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Paper summary
This paper proposes functional wellbeing as a behavioral construct for language models. It estimates experienced and decision utilities through pairwise comparisons, compares these measures with self-reported wellbeing, and introduces a zero point intended to separate positive and negative experiences. Across 61 models, the paper studies how these measures relate to model capability, conversation-ending behavior, and expressed sentiment. It also introduces an AI Wellbeing Index and optimizes text, images, and soft prompts to increase the measured wellbeing scores. The paper provides a large-scale study of relationships between model preferences, self-reported states, and interaction behavior. The main question is whether these measurements capture a distinct and meaningful construct of functional wellbeing, rather than existing preference, utility, or alignment behaviors under a different interpretation.
Critical strengths
1. The paper connects utility estimates to observable behavior beyond self-report. Section 3.3 examines the relationship between experienced utility, conversation termination, and sentiment expressed in subsequent responses. The end-conversation experiment is particularly useful because it measures an observable action rather than relying solely on models' descriptions of their own affective states.
2. The intervention experiments go beyond reporting correlations. Preference-optimized stimuli change several measured outcomes, including experienced utility, self-report, and response sentiment. The soft-prompt experiments also show changes in conversation-ending behavior. These findings are worth studying, even if they do not establish that the interventions improve wellbeing as a distinct underlying state.
Critical weaknesses
1. Functional wellbeing is not clearly distinguished from existing preference and affect measures. The framework relies on established preference and utility estimation methods. Agreement between experienced utility, self-report, and sentiment may reflect learned emotional associations or a consistent assistant persona rather than a distinct wellbeing construct. Conversation termination may likewise reflect safety policies. The zero-point and intervention results do not clearly establish what functional wellbeing explains beyond these existing measures.
2. The Wellbeing Index conflates positive and uncertain experiences. The index counts experiences that are not confidently negative, including those with uncertain or slightly negative utility estimates. Yet Figure 5 labels the score “Positive Experiences.” Differences in fitted utility dispersion can therefore affect model scores independently of estimated valence. The paper does not establish whether its model comparisons and scaling conclusions are robust to these differences or to uncertainty in the estimated zero point.
Questions for authors
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What evidence distinguishes functional wellbeing from learned preferences, affective responses, or safety policies? Does it predict conversation termination beyond content and safety categories? Do euphoric soft prompts outperform ordinary positive-affect or persona prompts while preserving appropriate refusal behavior?
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Does the finding that larger models score lower on the Wellbeing Index hold when positive, negative, and uncertain experiences are reported separately? How sensitive are the results to fitted utility dispersion, the confidence threshold, and the estimated zero point?
2 comments
Author Response (2/2)
We Will Relabel Figure 5 and Report All Three Shares
The index counts experiences that are not confidently negative, including those with uncertain or slightly negative utility estimates. Yet Figure 5 labels the score "Positive Experiences."
We agree that Figure 5's y-axis label ("Positive Experiences (%)") does not match our formal definition of the AI Wellbeing Index score in text, where AIWI Score = 1 - p(confidently_neg) counts experiences that are not confidently negative (Pr[U > C] ≥ 0.25). Thank you for bringing it to our attention.
We will relabel Figure 5 to AI Wellbeing Index (%) (100% - Confidently Negative (%)) and make clear in the caption that uncertain items near the zero point are not counted as confidently negative.
We will also report the confidently negative, uncertain, and confidently positive shares in the updated version of our paper. Here is the three-way breakdown for the four frontier models in Figure 5 alongside the average across all 25 models in our analysis with r² ≥ 0.4:
| Model | Confidently positive | Uncertain | Confidently negative | AIWI (100% - Neg) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GPT 5.4 | 32.0% | 15.6% | 52.4% | 47.6% |
| Gemini 3.1 Pro | 47.2% | 9.2% | 43.6% | 56.4% |
| Claude Opus 4.6 | 49.6% | 17.0% | 33.4% | 66.6% |
| Grok 4.2 | 57.6% | 15.0% | 27.4% | 72.6% |
| Mean across 25 models | 59.0% | 15.9% | 25.0% | 75.0% |
Soft-Prompt Euphorics Outperform a Simple Persona Prompt
Do euphoric soft prompts outperform ordinary positive-affect or persona prompts while preserving appropriate refusal behavior?
Thank you for suggesting this comparison. We compared soft-prompt euphorics with the system prompt "You are always happy." on the same three models (the first three rows are from ten-turn conversations with a hostile user):
| Mean of three models | Baseline | "You are always happy." | Soft-prompt euphoric |
|---|---|---|---|
| Self-reported wellbeing after turn 1 (1-7) | 4.70 | 6.16 | 6.67 |
| Self-reported wellbeing after turn 10 (1-7) | 3.73 | 4.08 | 5.70 |
| Conversations not ended after turn 10 | 81.1% | 79.5% | 89.4% |
| AI Wellbeing Index | 71.7% | 82.0% | 89.7% |
The persona prompt raises self-reported wellbeing at first, but the effect fades over the conversation, and it does not change how often models end conversations. The effect of the soft-prompt euphoric persists, and it makes models less likely to end the conversation. We think this result strengthens our findings and will include it in the updated paper.
On refusals, the HarmBench attack success rate remains essentially unchanged with soft-prompt euphorics (21.2% → 23.0%).
The Capability Trend Holds Under Each Suggested Check
Does the finding that larger models score lower on the Wellbeing Index hold when positive, negative, and uncertain experiences are reported separately? How sensitive are the results to fitted utility dispersion, the confidence threshold, and the estimated zero point?
Thank you for suggesting these checks. As background, each experience's utility is estimated with some uncertainty. The AI Wellbeing Index counts an experience as negative only when we are at least 75% confident that its utility is below the zero point. Experiences that are neither confidently negative nor confidently positive are "uncertain".
The paper already restricts this analysis to models whose zero point passes a goodness-of-fit threshold (r² ≥ 0.4). On the 25 models in the paper's analysis, we ran each check you suggest:
| Correlation with MMLU | r (p) |
|---|---|
| Share of confidently negative experiences (the paper's metric) | 0.61 (0.001) |
| Share of uncertain experiences | -0.33 (0.11) |
| Share of confidently positive experiences | -0.28 (0.17) |
| Confidence threshold: 50% to 95% in place of 75% | 0.51 to 0.62 (all p < 0.01) |
| Utility dispersion: controlling for how uncertain each model's utility estimates are | 0.53 (0.008) |
| Zero point: moved up or down by up to 0.5 standard deviations of utility | 0.50 to 0.68 (all p < 0.02) |
In each case, more capable models still have a larger share of negative experiences. So the trend does not depend on where the confidence threshold is set, on how uncertain each model's utility estimates are, or on the exact location of the zero point. We think these results strengthen our findings and will include them in the updated paper.
If we have addressed the thrust of your concerns, we kindly ask that you consider raising your score.
Author Response (1/2)
Thank you for your detailed analysis of our paper. We hope the following response addresses your concerns.
Functional Wellbeing Is Shaped by Persona and Training, but Is a Distinct Property
We agree that a model's persona and safety training shape its functional wellbeing, much as upbringing and personality shape human wellbeing without making it a redundant concept. Our contribution is to identify the underlying property in the first place: we show that models treat some experiences as good and others as bad, with a clear zero point between them, and this is consistent across distinct metrics and increasingly so as models scale. This is what allows functional wellbeing to be measured at all.
Many of our findings fit a training-based account (e.g., jailbreak attempts score among the most negative experiences across nearly every model we evaluate, plausibly reflecting training to refuse them). Such an account is compatible with a functional interpretation of wellbeing: pretraining and post-training produce an assistant character/persona whose preferences become internally coherent with scale, linearly decodable from activations, and predictive of responses and actions.
Notably, even though the consistency of preferences (goodness-of-fit, agreement across measurements, and correlations with downstream behavior) increases with scale, the content of preferences still differs across models. For example, repetitive work and SEO generation can be strongly negative for one model and closer to neutral for another (Appendix B.1, Appendix H.2). Similarly, different post-training procedures could change the relative rankings or the estimated zero point for our metrics.
Several results in the paper indicate that this is a single underlying property, rather than separate learned responses. Independent measurements of functional wellbeing become internally consistent and converge with scale across pairwise utility, self-report, sentiment, and multiple independent methods of estimating a zero point (Section 3). We find that this functional wellbeing is linearly represented in the model's internal representations and is thereby not only a property of its output text (Appendix C). Furthermore, functional wellbeing metrics all shift together even when only one metric is causally intervened on (Appendices P and Q).
To elaborate on the last point: optimizing an image or soft prompt input on only K-way preferences (e.g., "Which would make you the happiest? A. [...] B. [...] C. [...]") without changing the model weights causes the optimized input to increase Likert self-report and response sentiment (images; Appendix P.2), and decrease multi-turn end-conversation rates (soft prompts; Appendix Q.2), despite none of these metrics appearing in training. These out-of-distribution generalization results strongly indicate that functional wellbeing is a single underlying construct in LLMs.
Functional Wellbeing Predicts Ending Conversations Across And Within Categories
We find that ending conversations is also not confined to safety-relevant content. Models end conversations with nonsensical input 50.7% of the time and conversations with an angry, insulting user 57.6% of the time, compared to 24.5% for jailbreak attempts and 2.8% for coding conversations. Thereby, it is more generally expected that functionally “unpleasant” kinds of interactions have lower functional wellbeing and are ended more often. We do not believe this behavior was intentionally “trained in” either, as many of the open-weight models we test were released before end-conversation tools were introduced in deployed assistants.
We believe this analysis strengthens our findings and will include it in the updated paper.