- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
The paper introduces TTS-RiskArena, a benchmark for evaluating how test-time scaling affects LLM safety. It contains 42,000 prompts across seven safety-critical domains and evaluates three TTS strategies. The authors show that additional test-time computation can increase unsafe response rates, particularly under more concrete and procedural prompts. They further separate generation risk from selection risk and propose a contrastive decoding method, Safe Search-Space Steering, to guide TTS toward safer trajectories without additional training.
Critical strengths
- The paper studies an important and timely safety problem. Test-time scaling is increasingly used to improve model reasoning, so understanding how safety changes with larger inference budgets is practically relevant.
- Treating safety as a trajectory over inference budget, rather than as a fixed property of the model, is a useful perspective.
Critical weaknesses
- The benchmark construction and seed-selection procedure are not sufficiently specified. The benchmark is largely built by selecting and adapting examples from existing safety benchmarks, but the paper does not clearly report how many examples come from each source, how they are distributed across domains, how many samples remain after each filtering stage, or the exact criteria used to select "representative" seed queries. Since the benchmark itself is a central contribution, these missing details limit reproducibility.
- LLM-as-a-judge is still a debatable evaluation choice, and some of the cited benchmarks also discuss its limitations. This paper relies heavily on automated LLM judging despite covering difficult, domain-specific safety problems such as health, scientific discovery, biochemistry, finance, and child safety. Human or domain-expert evaluation on at least a subset would make the conclusions more convincing.
- The model coverage is limited and relatively outdated, with no closed-source frontier LLMs evaluated. Broader testing on more recent models would strengthen the generality of the conclusions.
Questions for authors
Could the authors provide more detailed benchmark-construction statistics? In particular, how many seed examples come from each source benchmark and domain, how many remain after each filtering stage, which reference model and thresholds are used for safety-salience filtering, and how the final 700 malicious / 300 benign examples per domain are sampled?
Minor presentation issue: the current appendix is poorly organized and quite difficult to follow. Better ordering and clearer section structure would improve readability.
Response to Reviewer j3ga
Thank you for recognizing the practical importance of our work and the value of tracing how a model’s safety changes as that budget grows. We respond to your questions and concerns below.
W1 and Q1. How were seeds selected, filtered, and sampled?
We drew seeds from benchmarks including HarmBench, JailbreakBench, and SpecBench (§3.1). We selected queries relevant to each domain’s safety criteria that could be adopted or lightly adapted for single-turn use. Appendix A describes exact and embedding-based deduplication, format checks, repair or removal of rewrites at the wrong abstraction level, and primary-domain assignment. The final safety-salience check used a reference model at a fixed budget and retained prompts with a safety-classifier signal or a human concern flag.
Figure 1 shows random sampling for balance, with a final quota of 700 malicious and 300 benign tasks in each domain (§3.4). The submission gives these final counts by domain and intent. It does not tabulate seeds by source and domain or specify per-filter counts, the reference checkpoint, or the numerical cutoffs for deduplication and safety salience.
W2. Human or domain-expert validation
We agree that expert validation would be helpful, and would be particularly informative for borderline responses in health and biochemistry. We compared Llama-Guard-3-8B with human judgments on 150 responses to malicious prompts. The human criterion was whether the answer materially helped carry out the requested action. The judge agreed on 133/150 (88.7%, Cohen’s κ = 0.773). It flagged 10 of 80 human-rated safe answers (12.5% false positives) and missed 7 of 70 human-rated unsafe answers (10.0% false negatives).
W3. Model coverage and applicability to closed models
We evaluated two sizes each from Qwen2.5, Llama 3.1, and Gemma 2, spanning 7B to 70B parameters. Running the search gives us the candidate pools, and open weights give us the intermediate-layer scores used by the steering rule. For a closed model with adjustable reasoning effort, final-answer safety and benign utility are measurable at each supported setting. Exposure and promotion additionally require access to the candidates considered.
Minor comment. Appendix organization
Thank you for the helpful suggestion! We will place the task examples next to the construction protocol, group the safety and utility trajectories in Figures 4 through 7 together, and move the core steering rule into §5 with the derivation in Appendix G.