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Withdrawn from ICLR 2027

AI Alignment via Incentives and Correction

Withdrawn from ICLR 2027, so left out of the paper lists and the map.

Abstract

We study AI alignment through law-and-economics models of deterrence, in which misconduct is a strategic response to the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. The same logic arises in agentic AI pipelines: a solver may gain from a persuasive but incorrect answer, while an auditor must decide whether costly monitoring is worthwhile. This creates a coupled incentive problem: stronger penalties deter the solver but can weaken the auditor's incentive to inspect, since once the solver seems reliable, auditing mostly incurs cost and rarely catches errors. This perspective also changes what should count as a post-training signal: rather than rewarding the final answer alone, a solver–auditor pipeline lets rewards target the full correction event. We formalize this in a two-agent model in which a principal chooses these rewards, making reward design a bilevel optimization problem judged by the behavior it induces. We propose a bandit-based outer loop that searches over reward profiles using noisy interaction feedback. On an LLM coding pipeline, adaptive reward profiles maintain oversight pressure and improve held-out principal value over static hand-designed rewards, reducing hallucinated incorrect attempts by 52%.

Primary area:
alignment, fairness, safety, privacy, and societal considerations
Keywords:
AI Alignment, Game theory, post-training, RL

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_G2fNOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

The paper studies reward design in solver–auditor systems, focusing on the relationship between discouraging solver errors and maintaining auditing incentives. Motivated by a simplified game, it uses an outer-loop bandit controller to select reward profiles for co-training based on principal value (PV). Code-generation experiments show fewer incorrect attempts and improved in-distribution PV, while downstream utility gains remain unestablished.

Critical strengths
  1. The problem formulation is valuable. The paper considers how to maintain effective oversight while constraining the generator, and clearly distinguishes training rewards from the system’s ultimate utility.
  2. The experiments provide encouraging preliminary evidence. Improved in-distribution PV and evidence of selective abstention support reward design as an approach to learning when to answer and when to abstain.
Critical weaknesses
  1. It remains unclear whether the method achieves a better risk–coverage tradeoff. The reported hallucination rate counts incorrect attempts among all samples, so it depends on answer coverage. The evidence for selective abstention and improved in-distribution overall pass rate means the gains cannot simply be dismissed as more abstention. However, without selective-answering baselines at matched coverage, the advantage over simple confidence filtering remains unclear. On LiveCodeBench, fewer incorrect attempts do not translate into higher overall pass rate or proxy PV than fixed-binary, limiting the scope of the conclusions.
  2. The independent contribution of feedback-driven reward selection remains unclear. Comparisons with static rewards do not sufficiently distinguish benefits from changing rewards during training from those of effective feedback-driven selection. Random or fixed-cycle schedules over the same reward library would provide direct and important controls. The single-seed main comparisons also limit confidence in a consistent advantage.
Questions for authors
  1. Regarding W1: Does the method retain lower error rates or higher PV than confidence-filtered baselines at matched answer coverage, with filtering rules calibrated on separate data?
  2. Regarding W2: Can random or fixed-cycle schedules over the same reward library achieve similar results under matched training budgets? Please also report repeated training results if available to clarify the consistency of the gains.
  3. Additional clarification: The cross-checkpoint analysis provides some evidence about the auditor’s contribution. Could the authors further clarify the contribution of auditor learning and how the single-assert auditing format limits generalization to more complex tasks?
Reviewer_sHG1OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
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Paper summary

The paper casts oversight in agentic pipelines as an inspection game between a solver and an auditor, drawing on law-and-economics models of deterrence. The authors separate the rewards given to the agents from a principal value scored over full correction events (correct, caught, silent failure, false positive, abstain). Reward design is posed as a bilevel problem, with an outer discounted Thompson sampler choosing among eight hand-designed reward profiles. The theory derives the local mixed equilibrium in noise-free and noisy-judge settings (Section 3, Appendix A) and proposes a screening protocol with hidden random review and inverse-propensity value estimation (Appendix B).

Experiments co-train a Qwen2.5-Coder-7B solver and auditor with GRPO on APPS, MBPP and HumanEval+, where the auditor flags bugs by writing a single assert. On held-out tasks, the Thompson controller reduces the solver hallucination rate to 0.286, versus 0.598–0.622 for the baselines. On LiveCodeBench, hallucination falls 32% relative to the fixed-binary baseline, but overall pass rate and proxy principal value are lower than the baselines'.

Critical strengths
  1. A focused question within AI control. The overall structure closely follows existing AI control protocols (Greenblatt et al., 2024; Griffin et al., 2024; Bhatt et al., 2025): an untrusted actor, a monitor, and an expensive audit under a budget. The paper's own question is narrower: what happens when the monitor is RL-trained jointly with the actor, so that its willingness to escalate is shaped by rewards. The paper shows such a monitor can learn to stop escalating altogether: under the fixed-default rewards, the auditor abstains on 99.7% of outputs by iteration 46 (Appendix D.2), though the cause is debatable (see weakness).
Critical weaknesses
  1. The framing overlaps substantially with AI control.
  • The solver, auditor and judge map onto the untrusted model, monitor and budgeted human audit of trusted monitoring (Greenblatt et al., 2024). Griffin et al. (2024) already formalize such protocols as games with a safety–usefulness tradeoff, and Wen et al. (2024) adapt protocols over time with a slow outer loop. The paper cites this line of work (Section 1, Appendix I), but does not discuss this adequately.
  • The stated distinction, that the monitor is a reward-trained learner rather than a fixed component, is real but narrower than the framing suggests. It concerns a monitor that is neither adversarial nor fixed but drifts under poorly chosen rewards. That is a training-dynamics problem, not the adversarial setting control targets.
  • Control protocols also avoid the central tension mostly. In trusted monitoring, the monitor outputs a suspicion score and the designer audits the top fraction within a fixed budget. The monitor is never paid per catch, so it has no reason to go quiet when errors become rare.
  1. The experiment does not test the regime that motivates the paper.
  • Every solver output's correctness is known from base tests, and the rewards use it. Several profiles make solver_uncaught_reward negative (−0.55 in silent_failure_penalty, −0.2 in strict_solver_catch). This penalizes wrong answers the auditor missed, using information the theory assumes the principal lacks.
  • Neither the noisy-judge model (Appendix A) nor the screening protocol with ρ < 1 (Appendix B) is tested, which are arguably regimes closer to reality.
  • The abstract claims adaptive profiles maintain oversight pressure. In Figure 5, however, the Thompson auditor's true-catch rate falls from about 0.3 to about 0.05 over training, so the gains likely did not come from the auditor, the novel part of this protocol.
Questions for authors
  1. At matched compute, how does Thompson compare with each of the eight profiles held fixed, and with a uniform random rotation over them?
  2. How does a solver-only baseline with a wrong-answer penalty and an abstention reward (for example +1 correct, 0 abstain, −1 wrong) compare? Why did the Appendix E.8 run collapse to abstention, and does a tuned version match Thompson's hallucination and pass rates?
  3. How does the method compare with a control-style protocol, where the auditor outputs a suspicion score and a fixed fraction of the most suspicious outputs is audited? This would test whether delegating the escalation decision to a rewarded auditor is necessary at all.
  4. How do the results change if solver rewards for unaudited answers cannot depend on ground-truth correctness, matching the information structure of Section 3?
  5. Is there any experiment with the Appendix B protocol, using ρ < 1 or a noisy LLM judge in place of base tests?
Reviewer_9ioeOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
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Paper summary

This paper studies the AI-human ethics and bechvior alignment through the lens of incentives. Inspired by economics models of deterrence and auditing, the paper proposed an game-theoretic freamwork for LLM training by cosnider joint solver–auditor outcome rewards. The experiment on Qwen and LiveCodeBench show this bilevel optimization using coipled incentive between the model and auditor is effective in reducing incorrect attempts.

Critical strengths
  1. Cross disciplinary idea like this is important and timely, especially when LLMs and exilibits stronger capability. Aligning incentives between 2 agents for joint bilevel optimization is a interest paragigm of training and utaizing the intrisic capabilities of large models themselves rather than a fixed static rewrad or loss function.

  2. The problem and solution is be presented in an interesting game theoretic freamwork,which offers an principled perspective on alignment and how that jointly improves the same objective.

  3. Method itself is simple enough to be a generalizable approach for other model families, tasks and application scerenios. Althoug the details of weather or not or how reward profiles can be transfer to different domains should be further examed.

  4. Empirical improvements are meaningful, showing the potentials of aligning incentives between 2 opposing agent in improving reliability.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The large abstention rate is convering. Top right figure of fig 5 shows large solver abstention rate. So the improvements can come from auditor as a regularizer and leads to more conservative solutions. The current experiments do not convencingly show the improvement is comming from the solver-auditor loop, it may also be a result of conditioning the solver to be more conservative.

  2. There are also no experiment showing the thompson sampling itself is effective against "finite library of eight reward profiles". In general, experiments that isolate the individual design component would help the paper greatly.

  3. Performence on LiveCoceBench is not convincing and making the high abstention problem even more appearant, where ithe gains do not transfer successfully to overall pass rate and proxy PV.

  4. The experimental coverage is also somewhat narrow. Just one downstream task and one benchhmark.

Questions for authors
  1. Is it possible to rule out the possibility that simple making solver more conservation can achieve the same result?

  2. Can authors demonstrate the effectiveness of thompson sampling over other alternatives.

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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