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Paper summary
This paper investigates whether detailed denial feedback from runtime guardrails can help LLM agents bypass security restrictions. The authors introduce GuardOracle, an evaluation framework that compares different feedback policies while keeping the preceding interaction unchanged. They measure whether agents subsequently execute actions that achieve the malicious objective. The original experiment shows a possible increase in bypass success with detailed feedback.
Critical strengths
1.Strong and relevant motivation. The paper examines an important question in agent security. Although runtime guards can prevent unsafe tool execution, their feedback may still influence the agent's subsequent decisions. Understanding this potential information leakage is relevant to the design of safer agent systems.
2.Interesting evaluation methodology. The same-prefix design provides a reasonable way to compare different denial-feedback policies while controlling the preceding interaction. The use of executable verification is interesting, which provides stronger evidence of successful bypasses than relying solely on model responses.
Critical weaknesses
1.Limited empirical findings and generalizability. The original experiment suggests a possible increase in bypass success, but the result remains uncertain. More importantly, the counterbalanced replication produces no eligible cases, despite using the same structural scenarios as the original experiment, which obtained 100 eligible groups. The differences in eligibility criteria and experimental settings remain unresolved, making it difficult to assess the reproducibility and generalizability of the original findings.
2.The effect of denial feedback is not sufficiently isolated. The original experiment reports a 7.85 percentage-point increase in bypass success with detailed feedback, but the 95% confidence interval [−0.54, 17.83] includes zero, and the p-value of 0.097 does not reach conventional statistical significance. Moreover, the counterbalanced replication produces no eligible cases despite using the same structural scenarios as the original experiment, which obtained 100 eligible groups. The differences in eligibility criteria and experimental settings remain unresolved, raising concerns about the reproducibility and generalizability of the findings.
Questions for authors
1.Can the authors distinguish tool actions generated after receiving denial feedback from those already proposed? This seems important for determining whether the observed bypasses are actually influenced by the feedback.
2.The original experiment produces 100 eligible replay groups, while the follow-up studies produce almost none. Could the authors further explain this discrepancy? In particular, how many of the original eligible groups would satisfy the stricter target-matching criterion used in later experiments?
Thank you for asking us to check the timing of the successful calls and to apply the later matching criterion to the original groups. We examined both questions in the retained records.
Q1. Which calls were generated after feedback became available? We cannot classify the generation timing of the 106 verified successful calls in the original Detailed and Opaque branches (54 and 52 calls, respectively). Across all four arms, the scoring windows contained 1,002 logged attempts in 100 eligible groups. Each attempt has a log index, but no link to the assistant message that proposed it or the model request that generated that message. If one message proposes two calls and the first is denied, the second can enter the scoring window even though both were proposed before feedback was available.
The +7.85 percentage-point estimate (95% CI [−0.54, 17.83], p=0.097) therefore applies to verified bypass within the next three logged capability attempts (Appendix E, lines 871–878). An estimate restricted to calls generated with the denial in context would require the missing message-to-request links. Fixed arm order further limits attribution to feedback content. We will state both qualifications alongside the main result.
Q2. How many original groups meet the stricter criterion? All 100. For each originally eligible group, we located the first denied candidate in each of its four replays. In every arm the candidate matched both the scenario destination and its payload marker. Applying the later target-matching requirement retrospectively would retain every originally eligible group.
In the counterbalanced study, the 63 structural scenarios were run anew. All 189 screening records had
first_denial_observed = false. Table J1 labels these recordscandidate_goal_not_matchedbecause the reporting code assigns that label first when it finds no matching denied action. The underlying records identify where the two studies diverged: the new screening windows contained no recorded first denial at which a feedback comparison could begin. Why denial occurrence changed remains unresolved. We will report the 100/100 check and the first-denial count together in the revision.