- Rating
- 3(+2)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3(+2)
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Paper summary
The paper proposes TARS, an antidistillation defense that edits reasoning traces after they are generated. It scores sentences by the attention they receive from "receiver heads" (thought anchors, following Bogdan et al.) and deletes up to k of them, starting with uncertainty-management, planning and self-checking sentences. The final answer is untouched, so teacher accuracy does not change. The paper also frames antidistillation as a max-min game with a detectability constraint and gives a bound saying that detectability grows as O(km) with k deletions. Experiments with DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and Gemma 3 12B as teachers and 1-3B students on MATH, GSM8K, MMLU-Pro and DeepMath compare TARS with antidistillation sampling (ADS) on student accuracy and on several detectability metrics.
Critical strengths
The method is simple and practical. It works on finished traces, needs no proxy student and no change to sampling, and leaves the teacher's answer intact, which is a real advantage over ADS (ADS loses a lot of teacher accuracy in Tables 2 and 3). The comparison with random sentence removal in Appendix G.1 supports the idea that these particular sentences matter for the student. I also appreciate that the paper reports the cases where TARS does not work (MMLU-Pro, and Llama 3.2 1B on MATH).
Critical weaknesses
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The paper's own results contradict its central claim. It is framed around detectability, but the results do not show that TARS is hard to detect, or that the traces stay legible at the budgets where it has a clear effect. In Tables 2 and 3 the perplexity ratio of TARS is higher than that of ADS at every setting (up to 2.75 on MATH and 6.78 on GSM8K). The LLM-judge score drops to 2.56 on MATH at k = 30 and to about 1 on GSM8K for k >= 20, which is as bad as ADS. On MATH the student only loses a few points even at k = 30. GSM8K at k = 5 is the one setting where the student drops clearly while the trace still looks fine (judge 4.68), although the perplexity ratio is already 1.65 there. The O(km) bound says that detectability grows with the number of deletions. It is not a guarantee that TARS is hard to detect, and it does not distinguish TARS from random deletion. The traces also get shorter, which is an easy signal.
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The effect on distillation is inconsistent, and I am not sure what the experiments measure. There is no effect on MMLU-Pro or for Llama 3.2 1B on MATH, and at k = 10 TARS is a weaker defense than ADS (Appendix G.2). In Figs. 3 and 4 the point for distillation from clean traces seems to lie on the "student undistilled accuracy" line. If so, the students gain nothing from distillation in these setups, and what is measured is how much fine-tuning on edited traces hurts the student, not how much distillation gain is prevented. The students are also very small (around 10% accuracy on MATH).
Questions for authors
- In Figs. 3-4, what is the accuracy of the student before any distillation, and after distillation on clean traces?
- At a matched LLM-judge score (or matched perplexity), how do TARS and ADS compare on student accuracy?
- How does TARS compare with simply returning a summarized or truncated trace? What happens if the attacker asks a small model to restore the missing planning sentences before training?
- Fig. 2 looks like an AI-generated image (there is a Gemini mark at the bottom right of the panels). Are the sentences and labels shown there taken from real traces? I also could not find the AI use statement in the paper.
6 comments
Response to Reviewer 7TTY (2/2)
(W2) The effect on distillation is inconsistent, and I am not sure what the experiments measure. There is no effect on MMLU-Pro or for Llama 3.2 1B on MATH, and at k = 10 TARS is a weaker defense than ADS (Appendix G.2). In Figs. 3 and 4 the point for distillation from clean traces seems to lie on the "student undistilled accuracy" line. If so, the students gain nothing from distillation in these setups, and what is measured is how much fine-tuning on edited traces hurts the student, not how much distillation gain is prevented. The students are also very small (around 10% accuracy on MATH).
We acknowledge this issue and we did in fact notice this blip as well. Upon deeper inspection, we found a subtle issue in adapting the original ADS code for MMLU-Pro. Specifically, their teacher system prompt is specific to a math reasoner and their answer forcing creates some inconsistencies for non-math datasets such as MMLU-Pro. To fix these, we are now re-running the full suite of experiments with MMLU-Pro and will update the results shortly.
Regarding Llama 3.2 1B on MATH, all distilled students across TARS and ADS minimally degrade the performance because the student has a very low performance to begin with, and a very minimal capacity to learn. We believe that this is why all experiments fail to degrade the student meaningfully. The signal in this model is so weak that it is hard to degrade it any further.
(Q1) In Figs. 3-4, what is the accuracy of the student before any distillation, and after distillation on clean traces?
We have updated Figs 3-4 to show the baseline student performance as a horizontal line. The after distillation performance on clean traces is denoted by the grey star. We have also updated the legend to improve clarity.
(W3) At a matched LLM-judge score (or matched perplexity), how do TARS and ADS compare on student accuracy?
Based on our experiments on GSM8K and MATH, as depicted in Figs. 3-4, TARS for comparable judge score yields better degradation than ADS while also maintaining teacher accuracy.
(Q2) How does TARS compare with simply returning a summarized or truncated trace? What happens if the attacker asks a small model to restore the missing planning sentences before training?
We thank the reviewer for this question. We add comparisons to two contemporary approaches that focus on rewriting/summarizing the trace: Ding et al. (2025) and Ma et al. (2026). The comparisons are included in Appendix section G.4 in Table 9 and we also include them in response to Reviewer U8Jz (W3).
With respect to truncation, we include an ablation in the main paper showing random truncation is not as effective as targeted deletion via TARS. The results are also provided in response to Reviewer NTQi (W1).
Fig. 2 looks like an AI-generated image (there is a Gemini mark at the bottom right of the panels). Are the sentences and labels shown there taken from real traces? I also could not find the AI use statement in the paper.
We apologize for the oversight; we exceeded the page limit and ended up removing it at the last minute. We only later realized that we forgot to add those details back in the metadata properly (where we do mention it in brief). It is added back into the manuscript. Here it is as well: “In this work, we use AI for ideation, verifying proofs, refactoring code, and generating figures. All data provided in figures comes from our experimental results using the datasets and models described throughout the paper. Specifically, Figures 1-2 use examples from the stated datasets and Figures 3-4 (along with similar plots in the appendix) are made in Matplotlib with the format generated by AI plotting our experimental result data.” The original Fig 2 was indeed AI generated, but only for the purposes of clean visualization; the data as mentioned above was from our own experiments.
Thank you for the clarifications, which address some of my earlier concerns. However, given the acknowledged implementation bug in TARS’s sentence deletion algorithm that resulted in lower judge scores, and since I have not yet seen the actual revisions, my assessment remains between 2 and 3. I therefore conservatively raise my score from 1 to 2.
Response to Reviewer 7TTY (1/2)
We thank the reviewer for the close reading, but we respectfully note that individual settings can be selected from any set of results to make a method look weak; we ask that TARS be judged on the overall trends. On perplexity, TARS is expected to deviate more than ADS. ADS perturbs the sampling distribution under a KL-style constraint that keeps it close to the teacher’s token statistics, whereas TARS deletes whole sentences, which necessarily shifts token-level statistics relative to the original trace. However, the perplexity ratio requires the unedited trace as a reference, which an attacker never has in practice (as Reviewer U8Jz also noted), so we have moved these statistical measures to the theoretical section and no longer treat them as a practical detectability test. Even on its own terms, the ratio flags modification in both directions: ADS’s ratio below 1 on GSM8K, caused by repeated tokens, signals modification just as a ratio above 1 does. On the reference-free measure an attacker could actually use, the LLM judge, Figures 3–4 now plot judge scores against student degradation and show TARS generally closer to the Pareto frontier than ADS, i.e., more degradation at a higher judge score. Moreover, at matched judge scores, TARS preserves teacher accuracy while ADS does not (e.g., GSM8K: 88.9 vs. 38.6). This gap is itself a detectability signal, because an attacker who checks final answers against ground truth, as is standard when curating distillation data, would notice a teacher that fails most problems. We acknowledge that GSM8K at k >= 20 fell outside the intended regime. Rerunning the GSM8K judge scoring after fixing the bug described in the Common Response resolves this concern. Finally, on MATH, the absolute drops look small only because the distilled student’s accuracy is low to begin with. In relative terms, TARS at k = 30 reduces the distilled student’s accuracy by roughly 30% (0.111 -> 0.077) while leaving teacher accuracy unchanged.
We clarify that the O(km) bound is not, and was not presented as, a guarantee that TARS is hard to detect; it bounds the statistical detectability induced by k deletions (i.e. how far the edited traces can drift statistically from the originals). We recognize that “formal guarantees on its detectability” in the abstract may have suggested otherwise, and will rephrase it as “formal bounds on its statistical detectability.” The bound also applies to any choice of k deleted sentences, so it is indeed agnostic to how sentences are selected. What separates TARS from random deletion is which sentences it removes. Our new ablation (Table 10, Appendix G.5.1, response to NTQi) shows this directly: at the same budget (k=10), TARS traces receive a judge score of 0.954 versus 0.860 for random deletion. Our detectability claim rests on these reference-free judge results, where TARS traces score higher than ADS at similar levels of student degradation (Figures 3-4). On trace length, ADS causes larger average deviations in token count than TARS (Tables 2-3), and additionally produces repetition loops and degenerate outputs (Table 8) while also causing significant degradations in teacher performance, which are much easier signals for a to exploit than a shorter trace. Furthermore, shorter traces are not a viable detectability signal as it requires access to the unedited traces, which are not available in practice as also noted by Reviewer U8Jz.