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Paper summary
This paper studies collaborative LLM unlearning when model parameters and forget data are held by different parties. The authors propose DARC, which publishes multiple model views using correlated Gaussian noise and function-preserving reparameterizations. Authorized executors perform local unlearning, while the server aggregates their updates using inverse-scale weights to cancel the common first-order noise effect. The paper provides analyses of checkpoint privacy under bounded collusion, update recovery errors, and optimizer compatibility. Experiments on Llama and Qwen models with TOFU and MUSE evaluate forgetting performance, retained utility, and update fidelity.
Critical strengths
- The paper addresses a meaningful problem by combining checkpoint protection with authorized unlearning. Theorems 1 and 2 analyze checkpoint privacy under bounded collusion and first-order noise cancellation, respectively, with clearly stated assumptions. This provides a useful framework for collaborative unlearning.
- The analysis of optimizer compatibility is technically valuable. Theorem 3 distinguishes the effects of signed permutations and continuous rotations on Adam-family optimizers. The experiments cover multiple unlearning methods, models, and datasets, and also report numerical discrepancies between theoretical compatibility and practical implementations.
Critical weaknesses
- The methodological novelty appears somewhat limited. Correlated noise cancellation, privacy-preserving collaborative learning, and parameter symmetries have been studied in prior work, including DECOR, Offsite-Tuning, and privacy-preserving federated unlearning. Although DARC adapts these ideas to LLM unlearning and provides a first-order error analysis, its distinct contribution over existing techniques is not sufficiently established. Moreover, the comparisons in Table 2 differ in computation and perturbation settings, while Figure 3 shows that the aggregated update error (0.3890) is slightly higher than that of one individual view (0.3726). This makes the practical benefit of the proposed mechanism unclear.
- The practical model confidentiality remains questionable. Theorem 1 requires a fixed public covariance, complete release accounting, and a specified sensitivity bound, while some experimental settings do not satisfy the conditions for full-checkpoint privacy accounting. In Appendix J.9, Table 62 shows that public-anchor alignment using only one published view achieves a relative parameter error of approximately (6.44\times10^{-5}). Table 64 also reports highly similar outputs between individual views and the original model. These results do not invalidate the conditional RDP theorem, but they raise concerns about the practical confidentiality provided by DARC.
Questions for authors
- Compared with existing correlated noise cancellation and privacy-preserving collaborative learning methods, such as DECOR, what is the main distinct technical contribution of DARC? Could the authors clarify which challenges cannot be directly addressed by existing approaches?
- Appendix J.9 shows highly accurate parameter recovery from a single published view using a public base model. How do the authors reconcile this observation with the practical model confidentiality objective? Can a meaningful privacy budget be provided for the evaluated noise settings?
- Could the authors provide more closely matched comparisons in terms of computation and perturbation settings to demonstrate the benefit of inverse-scale aggregation over simpler single-view or multi-view averaging strategies? Also, Eq. (5) and Algorithm 1 use different orders of noise addition and parameter transformation. Please clarify which formulation is implemented.
6 comments
Response to Reviewer iUzB (2/2): W2 / Q2
W2 / Q2. Practical confidentiality is questionable: some settings do not meet Theorem 1's conditions, one view allows accurate parameter recovery (Table 62) and has near-identical outputs (Table 64). Can a meaningful budget be given?
A budget is now given, together with a new configuration that meets all conditions of Theorem 1 (Tables 68, 70). We agree with your concern with Tables 62 and 64: at κ = 0.01 one view determines the parameters up to the injected noise, and its outputs match the original model's. The submission reports both (abstract; Appendix B.6, J.9), but its main text did not say that DARC bounds what a coalition learns about the parameters and does not hide the function. Section 3 now does.
- Budget. At κ = 0.01 and m = 2, one view is (1, 10⁻⁵)-DP within Δ = 0.0027 whitened units (Table 68). This is a statement of Theorem 1 in the formal configuration; for the submitted runs it holds only in the restricted sense of item 3. In the same units the fine-tuning delta has norm 482 (formal) or 3.1 × 10⁴ (submitted), and the model retrained without the forget set is 139 or 1.6 × 10⁴ away, so at this κ the radius covers only small parameter differences; Section 5.1 now says so. Theorem 1 is a metric-privacy statement about parameters, and the submission does not claim a record-level bound (Section 3 notes that one would need a separate sensitivity certificate).
- Table 62. Public-anchor alignment removes the key, and Theorem 1 is proved with keys revealed. The remaining error, 6.44 × 10⁻⁵ of ‖θ‖, is the injected noise: we measure a noise norm of 0.0446 against ‖θ‖ = 706.6, a ratio of 6.3 × 10⁻⁵. The parameter protection at this κ is the radius of item 1, and it grows linearly with κ.
- Conditions of Theorem 1. As Section 5.1 of the submission notes, a task-vector profile supports only a stratum statement and an unnoised private coordinate can invalidate ordinary RDP. The submitted runs had both: the tied embedding and LM head were left unnoised (Appendix J.8). The new "formal" configuration uses a public profile (layer RMS of the public base model), noises every tensor that differs from the base, takes the frozen reference model from the executor's own view, and runs a single round, so no composition assumption is needed.
- Results in the formal configuration. At κ = 0.01, a view has cosine 0.81 to the fine-tuning delta, KL 0.0028 to the original model and 0.67% top-1 changes, and it remains a working model (Table 70). DARC's update error is 0.52–0.80 of the single view's across the four methods. DARC is closer than the single view in 12 of 12 paired runs, and closer than the independent average in 8 of 9 runs for NPO, SimNPO and UnDIAL and in 1 of 3 for GradDiff (Table 73).
- Exposure against noise. Table 70 covers κ = 0.01 to κ = 10 for one view. For two colluders out of three at κ = 1, the cosine rises from 0.71 to 0.89, as Theorem 1 predicts (γ(S) = 4).
In response to your review, Section 2 now states the difference from DECOR; Sections 6.2 and 6.4 and Appendix M give the matched comparison; Sections 3 and 5.1 and Tables 68 and 70 give the budget, its scope and a configuration within Theorem 1; and Algorithm 1's cross-reference is clarified. We would welcome your updated assessment. Relative to prior noise-cancellation work, the paper contributes first-order cancellation through a multi-step adaptive optimizer, with the decoder weights and key family this requires, and an exact coalition bound for the published views.
Thank you for the detailed rebuttal and additional experiments. However, I still have some questions about the following three points:
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The new formal configuration satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1, but Table 68 shows that the privacy guarantee applies only within a relatively small parameter neighborhood, while Table 73 still reports non-negligible update errors. I encourage the authors to evaluate additional noise levels under the formal configuration, using NPO or SimNPO, and jointly report the privacy budget, parameter recovery error, relative update error, and unlearning performance. This would provide a more direct assessment of the confidentiality–fidelity trade-off and clarify which practical parameter-disclosure risks the guarantee meaningfully mitigates.
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Theorem 1 holds even when the transformation keys are revealed, while Appendix J.9 demonstrates highly accurate public-anchor alignment. Furthermore, the new matched comparisons use equal noise scales, under which inverse-scale weighting reduces to uniform averaging. I encourage the authors to provide targeted ablations comparing parameter recovery with and without reparameterization keys under matched noise settings, and comparing inverse-scale weighting against uniform averaging under heterogeneous noise scales. These experiments would help establish the distinct contributions and practical necessity of the individual components.
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Appendix J.6 reports non-negligible numerical discrepancies even for theoretically compatible transformations, while the new matched comparisons primarily focus on Llama-3.2-1B and TOFU Forget01. Could the authors clarify how randomness coupling and optimizer states were handled in Tables 71–73, and report the transformation-induced update discrepancies under the same experimental settings? Additionally, I encourage at least one compute-matched comparison against independent-noise averaging on a Qwen model or the MUSE dataset to assess whether the observed denoising improvements generalize across models or datasets.
Response to Reviewer iUzB (1/2): W1 / Q1 and Q3
Your review asks what DARC contributes beyond existing noise-cancellation methods and whether its benefit and confidentiality hold in practice. We answer with a comparison matched in compute and noise against independent-noise averaging (Tables 71–73), an explicit budget in a configuration that meets Theorem 1's conditions (Tables 68, 70; part 2/2), and a clarification of Algorithm 1. Table numbers refer to the revised PDF; the tables are also in the general response.
W1 / Q1. The contribution over DECOR, Offsite-Tuning and privacy-preserving federated unlearning is not established. Which challenges can existing approaches not address?
DARC's distinct element is correlated noise that passes through a nonlinear multi-step optimizer before it is combined, used to protect the model owner's parameters. Section 2 now states the difference from DECOR.
Q3 (and W1, second part). Please match computation and perturbation in the comparisons; Figure 3; which of Eq. (5) and Algorithm 1 is implemented?
(a) Matched comparisons. We added them in Tables 71–73. Table 2 did not match computation and perturbation; Section 6.2 of the submission notes that its one-copy control differs in both. The new tables compare a single view, an average of independent-noise views and DARC with the same client loop, batches, seeds, key family and marginal noise. The last two have equal compute. Against the independent average, DARC's mean error is lower in all 72 cells (item 4 above). Against the single view, DARC is closer in 36 of 36 paired runs of Table 73, with 0.25–0.80 of its error. In Table 71, independent averaging leaves 0.72–0.83 of a single view's error for NPO, SimNPO, UnDIAL and SatImp, and DARC leaves 0.37–0.74. Every arm stays within 0.014 MU of the noise-free run, so scalar metrics do not separate the estimators at these noise levels, and the revision bases the denoising claim on update fidelity.
(b) Figure 3 (0.3890 against 0.3726). The figure is a single GradDiff noise draw with three copies, and its best copy can only be identified with the clean reference. Over nine new draws with three equal-scale copies at κ = 0.01, the mean errors are 0.38 (one view, sd 0.18), 0.29 (independent average of three) and 0.28 (DARC) (Table 72). GradDiff is the objective where the code adds least. Section 6.4 now describes Figure 3 as a single draw and reports these results; more detail is in our response to Reviewer DXjc (W2, item 5).
(c) Order of noise and key. The implementation follows Eq. (5): noise is added in canonical coordinates and the key is applied afterwards, θ_pub = T(θ + αe). We apologise that algorithm 1 in original version did not make this clear: its first line cited Section 4.2 for both the noise and the keys. For revised version, it now cites Section 4.1 for the noise, and its line 3 sends T(θ + αe), as in Eq. (5). The order matters for the zero-sum constraint, which is defined in canonical coordinates.