weaknesses above.

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer 6LHN

Thank you for the thorough review. In short: (1) we will state the contribution precisely relative to classical schedules. (2) The LLM experiments evaluate SCTL as an informational coordination mechanism, and the controlled games evaluate responses to payment timing. (3) Equation (6) is an accounting property. (4) We will report the component effects at their measured size.

1. Methodological novelty.

Time-consistent Shapley schedules (Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003), subgame-consistent and node-consistent allocations, and recomputation on a moving horizon (the Looking Forward Approach) are the foundation of SCTL, and we will state what each covers in Section 3.3 and Appendix A.5. The contribution of SCTL is to carry these schedules to LLM teams: coalition values are estimated by rollouts of LLM agents, the shares are recomputed at the state reached after a deviation, and the study measures how LLM agents respond to the timing of displayed charges.

2. The payment interpretation.

Appendix G states that the ledger fields create no binding incentive on the LLM benchmarks. Those experiments therefore test the value of the information in the prompt, and we present them as evidence for an informational coordination mechanism. The controlled games, where agents make explicit stay or exit decisions under specified cost rules, provide the evidence about responses to payment timing, measured for LLM agents (general response, item 1).

3. Accounting consistency and the sustainability of cooperation.

Equation (6) follows from the telescoping update in Equation (5) and is an accounting property. Individual rationality and stability against strategic deviation require further conditions, since the Shapley value need not lie in the core, and Appendix K treats the forward-looking agent as an optimal-stopping problem. We will describe Equation (6) accordingly and make no stability claim.

4. Ablations and the necessity of the components.

The ablations identify exposure of the rollout estimates as the main driver of the improvement and bound the role of the remaining components. SCTL is significantly better than StructuredTeamValue on 3 of 9 tasks and than SameInfoSummary on 3 of 10 settings, while the equal split stays within 0.33% of SCTL and no interval against proportional or equal-savings allocation excludes zero. We will report each component effect at its measured size.

Reviewer_cgGHOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
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Paper summary

The paper proposes SCTL, an inference-time ledger for teams of LLM agents working on long-horizon tasks. At each checkpoint, SCTL estimates the value of every coalition from the current state. These values are computed exactly in a controlled linear-quadratic game and estimated by rollouts on the LLM benchmarks. SCTL then splits the team value with the Shapley value and shows each agent its share, the amount it has already paid, and its remaining balance in the prompt. When an agent deviates, its unpaid balance is kept as a penalty. The central claim is that whether agents stay on the cooperative plan depends on when a share is charged, not only on its total, because under a Delayed schedule the balance an agent still owes eventually exceeds its falling cost of deviating. Empirically, SCTL beats the strongest pre-fixed baseline in 8 of 10 LLM benchmark settings, with a median gain of 3.6%. On the controlled game, it reduces the team-cost gap by 37.1% relative to a uniform schedule.

Critical strengths

S1: The experiments are carefully and transparently designed: comparators fixed in advance, compute-matched, placebo and shuffled controls, multiple-testing correction, and 7 models × 10 settings. The controlled game is fully specified, and every published value can be reproduced exactly from Table 5; This makes the empirical results credible and checkable.

S2: The paper connects time-consistent payment schedules from cooperative dynamic games to LLM teams. Its training-free ledger consistently improves the benchmarks' own workflows (Native+SCTL, Table 26), which gives it practical value regardless of how the mechanism is interpreted.

Critical weaknesses

W1: The central incentive argument fails in the paper's own model. Under Delayed with write-off, a forward-looking agent exits only at T−1T-1, where all controls are zero. I re-solved G1–G3 from Table 5: Delayed's rational GcostG_{cost} is 0, as for SCTL (Uniform: 0.065–0.124). So Delayed gives no "reason to deviate" (lines 45–48), and the Delayed-based identification measures only myopic LLM choices.

W2: On the LLM benchmarks, the gains do not come from the claimed mechanism. Agents cannot deviate, and the ledger is non-binding. ComputeMatched, PlaceboLedger and NoMechanism score about the same, and Shapley and an equal split differ by at most 0.33%, so the gain comes from showing rollout forecasts. SCTL uses about 10× more tokens and is significantly better than the compute-matched ActionLookahead on only 4 of 9 tasks.

W3: The theory is asserted, not proven, and the paper contains no theorem. As defined in §3.3, the penalty is collected only when the agent returns, so under permanent deviation it equals write-off; the reported 0.611 → 0.166 result uses a different rule (Appendix E.5). The claim that "SCTL keeps staying cheaper" holds only on filtered instances: SCTL crosses the boundary in 37 of 120 unfiltered ones (Appendix D).

Questions for authors
  1. Under write-off, a forward-looking agent under Delayed exits only at T−1T-1, with Gcost=0G_{cost} = 0? If so, how should the Delayed-based identification results be read? Can the identification be repeated under Uniform?
  2. Which penalty rule is SCTL: "collected on return" (§3.3) or "payable after EXIT" (Appendix E.5)? Apart from Appendix N.2, is any result obtained with the penalty exactly as defined in §3.3? Can you prove that the penalty deters deviation, or that SCTL keeps staying cheaper than deviating without filtering instances?
  3. Can you add a neutral-forecast control (the same per-agent rollout estimates, without payment language) and compute-matched versions of the strongest baselines?
  4. How does the ledger differ from Petrosyan & Zaccour (2003) and the Looking Forward Approach (Petrosian 2016; Petrosian & Barabanov 2017)? Neither is cited.
2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer cgGH (1/2)

Thank you for the careful review and for re-solving the controlled games. In short: (1) your analysis of the Delayed schedule agrees with Appendix K, and we will present the identification results as a measurement of LLM responses to displayed charges. (2) The ablations locate the LLM gains in the rollout information and show an additional effect of the ledger format. (3) We clarify the penalty rule and will cite and discuss the works you name.

Weaknesses

W1. The incentive argument under Delayed.

Your result agrees with Appendix K. Under Delayed with write-off a forward-looking agent exits only at the final step, so the rational deviation rate is zero for both Delayed and SCTL. The deviations observed under Delayed are therefore choices of LLM agents in response to the displayed balance, which is what the identification experiments measure. We will state this in lines 45 to 48 and in Section 4.2. We will also report that under Uniform a forward-looking agent does deviate (rational rate 0.065 to 0.124 by your calculation), which gives readers a direct comparison of the two schedules.

W2. Source of the gains on the LLM benchmarks.

On the LLM benchmarks agents cannot deviate and the ledger is informational. ComputeMatched stays within 0.6% of NoMechanism, and Shapley and equal splits differ by at most 0.33%, so the main source of the gain is the rollout information (general response, item 2). Against the compute-matched ActionLookahead, SCTL scores higher on 7 of 9 tasks, with 4 intervals above zero. SCTL uses about ten times the tokens of NoMechanism, and we will report this cost in the main text.

W3. Theory and the penalty rule.

Equation (6) is an accounting identity, and the paper will make no claim that the penalty deters deviation or that the ledger sustains cooperation (general response, item 3). The penalty rule of SCTL is that of Section 3.3: the unpaid balance is kept and collected when the agent returns. Under permanent deviation the agent never returns, so the rule coincides with write-off, as you note.

  • Appendix E.5. The 0.611 to 0.166 result comes from the No-write-off arm, which keeps the balance payable after exit. We will label it as a separate variant in the abstract and in Section 4.
  • Appendix N.2. The rule of Section 3.3 is tested with returning agents, where it lowers the share of steps off the plan from 0.241 to 0.165 and Gcost by 0.073 [0.044, 0.104].
  • Filtered bank. The comparison between staying and deviating holds on the filtered identification bank, and we will state that SCTL crosses the boundary in 37 of 120 unfiltered instances.
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer cgGH (2/2)

Questions

Q1. Exit timing under Delayed and identification under Uniform.

Yes. Under write-off a forward-looking agent under Delayed exits only at the final step, and the Delayed-based identification results measure LLM responses to displayed charges (W1). Identification under Uniform is a natural next experiment, and we will list it in the limitations.

Q2. Which penalty rule is SCTL.

SCTL uses the rule of Section 3.3, which Appendix N.2 evaluates directly. Appendix E.5 evaluates a variant that keeps the balance payable after exit (W3). We present both as empirical results and make no deterrence claim.

Q3. Neutral-forecast control and compute-matched baselines.

SameInfoSummary serves as this control. It shows each agent the same continuation estimates, checkpoint timing and carried values as SCTL in plain text, without the ledger fields. SCTL exceeds it on all four pooled point estimates, with intervals excluding zero on 3 of 10 settings. A variant without any payment language and compute-matched versions of the strongest baselines are natural extensions, and we will list them in the limitations.

Q4. Relation to Petrosyan and Zaccour (2003) and the Looking Forward Approach.

Thank you for these references, which we will cite. Petrosyan and Zaccour (2003) define a time-consistent payment schedule for the Shapley value along the cooperative trajectory, which SCTL reproduces on that trajectory. The Looking Forward Approach (Petrosian, 2016, Petrosian and Barabanov, 2017) recomputes the cooperative solution on a moving truncated horizon with updated information, which is close to the moving forecast horizon of SCTL. SCTL extends both in three respects.

  • Coalition values are estimated by rollouts of LLM agents, without a known model of the task.
  • The shares are recomputed at the state reached after a deviation.
  • The unpaid balance of a deviating agent is carried into its ledger.

We will add this comparison to Section 3.3 and Appendix A.5.

Reviewer_RVHhOpenReview ↗
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2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
3
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Paper summary

This paper introduces SCTL, an inference-time coordination mechanism for long-horizon LLM teams. It estimates coalition values from the current state, allocates costs or cooperation gains using Shapley values, and updates per-agent ledgers over time. Experiments combine controlled games with ten benchmark settings to examine cooperation and task performance.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper offers a novel perspective on long-horizon cooperation by making allocation depend on both time and the state reached during execution.

  2. The evaluation is comprehensive, covering multiple models, benchmarks, and ablations. SCTL outperforms the strongest baseline in eight of ten settings.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The core mechanism’s independent contribution appears limited. Ablations show that rollout-derived information accounts for most gains, while individual ledgers add smaller benefits and Shapley allocation performs similarly to equal allocation.

  2. There is a gap between the controlled games and practical LLM-team settings. The former provide explicit stay/exit decisions and cost rules, whereas the latter mainly present cooperation credits through prompts.

Questions for authors

N/A

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to Reviewer RVHh

Thank you for the review and for the positive assessment of the time- and state-dependent allocation. In short: (1) the ablations locate the gain on the LLM benchmarks in the rollout information and measure the additional effects of the ledger format and the Shapley split. (2) We will report the controlled-game evidence and the benchmark evidence separately.

1. Independent contribution of the mechanism.

ComputeMatched runs the same rollouts without showing them and stays within 0.6% of NoMechanism, so the gain requires exposing the estimates to the agents. On top of this, the ledger format and the per-agent split contribute +1.19% and +0.62% in the 2 × 2 design. The Shapley split matters most under asymmetry: at the highest asymmetry of the controlled stress test it lowers Gcost by 14.3% relative to an equal split, while on the LLM benchmarks an equal split stays within 0.33% of SCTL. We will report each component at its measured size (general response, item 2).

2. Gap between the controlled games and the LLM settings.

The two settings answer complementary questions. In the controlled games agents make explicit stay or exit decisions under specified cost rules, which measures how LLM agents respond to the timing of displayed charges. On the LLM benchmarks the ledger is shown in the prompt without binding effect, which measures whether the same information improves task scores. We will report the two kinds of evidence separately and keep the incentive interpretation to the controlled games.

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General Response to All Reviewers

We thank the reviewers for their careful reading. Three points recur in the reviews: the incentive argument for the Delayed schedule, the role of the ledger on the LLM benchmarks, and the relation to classical payment schedules. We address them here and answer the remaining points individually.

1. The incentive argument.

Reviewer cgGH's analysis of the Delayed schedule is consistent with Appendix K, which treats the decision of a forward-looking agent as an optimal-stopping problem. Under Delayed with write-off, such an agent exits only at the final step. The deviations observed under Delayed therefore measure how LLM agents respond to the displayed balance, which is the quantity the identification experiments are designed to capture. We will make this reading explicit in the motivation (lines 45 to 48) and in Section 3, and present the identification results as a measurement of how LLM agents respond to the timing of displayed charges.

2. The role of the ledger on the LLM benchmarks.

The ablations locate the source of the gain precisely.

  • Rollout information. ComputeMatched runs the same rollouts without showing them and stays within 0.6% of NoMechanism, so the improvement requires that agents see the rollout estimates.
  • Ledger format. SCTL scores above StructuredTeamValue on 7 of 9 tasks, with 3 intervals above zero, and a 2 × 2 design separates the ledger format (+1.19%) from the per-agent split (+0.62%).
  • Split rule. On these benchmarks the ledger is informational rather than binding (Appendix G), and an equal split stays within 0.33% of SCTL.

We will present SCTL on the LLM benchmarks as an informational coordination mechanism and report each component effect at its measured size.

3. Theory and relation to classical schedules.

Equation (6) is an accounting identity that follows from the telescoping update, and we will describe it as such. Individual rationality and stability against deviation require further conditions, since the Shapley value need not lie in the core, so the paper will make no stability claim. We will cite Petrosyan and Zaccour (2003), who define a time-consistent payment schedule for the Shapley value, and the Looking Forward Approach (Petrosian, 2016, Petrosian and Barabanov, 2017), which recomputes the cooperative solution on a moving truncated horizon. SCTL builds on both and extends them in three respects: coalition values are estimated by rollouts of LLM agents rather than computed from a known model, the shares are recomputed at the state reached after a deviation, and the unpaid balance of a deviating agent is carried into its ledger.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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