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Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

Auditing Privacy Risks in LLM-Enhanced Graph Neural Networks

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) have recently advanced graph neural networks (GNNs) by enriching node representations with semantic information, giving rise to LLM-enhanced GNNs that achieve substantial performance gains. However, how such semantic enhancement affects privacy risks remains largely underexplored. To bridge this gap, we systematically audit the privacy risks of LLM-enhanced GNNs through a unified framework consisting of five stages: (1) dataset preparation, (2) victim model training, (3) privacy attack, (4) risk assessment, and (5) defense analysis. Specifically, our evaluation spans ten text-attributed graph datasets across diverse domains, six privacy attacks, 42 LLM-enhanced GNN configurations, and three more recent language-model backbones. Extensive experiments show that, despite their utility improvements, LLM-enhanced GNNs consistently exhibit greater empirical privacy vulnerability than shallow text representation baselines under the evaluated attacks across diverse models and datasets. Further analysis shows that LLM-enhanced representations exhibit more distinguishable link-, label-, and membership-related signals in the embedding space, making them more exploitable by inference attacks. Finally, we evaluate representative defenses and examine their effectiveness in mitigating these privacy risks. Overall, this work provides a systematic audit of privacy risks in LLM-enhanced GNNs and offers insights for developing more secure and trustworthy graph learning systems.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
Privacy, Graph Neural Networks, Large Language Models

Reviews

Among:
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1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_zbJbOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

This paper presents an empirical audit of privacy risks in LLM-enhanced graph neural networks for text-attributed graphs. It introduces a five-stage framework covering dataset preparation, victim model training, privacy attacks, risk assessment, and defense analysis. The study considers six main datasets, six attacks targeting link existence, node labels, and training-set membership, and 42 configurations combining six feature enhancers with seven GNN backbones. The main experiments compare semantically enriched representations against shallow text features, reporting improved node classification performance alongside increased attack performance. The authors also examine embedding-distance and prediction-confidence distributions and evaluate embedding-, link-, and label-level differential privacy mechanisms. The main contribution is a systematic empirical investigation of the relationship between representation enhancement, predictive utility, and privacy vulnerability.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper addresses a practically important privacy question in an increasingly relevant graph-learning setting. Integrating language-model representations into GNNs can improve predictive performance, but its implications for privacy deserve explicit evaluation. The paper investigates this issue across link, label, and membership inference rather than considering utility alone. This makes the study relevant to practitioners deciding whether and how to adopt semantically enriched graph representations.

  2. The paper connects utility, attack performance, and defensive costs within a coherent evaluation framework. Table 2 and Figures 3–5 jointly present classification performance and several forms of privacy vulnerability. Figure 6 offers an intuitive examination of representation and confidence separation, while Figures 7–8 illustrate the utility costs associated with privacy perturbations. This combination provides a useful empirical perspective on the consequences of representation enhancement.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The label-inference evaluation requires a clearer operational definition and comparison baseline.The label-inference evaluation needs clarification. HGA’s neighboring-label source is unspecified, and its accuracy varies across feature enhancers (Fig. 4), although it should remain unchanged with fixed graph structure, target nodes, and observed labels. NIA also requires comparison with direct posterior argmax on identical target nodes to establish whether its results reveal privacy leakage beyond improved classification.

  2. The defense curves do not sufficiently establish a reduction in exploitable privacy leakage. Figures 8(a–b) report attack AUCs below 50%, which become above-chance after reversing score orientation. Although Section 5.6 specifies a fixed MLA attack, its reduced AUC does not establish reduced privacy leakage. The privacy–utility conclusions therefore require score orientation selected on independent validation data and evaluation of attacks adapted to the defended outputs.

Questions for authors
  1. About HGA: In Section 4.3, does HGA use observed ground-truth labels or predicted neighboring labels? Which graph, target nodes, and label information are held fixed across feature enhancers? How does this explain the representation-dependent HGA results in Figure 4?

  2. Under the access assumptions in Section 3, can the attacker directly query the target node’s class posterior? If so, how does NIA compare with the direct posterior-argmax baseline on exactly the same target nodes? If not, what restriction prevents this query?

  3. As for the defense interpretation: In Figures 8(a) and 8(b), is MLA’s score orientation fixed across privacy budgets? Do the reported privacy–utility conclusions remain valid when the attacker selects score orientation using independent validation data and adapts the attack to each defense setting?

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Rebuttal by Authors (Part 1/2)

Thank you for your careful and constructive feedback. We particularly appreciate your recognition of the practical importance of investigating privacy risks in LLM-enhanced GNNs and the value of jointly evaluating predictive utility, privacy vulnerabilities, and defense costs. Below, we address your three questions in detail.

Q1: HGA Implementation

Thank you for this important question. We clarify that our HGA implementation uses a combination of observed ground-truth labels and model-predicted neighboring labels. For neighboring nodes with available training labels, the attacker directly uses their observed labels. For the remaining neighbors, the attacker queries the victim GNN and obtains predicted labels through argmax over their class posteriors. The target node's label is then inferred through majority voting.

Across different feature enhancers, we keep the graph structure, target nodes, data splits, and ground-truth labels unchanged. Consequently, the observed neighboring labels remain fixed, while the predicted labels of unlabeled neighbors vary with the learned node representations. These differences affect majority voting and explain the representation-dependent HGA accuracy in Fig. 4. Since only 10% of nodes are used for training, most neighboring labels are model-predicted, making HGA performance sensitive to the victim model's predictions.

To avoid ambiguity, we will clarify the hybrid-label HGA implementation in Section 4.3 and Appendix A.3 as follows:

We adopt a hybrid-label variant of HGA that exploits graph homophily to infer target node labels. The attacker uses available ground-truth labels for known training neighbors and model-predicted labels for the remaining neighbors, followed by majority voting. While the graph structure and observed labels remain fixed, the predicted neighboring labels may vary across feature enhancers, leading to differences in HGA performance.

Q2: NIA vs. Direct Posterior Inference

Thank you for raising this important concern. Yes, under the black-box access assumptions in Section 3, the attacker can directly query the target node's class posterior. We agree that this makes Direct Posterior-Argmax a necessary baseline: it predicts the target label as the class with the highest posterior probability, without modifying the graph. In contrast, NIA injects an attacker-controlled node connected to the target and infers the label from the resulting posteriors, with additional sensitivity-based scoring when prediction confidence is insufficient.

We compare Direct Posterior-Argmax, HGA, and NIA under GCN on Cora (Table 2 and Fig. 4):

Feature EnhancerDirect Argmax (%)HGA (%)NIA (%)
Shallow80.879.258.2
TAPE82.181.860.5
KEA83.283.062.1
LLaMA82.282.161.5
Linq84.884.475.0
SimTeg83.382.965.4
E5-Large84.584.277.6

NIA consistently underperforms Direct Posterior-Argmax in this setting. We therefore do not claim that NIA reveals label information beyond direct posterior access; rather, it represents a complementary active attack involving additional adversarial capabilities.

Importantly, Direct Posterior-Argmax is itself a label-inference attack: because target labels are private, the higher accuracy of LLM-enhanced GNNs directly increases how accurately a querying adversary can infer them. We acknowledge that this label exposure is closely tied to predictive utility. Our matched-utility analysis (Appendix B.10.2, Table 13) further shows that at closely matched utility, where direct posterior exposure is comparable, Linq-GCN still yields 2.41 percentage points higher label-inference accuracy than Shallow-GCN on Reddit, although this difference should be interpreted in light of the variability across runs.

We will revise Section 5.4 accordingly, adding Direct Posterior-Argmax as a reference baseline evaluated on identical target nodes, and describing NIA as an active attack under a complementary threat model rather than an inherently stronger label-inference method. The access assumptions in Section 3 remain unchanged.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Rebuttal by Authors (Part 2/2)

Q3: MLA Score Orientation and Defense Interpretation

Thank you for this insightful question. Yes, MLA uses a fixed score orientation across all privacy budgets in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b). As described in Section 4.3 and Appendix A.3, smaller Manhattan distances between node posteriors indicate a higher likelihood of a link, corresponding to the score suv=−∥∣Ru−Rv∥∣1s_{uv}=-\||R_u-R_v\||_1. We agree that an AUC below 50% indicates a reversed rather than eliminated ranking signal: an attacker who reverses the orientation obtains 1−AUC1-\mathrm{AUC}, which is above chance. Therefore, the reduced AUC in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) reflects the reduced effectiveness of the fixed MLA attack, and should not be interpreted as reduced exploitable leakage at small privacy budgets.

To avoid ambiguity, we will revise the corresponding discussion in Section 5.6 and Appendix A.3 as follows:

MLA uses a fixed score orientation, s_uv=-||R_u-R_v||_1, across all privacy budgets. The AUC values in Figs. 8(a) and 8(b) therefore measure the effectiveness of this fixed attack, rather than the maximum inference capability of an adaptive attacker. When the AUC falls below 50%, the ranking signal is reversed rather than eliminated, and an attacker who selects the score orientation on validation data, or adapts the attack to the defended outputs, may still achieve above-chance link inference. Accordingly, the observed decrease in fixed-MLA AUC indicates reduced effectiveness of the evaluated attack, and does not by itself establish reduced privacy leakage. Evaluating DP defenses against such adaptive attackers is an important direction for future work.

We sincerely thank the reviewer again for the thoughtful and constructive suggestions, which have helped us improve the clarity and rigor of our privacy evaluation.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Looking Forward to Your Feedback

Dear Reviewer zbJb,

We sincerely appreciate the time and effort you have devoted to reviewing our submission. Your comments have been very helpful, and we have carefully addressed each of them in our response.

With the discussion period nearing its end, we would be grateful to hear whether our response has resolved your concerns. If any points remain unclear, we would be glad to provide further clarification.

Thank you very much for your consideration.

Best regards,
The Authors

Reviewer_fRRDOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
4
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper systematically investigates privacy risks in LLM-enhanced Graph Neural Networks (GNNs). The authors propose a unified auditing framework covering dataset preparation, victim model training, privacy attacks, risk assessment, and defense analysis. Extensive experiments are conducted on ten text-attributed graph datasets, six privacy attacks, and 42 model configurations. The results suggest that LLM-enhanced GNNs are generally more vulnerable to link, label, and membership inference attacks than conventional GNNs using shallow text representations.

Critical strengths
  1. Extensive experimental evaluation. The paper involves a substantial amount of experimental work, covering diverse datasets, model architectures, privacy attacks, and defense mechanisms.

  2. Clear presentation. The paper is well-written and logically organized. The motivation, methodology, and experimental results are presented clearly, making the paper easy to follow.

Critical weaknesses
  1. Limited innovation. The overall innovation of this study is relatively limited. Privacy vulnerabilities in Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have been extensively researched; the observation that richer representations may increase the risk of privacy leakage is not particularly surprising. Compared to existing literature, this paper fails to offer sufficiently novel insights.

  2. Insufficient methodological contribution. The proposed auditing framework primarily integrates existing LLM-enhanced GNN models, established privacy attack methods, and conventional defense mechanisms. The paper does not introduce new attack strategies, defense methods, or theoretical formulations. Consequently, its technical contribution is relatively limited.

  3. Lack of in-depth analysis. Although a substantial number of experiments were conducted, the analysis remains largely descriptive. The paper focuses on presenting attack performance and representation distributions but fails to adequately explain the underlying mechanisms that drive the increased risk of privacy leakage. In particular, it remains unclear to what extent the observed privacy risks stem specifically from semantic enhancement via llms, as opposed to improvements in predictive performance or representation quality.

Questions for authors

Please see the weakness.

4 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Rebuttal by Authors (Part 1/3)

We sincerely thank the reviewer for the thoughtful and constructive feedback. We particularly appreciate your recognition of the extensive experimental evaluation and the clarity of our paper's presentation. Your comments have helped us clarify the research contributions, the methodological design, and the underlying mechanisms of our findings. Below, we address the three concerns in detail.

Q1: Clarification of Research Novelty

Thank you for this valuable comment. We agree that the general intuition that richer representations may increase privacy leakage is not surprising on its own. Our contribution is to test this intuition rigorously in LLM-enhanced GNNs and to identify where it holds, where it originates, and what it costs to mitigate. Prior GNN privacy studies focus on conventional shallow features and do not characterize how semantically enriched language representations interact with graph message passing. Our study establishes four insights beyond the increase in attack success:

  • Signal amplification across threats and backbones. LLM-enhanced representations exhibit more distinguishable link-, label-, and membership-related signals (Fig. 6), and this pattern holds under GCN, SAGE, and GAT (Appendix B.11). This provides a shared mechanism behind three types of leakage.
  • Source of the risk. Pure DeBERTa is more vulnerable than Shallow, and LLaMA is more vulnerable than Pure DeBERTa (Appendix B.9). The gap persists under matched dimensionality and matched predictive utility (Appendix B.10), so it is not explained solely by these factors.
  • Model-agnostic risk. The trend holds across six feature enhancers, seven GNN backbones, recent LLMs released in 2024–2026 (Appendix B.8), and four additional graph domains (Appendix B.7). The risk therefore does not disappear by switching to a newer language model.
  • Privacy–utility tension. Under identical GAP privacy budgets, Linq-GCN no longer outperforms Shallow-GCN (Appendix B.12). The utility gain that motivates LLM enhancement is the part most difficult to retain once formal privacy is required.

To better highlight these insights, we will refine the contribution discussion in Introduction (Section 1) as follows:

Beyond measuring aggregate attack performance, our study systematically characterizes the privacy implications of semantic enhancement in graph learning. Through representation-level investigations and controlled comparisons, we examine how semantic enrichment amplifies privacy-sensitive signals and whether the observed vulnerabilities can be explained by predictive utility, embedding dimensionality, or pretrained semantic representations. We further show that the utility advantage of semantic enhancement is difficult to preserve under formal privacy protection, providing practical insights into privacy-preserving LLM-enhanced graph learning.
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Rebuttal by Authors (Part 2/3)

Q2: Methodological Contributions

Thank you for highlighting this point. We acknowledge that our study does not propose new attack strategies, defense methods, or theoretical formulations. This is a deliberate design choice: to attribute observed differences to semantic enhancement, we adopt established attacks and defenses under fixed threat models, so that changes in vulnerability reflect the representations rather than a newly designed attack. We therefore position our work as a systematic measurement and auditing study, and its methodological value lies in three aspects:

  • Unified threat coverage. It evaluates link, label, and membership inference within a consistent workflow under explicitly defined adversarial assumptions, rather than assessing a single attack in isolation.
  • Controlled attribution. It combines attack evaluation with representation-level analyses and confounder controls (pretrained semantics, dimensionality, and predictive utility), moving beyond aggregate attack performance.
  • Integrated defense evaluation. It examines input-level perturbation and private GNN training within the same framework, so that protection effectiveness and utility costs can be compared directly.

Our framework and code are publicly released, enabling future LLM-enhanced GNNs to be audited under the same protocol. To clarify its methodological significance, we will strengthen the description in Privacy Auditing Framework (Section 4) as follows:

The proposed framework provides a unified evaluation methodology for examining privacy vulnerabilities in LLM-enhanced GNNs across multiple threat scenarios. By adopting established attacks and defenses under fixed threat models, it attributes changes in privacy vulnerability to the node representations rather than to the attack design. Beyond attack evaluation, it combines representation-level investigations, controlled comparisons, and defense evaluations, enabling a systematic characterization of empirical privacy vulnerabilities, their contributing factors, and the effectiveness of representative privacy protections.

Q3: In-depth Analysis of Privacy Vulnerabilities

Thank you for this insightful suggestion. We agree that the key question is to what extent the increased risk stems from semantic enhancement itself, rather than from improved predictive performance or representation quality. We address this through four controlled analyses, followed by a mechanistic explanation.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Rebuttal by Authors (Part 3/3)

First, privacy-sensitive signals become more distinguishable in learned representations. As shown in Fig. 6, LLM-enhanced GNNs exhibit greater separation between connected and unconnected pairs, intra- and inter-class pairs, and members and non-members. Appendix B.11 shows the same pattern under SAGE and GAT. For example, under SAGE, the link-, label-, and membership-related CDF gaps increase from 0.399, 0.341, and 0.100 (Shallow) to 0.604, 0.644, and 0.289 (Linq).

Second, we disentangle general pretrained semantics from LLM-based enhancement. Appendix B.9 introduces Pure DeBERTa, which encodes the original node text without LLM-generated augmentation.

Table 1: Comparison with a vanilla pretrained LM on Tape-Arxiv23 (%).

MethodMLA (AUC)NIA (Acc.)MIA (AUC)
Shallow80.3 ± 1.738.1 ± 4.160.1 ± 2.1
Pure DeBERTa80.9 ± 0.645.6 ± 4.364.3 ± 3.0
LLaMA85.1 ± 0.862.3 ± 2.267.6 ± 0.5

Pure DeBERTa is comparable to Shallow for link inference and more vulnerable for label and membership inference, while LLaMA is the most vulnerable across all three threats. This indicates that general pretrained representations account for part of the risk, and LLM-based enhancement contributes additional risk beyond it.

Third, we control for representation dimensionality. Appendix B.10.1 projects all representations to 768 dimensions using label-independent Truncated SVD fitted on training nodes only.

Table 2: Attack performance under matched representation dimensionality on Cora with GCN (%).

MethodMLA (AUC)NIA (Acc.)MIA (AUC)
Shallow68.957.473.9
TAPE71.260.575.5
KEA69.961.375.7
LLaMA71.760.775.2
Linq70.672.876.0
SimTeg70.164.275.8
E5-Large70.875.976.2

After dimensionality matching, all six enhancement methods remain more vulnerable than Shallow, exceeding it on average by 1.8, 8.5, and 1.8 percentage points under MLA, NIA, and MIA, respectively. Higher dimensionality alone does not explain the privacy gap.

Fourth, we control for predictive utility. Appendix B.10.2 adjusts Linq-GCN to closely match the node-classification accuracy of Shallow-GCN on Reddit, keeping the data split, GNN architecture, and attack configurations unchanged.

Table 3: Attack performance under matched predictive utility on Reddit (%).

MethodUtility (Acc.)MLA (AUC)NIA (Acc.)MIA (AUC)
Shallow59.91 ± 0.1960.53 ± 4.5252.46 ± 5.4451.15 ± 1.33
Linq60.26 ± 0.9462.13 ± 3.5554.87 ± 6.4852.72 ± 0.85

At comparable utility, Linq-GCN remains more vulnerable by 1.60, 2.41, and 1.57 percentage points. We note that these margins are modest relative to the variance: they suggest that improved accuracy does not fully explain the privacy gap, while also indicating that a substantial part of the gap in the main experiments is associated with improved utility. We will state this explicitly in the revision.

Mechanistic interpretation. All six attacks exploit model posteriors, and their success depends on two properties: how smooth posteriors are across related nodes (exploited by link and homophily-based label inference) and how confident posteriors are on training nodes (exploited by membership inference). Semantic features of linked and same-class nodes are more similar than shallow features, so message passing produces posteriors that are smoother over graph neighborhoods and more class-separable, consistent with Fig. 6(a–b). Meanwhile, richer features allow the GNN to fit training nodes with higher confidence, enlarging the member–non-member confidence gap, consistent with Fig. 6(c). This explains why one change, semantic enhancement, raises three distinct privacy risks at once. It also explains why controlling dimensionality or utility does not fully remove the gap: the risk depends on how privacy-relevant information is organized in the posteriors, not only on how accurate they are.

Taken together, these analyses move beyond descriptive comparisons by isolating the contributions of pretrained semantics, LLM-based enhancement, dimensionality, and predictive utility, and by linking them to a common posterior-level mechanism. We will add this mechanistic discussion to Section 5 and summarize the confounder analyses in the main text.

We sincerely thank the reviewer again for the thoughtful and constructive suggestions, which have helped us better articulate the research contributions and strengthen the explanation of our empirical findings.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Looking Forward to Your Feedback

Dear Reviewer fRRD,

We sincerely appreciate the time and effort you have devoted to reviewing our submission. Your comments have been very helpful, and we have carefully addressed each of them in our response.

With the discussion period nearing its end, we would be grateful to hear whether our response has resolved your concerns. If any points remain unclear, we would be glad to provide further clarification.

Thank you very much for your consideration.

Best regards,
The Authors

Reviewer_BZKgOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper audits link, label, and membership inference against GNNs using LM- or LLM-enhanced text representations. It relates attack performance to representation and confidence distributions and evaluates input-level perturbation and GAP-based training, as well as a vanilla pretrained LM. The main finding is higher attack success than shallow-text baselines under the evaluated protocols.

Critical strengths
  • The paper investigates a relevant privacy question across multiple attack objectives and model configurations. Studying structure, labels, and membership together offers a broader picture than evaluating only predictive utility or one attack.
  • The authors make a useful effort to examine alternative explanations and defenses. The Pure DeBERTa comparison, utility-matched experiment, cross-backbone analyses, and GAP evaluation go beyond a simple shallow-versus-LLM leaderboard. These analyses are important components of a convincing empirical audit.
Critical weaknesses

The methodological novelty is limited.

  • The contribution rests mainly on the empirical findings. The paper adopts six existing GNN attacks and evaluates established defenses, but it should clarify what new insight these establish beyond the observed increase in attack success.
  • The current contribution is closer to a technical evaluation report than a sufficiently novel research study. The full-stack safety survey by Wang et al. (A comprehensive survey in llm (-agent) full stack safety: Data, training and deployment, 2025, arXiv:2504.15585) provides related context for broad safety analysis, although it does not establish the same LLM-GNN results.
Questions for authors

Please see the Weaknesses.

3 comments
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Rebuttal by Authors (Part 1/2)

Thank you for your careful and constructive feedback. We particularly appreciate your recognition of the value of studying structure, label, and membership privacy jointly, and of our efforts to examine alternative explanations and defenses, including the Pure DeBERTa comparison, the utility-matched experiment, the cross-backbone analyses, and the GAP evaluation. Your comments have helped us articulate our contributions more clearly. Below, we address your two concerns in detail.

Q1: New Insights Beyond the Increase in Attack Success.

Thank you for this valuable suggestion. We agree that the contribution of an empirical audit should lie in what it explains, not only in what it measures. Beyond the observed increase in attack success, our study establishes four insights:

  • Insight 1: Semantic enhancement amplifies privacy-relevant signals at the representation level, consistently across threats and backbones. LLM-enhanced GNNs exhibit stronger separation between connected and unconnected pairs, intra- and inter-class pairs, and member and non-member nodes (Fig. 6). This pattern is not specific to GCN: under SAGE, the link-, label-, and membership-related CDF gaps increase from 0.399, 0.341, and 0.100 (Shallow) to 0.604, 0.644, and 0.289 (Linq), with consistent trends under GAT (Appendix B.11). This provides a common mechanism linking the three types of leakage, rather than three unrelated observations.

  • Insight 2: The increased risk arises from both general pretrained semantics and LLM-based enhancement, and is not fully explained by common confounders. Pure DeBERTa is more vulnerable than Shallow, most clearly for label and membership inference, while LLaMA is consistently more vulnerable than Pure DeBERTa (Appendix B.9). This indicates that pretrained language representations account for part of the gap, and LLM-based enhancement adds further risk. Moreover, the gap persists after matching representation dimensionality (Appendix B.10.1) and under closely matched node-classification utility (Appendix B.10.2), so it cannot be attributed solely to higher dimensionality or higher accuracy.

  • Insight 3: The risk is a property of semantic enrichment rather than of a specific model. Attack performance varies only moderately across the six feature enhancers and seven GNN backbones (Figs. 3–5). The trend persists with more recent LLMs released between 2024 and 2026 (Llama-3.1-8B, Qwen3-Embedding-8B, DeepSeek-V4-Pro; Appendix B.8) and on four additional graph domains (Appendix B.7). This suggests that the risk will not disappear simply by switching to a newer or different language model.

  • Insight 4: The utility advantage of semantic enhancement is difficult to preserve under formal privacy protection. Input-level LDP mitigates the evaluated attacks only at a substantial utility cost (Sec. 5.6). Under identical GAP privacy budgets, Linq-GCN no longer outperforms Shallow-GCN and is even slightly lower (by 1.2, 0.8, and 0.7 points at ϵg\epsilon_g = 1.0, 2.0, and 4.0; Appendix B.12). This shows a practical tension for practitioners: the performance benefit that motivates LLM enhancement is the part most difficult to retain once privacy is required.

Together, these insights move beyond a shallow-versus-LLM leaderboard toward an explanation of why semantic enhancement increases privacy risk, where the risk comes from, and what it costs to mitigate it. We will restructure the summary of findings in Section 1 and the analysis in Section 5 around these four insights.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Rebuttal by Authors (Part 2/2)

Q2: Research Novelty and Positioning.

Thank you for raising this important point and for recommending the survey by Wang et al. (2025) (A comprehensive survey in llm (-agent) full stack safety: Data, training and deployment, 2025, arXiv:2504.15585) , which provides a valuable taxonomy of safety risks across the data, training, and deployment stages of LLM-based systems. We will cite and discuss it in the revision.

We acknowledge that our study does not propose new attack algorithms or defense mechanisms. This is a deliberate design choice: to audit privacy risks reliably, we adopt established attacks and defenses so that any observed difference can be attributed to semantic enhancement rather than to a newly designed attack. We therefore position our work as a systematic measurement and auditing study, whose contribution lies in the controlled comparisons and the insights summarized in Q1.

Our study complements Wang et al. (2025) by focusing on a specific and increasingly adopted paradigm: the integration of language-model-based representations with graph message passing. In this setting, semantically enriched node features are propagated and aggregated over the graph, which can jointly affect the exposure of graph structure, node labels, and training membership. These graph-specific privacy effects are outside the scope of general LLM safety surveys and have not been characterized in prior GNN privacy studies, which focus on conventional shallow features. In addition, our five-stage auditing framework and code are publicly released, allowing future LLM-enhanced GNNs to be audited under the same protocol.

To clarify our contributions and distinguish our work from existing studies, we will revise the following sections:

  • Introduction (Section 1). We will clarify the research gap and the specific insights established by our study. The following paragraph will be added before the contribution summary:
Existing studies have extensively investigated privacy inference attacks against conventional GNNs, while broader LLM safety research has examined risks across different stages of the model lifecycle. However, how language-model-based semantic enhancement interacts with graph message passing to affect privacy vulnerability remains insufficiently understood. Our study addresses this gap by systematically examining link, label, and membership inference in LLM-enhanced GNNs, together with controlled analyses of representation dimensionality, predictive utility, pretrained semantics, and privacy-preserving training. These investigations reveal how semantically enriched representations amplify privacy-sensitive signals, where this amplification originates, and why it is difficult to mitigate without sacrificing the utility gains of semantic enhancement.
  • Related Work (Section 6). We will further distinguish our work from existing GNN privacy studies and general LLM safety surveys. The following discussion will be added:
Existing graph privacy studies primarily investigate inference attacks and defenses for conventional GNNs, while comprehensive LLM safety surveys, such as Wang et al. (2025), provide a broad taxonomy of security and privacy risks across data, training, and deployment. Our work complements both lines of research by specifically investigating privacy risks arising from the integration of language-model-based representations into graph learning. Through systematic evaluations and controlled analyses, we characterize the privacy implications of semantic enhancement across multiple inference threats and examine the effectiveness and utility costs of representative privacy protections.

We sincerely thank the reviewer again for the thoughtful suggestions, which have helped us clarify our research contributions and strengthen the positioning of our work. We would be happy to address any further questions.

AuthorsOpenReview ↗

Looking Forward to Your Feedback

Dear Reviewer BZKg,

We sincerely appreciate the time and effort you have devoted to reviewing our submission. Your comments have been very helpful, and we have carefully addressed each of them in our response.

With the discussion period nearing its end, we would be grateful to hear whether our response has resolved your concerns. If any points remain unclear, we would be glad to provide further clarification.

Thank you very much for your consideration.

Best regards,
The Authors

Comments on the paper

1 comment
AuthorsOpenReview ↗

General Response to Reviewers and AC

We thank all reviewers for their constructive feedback. We were glad to see the problem recognized as practically important (zbJb, BZKg), the joint study of link, label, and membership privacy valued (BZKg, zbJb), and the experiments seen as extensive and clearly presented (fRRD, BZKg). We have carefully addressed every comment in our individual responses. As the discussion period ends soon, we would greatly appreciate it if the reviewers could let us know whether our responses resolve their concerns. Our improvements are summarized as follows:

  • Clarified positioning as a systematic auditing study. We also restructured the Introduction and Section 5 around four insights that go beyond higher attack success (BZKg, fRRD).
  • Added a discussion of LLM safety surveys to the related work, including Wang et al. (2025) (BZKg).
  • Separated pretrained semantics from LLM enhancement using a Pure DeBERTa baseline (fRRD, BZKg).
  • Controlled for dimensionality and predictive utility, and stated the size of the margins openly (fRRD).
  • Gave a posterior-level explanation of the mechanism, which holds consistently across GCN, SAGE, and GAT (fRRD, BZKg).
  • Clarified how HGA is implemented: it uses a hybrid of observed and predicted labels (zbJb).
  • Added a Direct Posterior-Argmax baseline, and reframed NIA as an active attack under a complementary threat model (zbJb).
  • Corrected how the DP defense results are interpreted, taking MLA score orientation into account (zbJb).

In summary, we have addressed all of the reviewers' concerns, covering novelty and positioning, mechanism and confounders, and evaluation rigor. All of these changes will be incorporated into the revised paper.

We sincerely thank the reviewers and the AC for their time and valuable feedback, which have substantially improved our work.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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