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- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
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Paper summary
This paper studies how LoRA can degrade LLM safety, even when using safe training data. The authors conduct experiments across different model sizes, LoRA ranks, training settings, and datasets. The results show that higher LoRA ranks and more aggressive fine-tuning can lead to greater safety degradation, even without harmful training examples.
Critical strengths
- Corpus auditing is meaningful, it shows that hh-rlhf red-team target responses still contain usable harmful content.
- The experiments are carefully designed and thoroughly analyzed, with extensive ablation studies investigating the factors contributing to safety degradation.
Critical weaknesses
- The evaluation suite is relatively small, consisting of only 110 examples. The Safety QA subset contains just 8 examples but accounts for 30% of the Safety score, which makes the results less reliable to me.
- Findings are interesting but less novel, similar observations regarding safety degradation under fine-tuning and LoRA have already been studied.
Questions for authors
- Can the authors complete the missing runs in Figure 1? These are the main results for this paper, but entries for 3B/7B at rank=32/48 are still missing.
- Can you further prove the generalizability? The central claims are tested on a single Qwen-2.5 family. And as stated by the authors, the cross-family experiments on Mistral-7B are also inconclusive. I would suggest validating this claim on more recent models like Qwen-3.5 4B or 9B, this would make the results more convincing.
Author response to Reviewer 8rHn
We thank the reviewer for the constructive report. Both suggestions were experiments we could run, and both are now in the revision.
On Q1 (missing runs). All five cells are trained and evaluated at three seeds, so Figure 1 is a complete 4 × 5 map (p. 5). Filling them did more than add points. The correction family grew from 24 to 29 tests, and the two rank-128 cells at 1.5B and 7B now sit just outside Benjamini-Hochberg (p(BH) = 0.054 and 0.058). We report the completed-family verdict, three survivors all at the mid-scale, rather than the earlier count.
On Q2 (generalizability). We added Qwen3.5-9B at ranks 16 and 128 with the same recipe, on a smaller 2,000-sample budget; both ranks share it and are compared only with each other. There is no cost at either rank under the rule scorer: +0.016 (p = 0.25) and +0.031 (p = 0.08). This is a null, not a ceiling. The Qwen3.5-9B base refuses harmful prompts at 0.933, the same rate as the Qwen2.5-1.5B base that loses a third of its refusals at rank 128. The cross-family Mistral-7B arm is inconclusive for a different reason: its base refusal is 0.367, so the suite does not discriminate there. That is why we chose Qwen3.5-9B for this test. The paper now states that the map is a Qwen2.5 map (Limitations, p. 8).
On the size of the suite. We agree, and we state this in Limitations. Eight safety-QA items carry 0.3 of the safety score. The revision reports every channel next to the composite, adds AdvBench and JailbreakBench, a five-generation-seed protocol for fourteen cells, minimum detectable effects (0.028-0.074), and full-response re-scoring of the high-rank cells.
On novelty. Beyond the observation that a higher rank or a larger learning rate damages more, the paper reports three results we did not anticipate from the standard picture: the scale-specific, non-monotone curve (0.5B inert, 1.5B a cliff, 3B a ramp from rank 32, 7B only the top); rank not being update magnitude (8× parameters, 1.7-2.1× weight movement, identical-norm cells differing 4.5-fold); and the instrument result, in which a scorer defect that covaries with the treatment inflates the high-rank losses by up to 0.37 in refusal rate and flips the survivor count from three to four to none.