acceptodds
Desk rejected at ICLR 2027

Beyond Corrective Content: Social Hypergraphs for Misinformation Intervention

Desk rejected at ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

By the time misinformation is detected, users may already believe it, discuss it, or pass it on. Correcting misinformation after exposure therefore requires deciding which users or audiences need attention, what corrective information to provide, and how to adapt as their responses evolve. Existing methods personalize corrective messages or broadcast fact-checks, but rarely treat changing social responses as feedback for subsequent intervention. We address this limitation by formulating socially driven post-exposure intervention, in which observable user responses guide where and how to intervene over time. We represent local social groups as hyperedges in a social hypergraph, coupling each group's evolving discourse with its intervention audience while preserving users shared across groups. Within an LLM-agent simulation, an external Intervention Agent identifies risk hyperedges, generates evidence-grounded group corrections, coordinates messages for shared users, and uses previous intervention outcomes to inform later rounds. Across four misinformation datasets, our framework achieves the lowest simulated Trustamong all compared methods, reducing it by 56%–58% relative to no intervention. It also reduces SpreadRate by 49%–84%, although its advantage over competing interventions varies across datasets.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Misinformation Intervention, Social Hypergraph, Simulation

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Top 49%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.33 over 3 reviews, above 51% of the others.
Reviewer_af5NOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The framework uses social hypergraphs to identify risky groups, generate evidence-grounded corrections, and coordinate messages for users belonging to overlapping groups. Group Doubt Ratio and Correction History inform later user updates. Experiments cover four misinformation datasets in a seven-day LLM-agent simulation, with baseline comparisons, component and structural ablations, persistence tests, and a smaller intervention model.

Critical strengths
  1. Explicit group membership lets the intervention agent adapt corrections to local discourse and fuse messages for users shared across overlapping or nested groups.
  2. Across 400 news items, the method obtains the lowest final simulated misinformation trust on all four datasets. The propagation analysis distinguishes supportive sharing from doubt or corrective sharing.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The no-hypergraph control changes both propagation and intervention: it removes group-based routing and replaces adaptive corrections with one neutral fact-check (Section 4.4.1). The performance gap therefore cannot be attributed specifically to higher-order relations. The operations removed by the separate w/o HR ablation are insufficiently specified, while Appendix B reports projected full-set values rather than direct measurements for its structural controls.
  2. Correction History is supplied to simulated users as historical corrective context during subsequent judgment updates (Section 3.4). Removing it changes both access to response-outcome summaries and access to additional corrective context. The ablation does not distinguish these effects. The persistence test retains both Individual Memory and Correction History, and, as Appendix E.4 acknowledges, establishes only their joint effect.
Questions for authors
  1. What exactly is removed in w/o HR? Can the authors isolate the structural contribution while retaining the same exposure routing, factual evidence, message budget, and group adaptation, and report directly measured results for the matched subset used in Appendix B?
  2. Does Correction History outperform a matched-length context containing the earlier corrections without response-outcome summaries? This would distinguish the contribution of social feedback from simply retaining more corrective information.
12 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer#af5N (Part-1)

Concern 1: The no-hypergraph control changes both propagation and intervention: it removes group-based routing and replaces adaptive corrections with one neutral fact-check (Section 4.4.1). The performance gap therefore cannot be attributed specifically to higher-order relations. The operations removed by the separate w/o HR ablation are insufficiently specified.

In our framework, higher-order relations (nested/overlapping hyperedges) enable Cross-Hyperedge Propagation. However, No-Hypergraph Control does not isolate these relations; instead, it merges all users into a single global group and replaces Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination with a neutral fact-check, thereby changing both propagation and intervention.

  • Existing evaluation: Our existing Case A (w/o HR) preserves the original hypergraph and Cross-Hyperedge Propagation but removes cross-hyperedge intervention coordination by randomly selecting one hyperedge's intervention for users in nested/overlapping regions.

  • Complementary experiments:: Following your suggestion, we further introduce Case B to isolate the contribution of higher-order structural relations. It removes nested/overlapping relations to eliminate Cross-Hyperedge Propagation, while retaining users in all their originally affiliated hyperedges to preserve Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination.

Details are as follows:

(1) Case A: Removing Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination (Existing Ablation)

  • Data: All 400 misinformation from four datasets.
  • Method: Preserve the original hypergraph and Cross-Hyperedge Propagation, but remove Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination by randomly selecting one affiliated hyperedge's intervention for users in nested/overlapping regions, without correction fusion.
  • Protocol: Follow the same 7-day simulation settings as the main experiments (Ours), varying only intervention coordination.

(2) Case B: Removing Higher-Order Structural Relations (Additional Ablation)

  • Data: All 400 misinformation from four datasets.
  • Method: Remove nested/overlapping relations by separating shared users into independent instances within each originally affiliated hyperedge, eliminating Cross-Hyperedge Propagation. Retain the original user–hyperedge affiliation mapping for Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination, including primary hyperedge selection, correction fusion, and GDR assignment.
  • Protocol: Follow the same 7-day simulation settings as the main experiments (Ours), varying only higher-order structural relations in propagation.

The results are reported below:

DatasetMetricOursCaseACaseB
Arg-EnTrust_D70.26830.34920.3917
Arg-EnSpreadRate_D70.06960.06710.0795
SnopesTrust_D70.26780.34300.3871
SnopesSpreadRate_D70.06230.03730.0450
CoAIDTrust_D70.19630.24330.3551
CoAIDSpreadRate_D70.20890.22530.3664
ECTFTrust_D70.21950.24260.2946
ECTFSpreadRate_D70.07480.53570.4094

Results and Interpretation: On average, Ours achieves lower Trust_D7 and SpreadRate_D7 than both Case A and B across the four datasets. These results support the contributions of Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination and higher-order structural relations to reducing misinformation belief and spread.

We will present their separate operations and measurement units in §4.3–4.4, together with the corresponding factual-input and correction-budget specification.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer#af5N (Part-2)

Concern 2: Appendix B reports projected full-set values rather than direct measurements for its structural controls.

Thank you for pointing our this issue. Appendix B examines the contributions of homophily-based membership and group-adaptive intervention through two structural controls: Random Membership and Flat Intervention. Due to the high simulation cost (~1 hour per news item), we initially evaluated these controls on matched subsets and projected their full-set results using relative changes. Following your suggestion, we add a full-dataset experiment on all 400 misinformation items under identical settings. The results show that Ours (main results in Table 1) still have the lowest Trust_D7 (0.2380), reducing it by 17.1% and 27.5% compared with Random Membership and Flat. Detailed results are as follows:

DatasetMetricOursRand.Member.Flat
Arg-EnTrust_D70.26830.34970.3909
Arg-EnSpreadRate_D70.06960.07370.0255
SnopesTrust_D70.26780.34660.3805
SnopesSpreadRate_D70.06230.03120.0194
CoAIDTrust_D70.19630.22720.2638
CoAIDSpreadRate_D70.20890.29780.1871
ECTFTrust_D70.21950.22550.2783
ECTFSpreadRate_D70.07480.11300.0597
OverallTrust_D70.23800.28720.3283
OverallSpreadRate_D70.10390.12890.0729

We will replace the projected table in Appendix B with these measurements and revise the corresponding interpretation.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer#af5N (Part-3)

Concern 3: Correction History is supplied to simulated users as historical corrective context during subsequent judgment updates (Section 3.4). Removing it changes both access to response-outcome summaries and access to additional corrective context. The ablation does not distinguish these effects.

Thank you for this valuable suggestion. We interpret the reviewer's additional corrective context and response-outcome summaries as the two components of Correction History (CH): Corrective Context (Part I) and Social Response (Part II), respectively. To further distinguish the contributions of corrective context and social response in Correction History (CH), we clarify its two components and conduct two complementary ablation experiments. Details are as follows:

(1) What Are the Two Components within Correction History?

  • Corrective Context (Part I): A summary of delivered corrections, successful/failed strategies, and recommended adjustments.
  • Social Response (Part II): A summary of pre-/post-intervention changes in comments, stances, and actions.

We will revise Section 3.4 to explicitly clarify these two components.

(2) How Do We Isolate Their Respective Contributions?

Following your suggestion, we add two ablations (w/o Part I and w/o Part II) to separately evaluate the contributions of corrective context and social response.

Experimental Setup

  • Data: All 400 misinformation from four datasets.
  • Method: Four Correction History (CH) ablations: Ours (full CH), w/o CH (remove both parts), w/o Part I (retain only Part II), and w/o Part II (retain only Part I).
  • Protocol: Follow the same 7-day simulation settings as the main experiments, varying only the retained CH components. The retained contexts in w/o Part I and w/o Part II are length-matched to full CH through controlled padding.

The results are reported below:

DatasetMetricOursw/o CHw/o PartIw/o PartII
Arg-EnTrust_D70.26830.27260.35500.3773
Arg-EnSpreadRate_D70.06960.34670.31380.2886
SnopesTrust_D70.26780.27620.38500.3477
SnopesSpreadRate_D70.06230.06790.15240.0883
CoAIDTrust_D70.19630.22710.22580.2806
CoAIDSpreadRate_D70.20890.29580.38160.4722
ECTFTrust_D70.21950.23060.23530.1793
ECTFSpreadRate_D70.07480.19810.15940.2974

Results and Interpretation: Full CH achieves the lowest SpreadRate_D7 across all four datasets and the lowest Trust_D7 on three datasets. These results validate the individual contributions of Corrective Context and Social Response, supporting the benefit of social feedback.

Reviewer_aCknOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
4
Informativeness
3
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The study introduces a social hypergraph-based misinformation intervention framework that integrates higher-order social structures, adaptive corrective messaging, coordination across overlapping communities, and temporal feedback to dynamically mitigate misinformation.

The study uses empirical validation through LLM-agent simulations to evaluate the proposed framework across four misinformation datasets, demonstrating 56–58% reductions in misinformation trust and 49–84% reductions in propagation relative to no intervention, outperforming competing methods in trust reduction.

Critical strengths

The paper moves beyond static, content-centric misinformation correction by integrating higher-order social structures with adaptive, feedback-driven interventions. This is significant because it accounts for evolving group dynamics and overlapping communities, enabling more targeted and coordinated misinformation mitigation.

Critical weaknesses

The framework is evaluated entirely through LLM-agent simulations using synthetic social networks rather than actual human interactions. This limits confidence in its generalizability and effectiveness in real-world misinformation environments, where human beliefs, social dynamics, and behavioral responses are substantially more complex.

Questions for authors

Why did the authors not evaluate their framework on a real-world scenario? Can the authors show that the LLM agent simulation closely reflects a real-world scenario?

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer#aCkn (Part-1)

Concern 1: Why did the authors not evaluate their framework on a real-world scenario? Can the authors show that the LLM agent simulation closely reflects a real-world scenario?

We thank the reviewer for raising concerns about real-world validity. We clarify our evaluation rationale and provide existing and additional experimental evidence supporting the sociological plausibility of our simulation.

(1) Why Simulation-Based Evaluation Rather Than Direct Real-World Evaluation?

Aligning simulation with reality is a widely recognized challenge in social simulation [1,2], particularly for post-exposure misinformation intervention:

  • Cognitive observability: Misinformation intervention involves internal belief changes and subsequent propagation behaviors, which are difficult to jointly observe and track in real-world settings due to privacy constraints.
  • Ethical constraints: Deliberately exposing users to misinformation and manipulating its propagation in real social networks raises substantial ethical concerns.

Thus, following the agent-based social simulation paradigm adopted in prior studies [3,4], which evaluates correction or moderation in controlled conditions, we adopt simulation-based evaluation to examine belief changes, spread behaviors, and intervention effects. This approach also can implicitly reflect the challenges and phenomena of real-world intervention, while avoiding practical and ethical constraints.

(2) How Does Our Existing Simulation Reflect Real-World Social Mechanism?

Based on established findings on misinformation correction and social influence [5-7], our existing analysis experiments reveal that our simulation reproduces several social patterns consistent with established social mechanisms.

  • Correction Saturation (Figure 7): Repeated corrections progressively reduce misinformation trust, with diminishing marginal effects, reflecting the saturation of corrective influence [5].
  • Belief–Behavior Changes (Figures 9–10): Interventions shift users' cognitive responses toward evidence verification and behavioral intentions toward preventing misinformation spread, consistent with belief–behavior mechanisms [6].
  • Group Opinion Consensus (Figure 11): Interventions reduce supportive discourse and strengthen corrective consensus across different group structures, reflecting the influence of social norms on user responses [7].
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer#aCkn (Part-2)

(3) We further check the real-world plausibility of our simulation.

We highly value your suggestion. To further assess whether our simulation reproduces real-world social mechanisms, we add two analytical experiments by adjusting Social Memory:

  • Social Influence: We vary the proportions of supportive and doubtful/corrective comments in Social Memory to examine whether our simulation reproduces the influence of group opinions on users' beliefs and spread decisions [7].
  • Homophily: We vary the attributed hyperedge sources of comments to examine whether our simulation reproduces the stronger influence of socially affiliated users observed in real-world social networks [8].

Experimental Setup

(i) Social Influence

  • Data: 100 misinformation items from four datasets (25 per dataset), with at least 10 supportive and 10 doubtful/corrective comments prepared per item.
  • Users: 10 User Agents (5 from hyperedge A and 5 from hyperedge B).
  • Methods: Compare three supportive-comment ratios (0%, 50%, and 100%) in Social Memory, using 10 comments per condition (0/5/10 supportive comments, respectively).
  • Protocol: Fix user profiles and misinformation, initialize Individual Memory as empty, and vary only the supportive-comment ratio. Evaluate each user–item pair independently under all three conditions without intervention.
  • Metrics: Trust (mean Belief State) and SpreadRate (proportion choosing Spread).

(ii) Homophily

  • Data: 100 misinformation items from four datasets (25 per dataset), with at least 10 comments from hyperedge A and 10 from hyperedge B prepared for each item.
  • Users: The same 10 User Agents.
  • Methods: Compare two comment-source conditions (Same vs. Different Hyperedge), using the same 10 comments per condition.
  • Protocol: Fix user profiles and misinformation, initialize Individual Memory as empty, and vary only the attributed hyperedge sources of comments. Evaluate each user–item pair independently under two conditions without intervention.
  • Metrics: Trust Change Magnitude (absolute Belief State change) and Action Change Rate (proportion changing Spread/Silence decisions).

Results and Interpretation:

Table 1. Social Influence Analysis

SupportiveCommentRatioTrustSpreadRate
0%0.50770.5250
50%0.56220.6850
100%0.59860.8550

Table 2. Homophily Analysis

CommentSourceTrustChangeMagnitudeActionChangeRate
Same Hyperedge0.203426.25%
Different Hyperedges0.095717.13%

Social Influence: As the supportive-comment ratio increases from 0% to 100%, Trust rises from 0.5077 to 0.5986, while SpreadRate increases from 0.5250 to 0.8550. This reproduces that group opinions influence users' beliefs and spread decisions, supporting the rationale for group-opinion-driven intervention.

Homophily: Same-hyperedge comments produce greater Trust Change Magnitude (0.2034 vs. 0.0957) and Action Change Rate (26.25% vs. 17.13%) than different-hyperedge comments. This reproduces the influence of socially affiliated users, supporting the rationale for homophily-based hypergraph construction.

We will add the completed protocols and results to the appendix and clarify this validation scope in the discussion.

References:

[1] Validation is the Central Challenge for Generative Social Simulation. Artificial Intelligence Review.

[2] From Individual to Society. ACM Computing Surveys.

[3] Dynamic Simulation Framework for Disinformation Dissemination and Correction With Social Bots. EMNLP.

[4] MOSAIC: Modeling Social AI for Content Dissemination and Regulation in Multi-Agent Simulations. EMNLP.

[5] A Meta-Analytic Examination of the Continued Influence of Misinformation in the Face of Correction. Communication Research.

[6] The Psychological Drivers of Misinformation Belief and Its Resistance to Correction. Nature Reviews Psychology.

[7] Source-Credibility Information and Social Norms Improve Truth Discernment and Reduce Engagement with Misinformation Online. Scientific Reports.

[8] Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Official Comment by Authors

Dear Reviewer#aCkn,

Thank you again for your constructive feedback and positive assessment! As the discussion period is coming to an end, we just wanted to follow up and see whether our rebuttal and additional experiments have addressed your concerns. We're happy to clarify anything further.

Reviewer_7eFJOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
1
Presentation
3
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

The paper uses social hypergraphs and LLM agents to study how corrections affect belief and sharing.

Critical strengths

The paper studies a useful problem, compares relevant AI methods, and reports lower Trust on four datasets.

Critical weaknesses

The Controller decides who receives messages and what enters social memory, but its implementation and decision rules need more detail. The user prompts and action updates are also not fully specified (Algorithm 1).

  1. The paper uses group structure, but the benefit of coordinating corrections across groups remains unclear. A simpler approach using top kk neighbors may be compared with the same information and correction budget.

  2. Trust relies on belief scores reported by the user LLM, but these scores need stronger validation. SpreadRate also counts corrective sharing, so lower values need not mean less harmful sharing (Eq. 5).

  3. All main experiments use DeepSeek to simulate users. The Qwen experiment changes the model giving corrections, so it does not test whether another user model would produce similar results (Table 6).

Questions for authors

How were the baseline methods adapted, and were their evidence, user information, and interaction opportunities comparable?

8 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer#7eFJ (Part-1)

Concern 1: The Controller decides who receives messages and what enters social memory, but its implementation and decision rules need more detail. The user prompts and action updates are also not fully specified (Algorithm 1).

Thank you for this valuable comment. To clarify our implementation and decision rules of Controller. (i) We first specify how the Controller selects recipients, routes information and constructs Social Memory. (ii) We then clarify how User Agents update their beliefs and actions before and after intervention. We will update our clarification in the paper. Details are as follows:

(1) Controller Implementation and Decision Rules

The Controller is implemented using DeepSeek-V4-Pro and follows three explicit decision rules:

  • Information Exposure and Routing Rules: Selecting seed recipients based on profile–news matching, then route misinformation follow users' Spread/Silence decisions and their affiliated hyperedges.
  • Social Memory Rules: Aggregating received public comments into a profile-conditioned Social Memory, updated daily with prior memory and new comments.
  • Information Visibility Rules: Comments accompanying spreading actions become available to recipients, while Belief States, Stance Labels, and Retainer comments remain private to other User Agents.

Detailed rules are as follows:

# 1. Information Exposure and Routing
FOR each hyperedge e:
    Select 1–3 seed users by profile–news matching
    Deliver misinformation x (users selected multiple times in overlapping/nested hyperedges are counted only once)

FOR each user u with Action == Spread:
    Candidates = users in u's affiliated hyperedges
    Randomly select 1 to |Candidates| recipients
    Deliver x and u's Comment to selected recipients

# 2. Social Memory Construction
FOR each exposed user u on Day t:
    NewComments = public comments received from Spreaders
    SocialMemory[u, t] = LLM_Summarize(
        Profile[u],
        SocialMemory[u, t-1],
        NewComments
    )

# 3. Information Visibility
FOR each user u:
    Keep Belief State and Stance Label private

    IF Action[u] == Spread:
        Make Comment[u] public
        Allow Controller to route Comment[u]
    ELSE IF Action[u] == Silence:
        Keep Comment[u] private
        Do not route Comment[u]

(2) User Agent BDI Prompts and Action Update Rules

To clarify Algorithm 1, we provide explicit User Agent BDI prompts and action-update pseudocode.

  • User BDI Updates: Before intervention, the User Agent uses its Profile, the misinformation, Individual Memory, Social Memory, and relevant Correction History to generate a Belief State, Comment, and Stance Label, followed by Desire and Intention. A delivered correction provides additional input for the post-intervention update. The updated judgments are appended to Individual Memory.
  • User Action Updates: Never-exposed users remain Ignorant (I). Users receiving misinformation update their BDI and make one final Spread/Silence decision, becoming Spreader (S) or Retainer (R). Previously exposed users receiving only an intervention update their Belief State, Comment, and Stance Label without a new Spread/Silence decision.

Details are as follows: Prompt 1: Pre-Intervention BDI Update

You are simulating a social media user.

Profile: {profile}
News: {news}
Individual Memory: {individual_memory}
Social Memory: {other_memory}
Correction History: {correction_history}
Before intervention, update your BDI cognitive layer using the above information.

Generate:
1. Belief: Evaluate the truthfulness of the news based on the available information, producing:
   - Belief State: A score in [0, 1] indicating your trust in the news.
   - Comment: Your textual judgment and reasoning about the news.
   - Stance Label: The stance associated with your comment (support, doubt, or correct).
2. Desire: Form your motivation to respond based on your updated belief, such as expressing agreement, raising doubt, or preventing further spread.
3. Intention: Translate your desire into a behavioral decision (spread or silence).
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer#7eFJ (Part-1-2)

Pseudocode: Action Update Rules

For each user u on Day t:

    # Case 1: Never activated (no misinformation exposure)
    IF u has never received misinformation:
        State = Ignorant (I)
        No cognitive or action update

    # Case 2: Newly or previously activated,
    #         receiving misinformation on Day t
    ELSE IF u receives misinformation on Day t:

        # Pre-intervention cognitive update
        Generate Belief Score, Comment, and Stance Label
        Append to Individual Memory

        IF u receives an intervention:
            # Post-intervention cognitive update
            Regenerate Belief Score, Comment, and Stance Label
            Append to Individual Memory

        # One final BDI action decision per day
        Generate Desire and Intention
        Action = spread or silence

        IF Action == spread:
            State = Spreader (S)
        ELSE:
            State = Retainer (R)

    # Case 3: Previously activated,
    #         no new misinformation received on Day t
    ELSE:

        IF u receives an intervention:
            # Cognitive update only
            Update Belief Score, Comment, and Stance Label
            Append to Individual Memory

        # No intervention: no cognitive update
        # No new exposure: no action update
        No new action decision
        No new propagation on Day t
        State = Retainer (R)
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response to reviewer#7eFJ (Part-2)

Concern 2: The paper uses group structure, but the benefit of coordinating corrections across groups remains unclear. A simpler approach using top k neighbors may be compared with the same information and correction budget.

Thank you for this insightful comment. We explain the motivation for Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination and provide additional experiment against Top-k under matched information and correction budgets.

(1) Why Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination Rather Than Top-k?

Top-k neighborhood intervention can be viewed as an extreme case of higher-order group modeling, where nested or overlapping hyperedges become identical and users are treated as members of the same local neighborhood. However, this simplification overlooks group-level social influence and multiple group memberships in real-world social networks [1–3], highlighting the need for relation-aware coordination.

Motivated by Homophily Principle [1] and the concept of Community Structure [2], we adopt Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination to preserve group-specific influence and integrate complementary corrections across nested and overlapping hyperedges. Specifically, we select the hyperedge with the highest profile similarity, incorporate complementary corrections from other affiliated hyperedges, and use this primary hyperedge's GDR.

(2) Complementary Experiments Against Top-k

Following your suggestion, we compare Top-k with our method under matched information and correction budgets. Ours achieves lower Trust throughout and lower SpreadRate from Day 3 onward in both nested and overlapping regions. Details are as follows:

Experimental Setup: We use 120 randomly sampled misinformation items, with 30 from each dataset. Both methods use the same user profiles, hypergraph, initial receivers, misinformation items, and 7-days intervention schedule.

  • Methods: Compare two intervention approaches:
    • Top-k (k=3): Select three most similar users (Eq. 1) from the nested/overlapping region as neighbors. Generate interventions directly from their comments and compute GDR within this neighborhood.
    • Ours: Apply the original Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination: prioritize the primary hyperedge, integrate complementary interventions from other hyperedges, and use the primary hyperedge's GDR.

The results are reported below:

RegionMethodMetricD1D2D3D4D5D6D7
NestedTop-kTrust0.44810.37020.32560.30850.30230.29980.3017
NestedOursTrust0.44210.30820.25600.23960.23930.23580.2373
NestedTop-kSpreadRate0.35000.34890.35580.26690.21970.18350.1678
NestedOursSpreadRate0.52500.41680.33680.21340.15560.15000.1352
OverlapTop-kTrust0.43000.35760.30910.28130.26890.26110.2590
OverlapOursTrust0.40250.27320.20260.18470.17510.17320.1721
OverlapTop-kSpreadRate0.35830.43610.45140.35560.30560.26110.2167
OverlapOursSpreadRate0.53330.58060.42500.28890.19170.19440.1750

Results and Interpretation: At Day 7, our method achieves lower Trust than Top-k in nested (0.2373 vs. 0.3017) and overlapping regions (0.1721 vs. 0.2590). Although our method's initial SpreadRate is higher, it becomes lower from Day 3 onward, reaching 0.1352 vs. 0.1678 (Nested) and 0.1750 vs. 0.2167 (Overlap) at Day 7. These results support our cross-hyperedge intervention coordination for reducing misinformation belief and spread.

References:

[1] Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks. Annual Review of Sociology.

[2] Uncovering the Overlapping Community Structure of Complex Networks in Nature and Society. Nature.

[3] Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long Ties. American Journal of Sociology.

Comments on the paper

2 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Response Summary (Part-1)

Dear AC/PC,

We sincerely appreciate your dedicated efforts in organizing the conference. To underscore the significance of our work, we re-highlight three core contributions:

  • Formulating socially driven post-exposure misinformation intervention, shifting from static correction to dynamic intervention guided by evolving social responses.
  • Introducing social hypergraphs as group-level intervention units, enabling risk hyperedge identification and relation-aware coordination across nested/overlapping hyperedges.
  • Proposing a social feedback-driven mechanism for sustained intervention effectiveness, leveraging correction history to guide subsequent interventions.

We are encouraged that Reviewer aCkn recognized the significance and novelty of these contributions, stating:

The paper moves beyond static, content-centric misinformation correction by integrating higher-order social structures with adaptive, feedback-driven interventions. This is significant because it accounts for evolving group dynamics and overlapping communities, enabling more targeted and coordinated misinformation mitigation.

We are grateful for the constructive feedback from all reviewers. Although R#aCkn and R#7eFJ did not provide follow-up comments, we proactively conducted 7 new major experiments and provided extensive clarifications to strengthen the paper's empirical rigor. We also deeply appreciate R#af5N for pushing us to solidify our theoretical assumptions. Specifically:

A. Enhancing Simulation Realism (R#aCkn)

  1. Rationale for Simulation-Based Evaluation: We clarified our evaluation rationale by following the agent-based social simulation paradigm adopted in prior studies, highlighting the practical and ethical challenges of direct real-world evaluation for misinformation intervention.
  2. Existing Evidence of Real-World Social Mechanisms: We clarified how our existing experiments reproduce established social mechanisms, including Correction Saturation (Figure 7), Belief–Behavior Changes (Figures 9–10), and Group Opinion Consensus (Figure 11), supporting the sociological plausibility of our simulation.
  3. Supplementary Experiments: We added two experiments by adjusting Social Memory to validate Social Influence and Homophily. Higher supportive-comment ratios increase Trust (0.5077 → 0.5986) and SpreadRate (0.5250 → 0.8550), while same-hyperedge comments exert stronger influence (Trust Change: 0.2034 vs. 0.0957; Action Change: 26.25% vs. 17.13%), supporting the reproduction of both social mechanisms.

B. Validating Higher-Order Structures and Intervention Coordination

  1. Intervention Coordination (R#7eFJ): We clarified the motivation for Relation-Aware Intervention Coordination and added a comparison against Top-k (k=3). Our method achieves lower Trust_D7 (0.2373/0.1721 vs. 0.3017/0.2590) in nested/overlapping regions, and lower SpreadRate from Day 3 onward, supporting the benefit of cross-hyperedge coordination for interventions.
  2. Higher-Order Structural Ablation (R#af5N): We clarified and extended the ablation experiments to isolate relation-aware intervention coordination (Case A) and higher-order structural relations (Case B). And we further clarified how Case B removes cross-hyperedge propagation while ensuring fair comparison. Our method achieves lower Trust_D7 and SpreadRate_D7 than both ablations, validating the contributions of both components.

C. Correction History (CH) Persistence (R#af5N)

  1. Decomposing CH: We clarified the two parts of CH (Corrective Context and Social Response) and refined their definitions to strictly separate Corrective Context from Social Response. And we added two ablation experiments to isolate the respective contributions of these two parts. Full CH achieves the lowest Trust_D7 and SpreadRate_D7 across all datasets.
  2. CH vs. Individual Memory (IM): We added two ablations (w/o IM and w/o CH) to isolate their respective contributions to intervention persistence. Retaining both achieves the lowest average Trust and SpreadRate under subsequent misinformation variants, validating their respective roles in intervention persistence.
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Response Summary (Part-2)

D. Strengthening Evaluation Reliability (R#7eFJ)

  1. Belief Score Reliability: We added two experiments on all 400 misinformation to validate LLM-reported Belief Score reliability. Results show strong Belief Score–Stance consistency (Spearman's ρ = 0.8272) and cross-model agreement (ICC = 0.8139).
  2. Harmful and Corrective Spread Analysis: We clarified the interpretation of SpreadRate and introduced two separate metrics, Harmful_SR and Corrective_SR. Results show that Daily Intervention substantially reduces harmful sharing while increasing doubtful/corrective sharing across all four datasets.
  3. Cross-Model Robustness: We added two experiments by replacing the User LLM alone (Gemini3-Flash) or both the User and Intervention LLMs (Qwen3.5-27B + GPT6.1-Sol) to assess cross-model robustness. Results show that Trust_D7, and Harmful/Corrective_SR_D7 remain relatively stable across different LLMs, supporting the robustness of our method.

E. Implementation Transparency and Fairness

  1. Controller and User Agent Implementation (R#7eFJ): We provided detailed decision rules, BDI prompts, and action-update pseudocode for Controller operations and User Agent updates, hoping this could improve the simulation reproducibility.
  2. Hypergraph Construction (R#af5N): We revised the inaccurate construction description and provided explicit pseudocode for constructing social hypergraph . We recognized the "augmented observation" act as a theoretical upper bound. We have explicitly added this as a limitation in the revision.
  3. Baseline Adaptation and Comparison Fairness (R#7eFJ, R#af5N): We clarified the adaptation of all six baselines to the same hypergraph environment, specifying method selection, evidence acquisition, and correction budgets while preserving their core intervention mechanisms. All methods share consistent evaluation metrics and intervention opportunities, ensuring a fair comparison of intervention strategies.
  4. Full-Dataset Validation (R#af5N): We replaced projected results with direct measurements on all 400 misinformation items. Our method achieves the lowest Trust_D7 (0.2380), reducing it by 17.1% and 27.5% compared with Random Membership and Flat Intervention, respectively, strengthening the empirical evidence for our structural design.

We hope the AC can recognize that the primary contribution of this work is the novel formulation (social hypergraph) and the conceptual framework for coordinating interventions, rather than a production-ready system. While no simulation can perfectly capture reality, we believe this work provides a foundational and pioneering sandbox for socially-aware misinformation intervention.

Best,

Authors

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