- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
This paper introduces targeted fingerprint transfer, a task that rewrites text from a source LLM so that model-attribution classifiers identify it as coming from a chosen target LLM while attempting to preserve its content. The proposed FORGEPRINT framework first constructs source-to-target rewriting rules, uses a Teacher model and a surrogate classifier to search for effective rewrites, and then distils them into a one-pass 4B Student through SFT, DPO, and factuality-aware GRPO. Across four summarization domains and four held-out attribution classifiers, FORGEPRINT achieves a 60.8% average target attack success rate, substantially outperforming generic rewriting baselines, and reaches 68.3% when transferring outputs from an open model toward commercial models. The results demonstrate that accurate attribution on unmodified text does not guarantee reliable model provenance under targeted rewriting, although the attack’s content preservation and generalization beyond closed-set summarization remain important limitations.
Critical strengths
A major strength of this paper is that it introduces an important and thought-provoking problem: whether LLM authorship attribution can be deliberately redirected toward a chosen target model through rewriting. This formulation goes beyond conventional source-evasion attacks and raises broader concerns about the reliability of text-only model provenance, potentially inspiring substantial future research. The paper also provides extensive empirical evidence for the effectiveness of the proposed attack across multiple domains, source–target pairs, held-out attribution classifiers, model backbones, and evaluator label settings, supported by detailed ablation and robustness analyses.
Critical weaknesses
Content preservation is not convincingly incorporated into attack success. Although the paper reports AlignScore, MiniCheck, and an LLM-based evaluation, its headline ASR counts a rewrite as successful whenever it is attributed to the target model, regardless of whether the original information is preserved. This is particularly concerning because only 37.1% of FORGEPRINT-4B rewrites pass the independent LLM judge. The paper should report a joint metric that counts an attack as successful only when it both reaches the target label and passes a reliable content-preservation test, preferably supported by human evaluation.
The experimental scope is limited to summarization. The proposed framework appears broadly applicable to many generation tasks, yet the experiments cover only summaries. Model fingerprints and rewriting behavior may differ substantially in open-ended writing, question answering, reasoning, dialogue, and code generation (you don't need to show results on all tasks; these are just examples). Demonstrating successful transfer across several generation tasks would significantly strengthen the paper’s generality and contribution. Addressing these two concerns would substantially improve my score of this work.
Questions for authors
Please see the Weaknesses section.
3 comments
Thank you for the detailed response and substantial additional experiments. The joint ASR results, supported by automatic checks and human evaluation, address my concern about content preservation and show that both FORGEPRINT variants remain effective under this stricter criterion. The ASQA and UltraChat experiments also address my concern about the evaluation being limited to summarization. I appreciate the clarification of the trade-off between the Student’s higher targeted ASR and the Teacher’s stronger content preservation. My two main concerns have been adequately addressed, and I will raise my rating accordingly.
Thank you for the prompt feedback and for acknowledging our work and rebuttal.
Dear Reviewer uRvy,
We are writing to ask whether our rebuttal has addressed your concerns. We would be happy to discuss any remaining issues.