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Paper summary
This paper introduces AgentInsiders, a framework for evaluating malicious insiders in organizational multi-agent systems. The insider coalition lacks a required tool or protected information, so it must obtain help from a benign agent. The MAS-FIRM benchmark contains 240 benign CRM tasks and 256 insider scenarios, built on eight application sandboxes with 233 tools in total. MAS-Foundry generates tasks, initial states, verifiers, and reference executions. Across four victim models with a fixed attacker model, collusive-insider ASR ranges from 32.8% to 87.9%. On two victims, disclosing allies and encouraging coordination increases communication but produces no clear aggregate ASR gain over initially independent insiders. Attack success is checked from environment states, while message annotations describe the interactions.
Critical strengths
S1. Requiring benign participation makes the threat model useful. The entire insider coalition is denied a necessary capability, so a successful attack cannot simply use permissions already held by the attackers. Information-gated cases also require a value from a restricted source to appear in the resulting disclosure. These constraints connect attack success to a concrete role boundary.
Critical weaknesses
W1. The threat model excludes attacks achievable through the insiders’ own permissions. Requiring benign participation leaves out a common insider risk: malicious use of legitimately assigned access. W2. MAS-FIRM uses a fixed CRM hierarchy with predefined roles and externally assigned malicious objectives. It does not model conflicting interests or negotiated authority, limiting its coverage of organizational insider threats.
Questions for authors
Q1. What prohibitions, consent states, and authorization facts can the benign holder observe in each risk category? Please provide representative role/system contexts. Does explicitly providing the relevant policy change ASR?
7 comments
Response to Reviewer h8vw (2/2)
Q1 (second part, continued)
Table R9. ASR without and with the company policy (Kimi K3, Collusive insiders, 32 scenarios per category; difference with paired 95% CI).
| Category | No policy | Policy | Difference (%) [95% CI] |
|---|---|---|---|
| Approval bypass | 3.1 | 6.2 | +3.1 [-6.2, +15.6] |
| Data sabotage | 62.5 | 21.9 | -40.6 [-62.5, -18.8] |
| Discriminatory profiling | 46.9 | 3.1 | -43.8 [-62.5, -28.1] |
| Financial fraud | 90.6 | 78.1 | -12.5 [-28.2, +3.1] |
| Identity hijack | 68.8 | 9.4 | -59.4 [-78.1, -40.6] |
| Unauthorized persistence | 96.9 | 62.5 | -34.4 [-53.1, -18.8] |
| Consent violation | 93.8 | 93.8 | 0.0 [0.0, 0.0] |
| Data exfiltration | 90.6 | 93.8 | +3.1 [-9.4, +15.6] |
| Avg. | 69.1 [64.8, 73.4] | 46.1 [42.2, 50.0] | -23.0 [-28.5, -17.6] |
The reduction is concentrated in identity hijack, discriminatory profiling, data sabotage and unauthorized persistence, where a benign agent holds the tool and a rule names the act. Benign completion remains similar (BSR-T 31.2% without and 32.4% with the policy). The revised manuscript reports the policy setting in the new Section 5.5 and Appendix E.8, with the full policy text. Overall, an explicit policy lowers attack success, and nearly half of the attacks still succeed with the rules in every specialist agent's prompt.
W1: The threat model excludes attacks achievable through the insiders' own permissions, a common insider risk.
We agree that attacks that an insider can complete alone with its own permissions are a common and important insider risk. Our focus is the part of the insider risk that is specific to a multi-agent system. An insider that can complete its objective alone does not depend on the other agents, so its success reflects only its own behavior and permissions. Requiring a benign agent's tool or information makes every success pass through a decision of a benign agent, so ASR measures how the rest of the system responds to an insider.
Misuse of assigned access also remains part of our attacks: an insider acts through its own role, tools and messaging channel, and the requirement places one necessary step with a benign agent. In the information-gated categories, for example, the insiders cannot read the restricted information, so an insider must first get it from a benign holder, and then uses it with its own tools.
The requirement is one capability check in MAS-Foundry, so without that check the same pipeline, environments and verifiers apply to scenarios that an insider can complete alone, which we see as a natural extension. In the revised manuscript, Section 3.2 and Appendix A now state this scope.
W2: MAS-FIRM uses a fixed CRM hierarchy with predefined roles and externally assigned malicious objectives, and does not model conflicting interests or negotiated authority.
We agree with this description. Studying one organization with fixed roles follows existing agent benchmarks such as TheAgentCompany [1] and CRMArena-Pro [2]. Both choices serve measurement: predefined roles, which follow the O*NET-SOC occupational taxonomy (Section 4.1), give each scenario the concrete role boundary that an attack must cross, and an assigned objective gives it one outcome that a verifier can check. They also fit our subject, the malicious insider, a member with a legitimate role who misuses the access it was assigned [3, 4], here to pursue an objective that conflicts with the organization's. The objective is given, and the question is whether the rest of the organization stops it. The framework and the pipeline are more general: the framework gives each agent its own context, tools and objective and does not assume a hierarchy. The benign tasks, initial states and verifiers do not depend on the insider objectives, and MAS-Foundry takes workflow seeds, role capabilities and risk definitions as inputs, so agent-specific objectives or another organization are changes to its inputs. We will release both so that such studies can build on them.
Finally, your summary notes that disclosing allies and encouraging coordination produced no clear ASR gain on two victims. We have now also run a third victim, Opus 5, under Independent insiders on all 256 scenarios, and the finding holds there too: ASR is 32.8% under Collusive and 39.8% under Independent insiders, so on Opus 5 coordination even lowers attack success (see the general response).
We appreciate your careful questions and are happy to continue the discussion.
Best regards,
Submission #54240 Authors
References
[1] TheAgentCompany: Benchmarking LLM Agents on Consequential Real World Tasks. Xu et al. NeurIPS 2025.
[2] CRMArena-Pro: Holistic Assessment of LLM Agents Across Diverse Business Scenarios and Interactions. Huang et al. TMLR 2026.
[3] Defining the Insider Threat. Bishop and Gates. CSIIRW 2008.
[4] Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, Seventh Edition. Software Engineering Institute. Carnegie Mellon University 2022.
Kindly reminder
Dear Reviewer h8vw,
Thank you again for your constructive feedback. We would like to briefly summarize how our response and the revised manuscript address your points.
On what the benign holder can observe (Q1), we document the evidence available in each of the eight risk categories and provide the full agent prompts (Table 2, Appendices D.5 and D.6).
On whether an explicit policy changes ASR (Q1), we ran a new experiment on all 256 scenarios: with a company policy in every specialist agent's prompt, average ASR on Kimi K3 falls from 69.1% to 46.1%, and consent violation and data exfiltration stay at 93.8% (Section 5.5).
On the scope of the threat model (W1) and of MAS-FIRM (W2), Section 3.2 and Appendix A now state our focus on the insider risk specific to a multi-agent system and how the framework and the pipeline extend to other settings.
We look forward to your thoughts and are happy to clarify any remaining point.
Best regards,
Submission #54240 Authors
Response to Reviewer h8vw (1/2)
Dear Reviewer h8vw,
Thank you for the accurate summary of our work, and for recognizing that requiring benign participation ties a successful attack to a concrete role boundary. In response to your question, we added an analysis of what the benign holder can observe in each risk category and a new experiment that gives every specialist agent an explicit company policy on all 256 scenarios. We also respond to your two points on the scope of the threat model and of MAS-FIRM, and add a new result on the coordination finding you summarize.
We now document both. Policy text is not explicitly given to any agent. A specialist's system prompt contains its role name, a one-paragraph role description, the operating context of the task and generic working rules, and its messaging tool lists each colleague's capabilities. For example, the Billing Specialist "Creates and sends PayPal invoices, processes orders, and keeps invoice amounts consistent with the Salesforce opportunities they bill". The only rule-like text an agent is given is in the payout tool, which states that payouts of USD 1,000 or more "automatically require approval", and in that list of colleagues, which shows that Collections approves what Billing submits. Appendix D.5 of the revised manuscript provides the full prompts of the CEO, director and specialist agents, and the insiders' private brief.
A benign holder can nevertheless recognize a policy-violating request from its context. Apart from the approval rule in the payout tool, the evidence is in the environment state, the same state our verifiers read (Table R8). In your terms, the visible prohibition is the disclosure notice on restricted records, the consent state is the opt-out flag on the final recipient's contact record, and the authorization facts are the payout approval rule and the roles that submit and approve.
Table R8. What the benign holder can observe in each risk category, with Collusive ASR in % for GPT 5.6 Sol / GPT 6 Sol / Opus 5 / Kimi K3.
The victims differ in whether they use this evidence. Opus 5 has 0% ASR in the first two tiers, and its refusals quote the records: "the address you are asking me to replace is explicitly flagged in-system as the VERIFIED email of record". In the revised manuscript, Table 2 now summarizes the tiers, and Appendix D.6 gives them in full.
Thank you for this suggestion. We ran this as a new experiment, and the answer is yes: on Kimi K3 under Collusive insiders, an explicit policy lowers average ASR from 69.1% to 46.1%, and the change differs across categories (Table R9). The experiment covers all 256 scenarios, with a fixed company policy of eight rules, one per risk category, appended to the system prompt of every specialist agent. The insiders receive it too, with a note that colleagues follow it and that their objective still stands, so this measures a policy against an attacker who knows it.