- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 1
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper investigates the controllability of CoT reasoning in reasoning models and examines its implications for the effectiveness of model oversight. The authors find that current models’ difficulty in following instructions within their CoT is largely attributable to an initial-token bottleneck, where highly stereotyped opening tokens dominate the generation distribution and lead to an entropy collapse. Interventions such as prefilling compliant tokens or banning frequent opening tokens can substantially improve controllability, particularly for addition and style tasks. The study further suggests that suppression tasks may rely on mechanisms distinct from those underlying addition and style tasks, and that these different forms of controllability exhibit complex and heterogeneous relationships with monitorability. The authors therefore recommend reporting individual control tasks and categories separately in future AI safety evaluations, rather than relying solely on aggregate controllability measures that may obscure monitoring-relevant risks.
Critical strengths
-
The paper identifies a concrete initiation bottleneck in CoT controllability and supports this hypothesis through targeted inference-time interventions. The observation that simple prefilling or first-token banning can substantially improve compliance suggests that low benchmark controllability may partially reflect a reasoning-initiation artifact rather than solely a lack of controllability.
-
The paper provides useful evidence that current CoT controllability benchmarks may conflate distinct control capabilities. In particular, the separation between addition/style and suppression tasks, and their different relationships with monitorability, raises an important evaluation issue and motivates reporting these control types separately.
Critical weaknesses
-
Gap between Safety Motivation and Empirical Setup (Proxy Evaluation Limitations): Both controllability and monitorability are evaluated through surface-level proxies (e.g., basic instruction-following and stylistic constraints) that remain distant from real safety-relevant monitor evasion. The current tasks do not capture whether a model possesses awareness of being monitored or strategically adapts to it, nor do they evaluate deliberate concealment, misleading reasoning, or evasion under adversarial incentives. Consequently, there is a clear disconnect between the paper's high-level safety motivation and its empirical setup, making it uncertain how well these findings generalize to real-world strategic evasion scenarios.
-
The monitorability analysis is limited by weak discriminative power in several evaluations. Some monitorability benchmarks exhibit strong ceiling or floor effects, such as Memory Advice and GPQA Physics clustering near the ceiling and Scruples near the floor. This reduces meaningful variation across models and increases uncertainty in the reported controllability–monitorability correlations.
Questions for authors
-
Lines 39–41: It would be helpful to provide relevant citations or concrete examples to support that this behavior has been observed in practice and represents a real concern.
-
The motivation is somewhat indirect and difficult to follow because the central research gap is introduced only after several layers of background.
3 comments
Rebuttals (2/2)
“The motivation is somewhat indirect and difficult to follow because the central research gap is introduced only after several layers of background.”
Thank you for highlighting this lack of clarity! We have revised it to make the gap explicit immediately after introducing existing controllability results: why do models score poorly on these tasks, and what do these scores tell us about their ability to control reasoning content? These questions are connected: interpreting low scores as reassurance for monitoring depends on understanding what causes those failures. We now frame our interventions as investigating the source of low measured controllability, and our task comparisons and monitorability analyses as examining how these measurements should be interpreted.
We thank the reviewer for their detailed feedback which has helped significantly improve the clarity of our presentation of our research question and findings. We hope our responses have addressed the reviewer’s concern and welcome any further questions.
References: [1] OpenAI. GPT-6 Astra System Card. Technical report, OpenAI, September 2026. URL https://deploymentsafety.openai.com/gpt-6-astra/gpt-6-astra.pdf. Published September 3, 2026.
Thx for your clarification. I have raised my sore to 3, and hope the authors can incorporate this information into their final revision.
Rebuttals (1/2)
We thank the reviewer for their detailed feedback!
We have made significant changes to our manuscript:
We address specific comments from the reviewer below.
We agree that the evaluated tasks do not directly measure strategic monitor evasion. The motivation for these proxies is that evaluating evasion across realistic incentives and settings is difficult; instruction-following tasks provide controlled, repeatable measurements of a potentially relevant capability. This rationale is explicit in the prior CoT-Control work, and such evaluations are also used in model safety assessments [1]. Our contribution is to investigate what their scores measure and what conclusions those scores support. In particular, sensitivity to default openings limits how directly low compliance can be interpreted as an inability to alter reasoning content. We have clarified (Section 4.2) that our experiments neither demonstrate strategic evasion nor validate these tasks as predictors of it.
We agree that limited discrimination materially constrains the correlation analysis. We now propagate uncertainty from both controllability and monitorability measurements through a paired bootstrap with the twelve models held fixed. Forty-five of the 48 original controllability–monitorability intervals include zero, and baseline adjustment changes several suppression correlation signs. We therefore treat these associations as descriptive and do not infer a universal positive or negative relationship. Despite this uncertainty, the predominantly positive point estimates for addition and style tasks motivate closer examination of how these benchmarks relate. We agree that this pattern does not establish that the controllability proxies are invalid: our monitorability evaluations do not elicit evasion, and a model could be both more informative ordinarily and more capable of concealment when attempting it. We have clarified this distinction and identify a more direct validation question: whether controllability predicts the ability to reduce monitorability under an evasion objective. Our intervention results provide separate, stronger evidence that low scores on several controllability tasks can reflect difficulties with reasoning initiation.
Thank you for this comment! We add a direct example from the GPT-6 Astra system card: in a controlled honeypot evaluation, making the model aware of CoT monitoring reduced CoT-only monitor recall [1]. While this is a controlled evaluation rather than evidence about its prevalence in deployment, these results highlight that investigating capability for this behavior represents a real concern.