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Paper summary
This paper investigates how pre-training data poisoning affects language models' performance on clean data, with a particular focus on the scaling relationship between the poisoning fraction (\epsilon) and relative perplexity degradation. Motivated by empirical observations of non-integer scaling exponents in OLMo-style models, the authors establish an analyticity barrier showing that smooth contamination of a nondegenerate optimum generically produces quadratic excess-risk scaling. They then construct a solvable heavy-tailed truncated regression model and derive two distinct exponents, (q_\star/(q_\star+2)) and (2-2/q_\star), depending on the order of the high-dimensional and small-poisoning limits. Numerical simulations support these theoretical predictions. Finally, the paper proposes a connection to LLM pre-training through finite-time spectral filtering and heavy-tailed inverse-curvature distributions, supported by numerical curvature measurements.
Critical strengths
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The paper studies aggregate clean-performance degradation rather than targeted attack success, offering a complementary perspective on pre-training data poisoning (Sec. 1). The relative perplexity metric provides a clear way to quantify degradation (Eq. (1)), and the empirical observations suggest that poisoning sensitivity depends on model size and training progress (Fig. 1). Understanding such relationships could provide useful insights into how data contamination affects large-scale pre-training.
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The analyticity barrier provides a principled explanation of quadratic scaling under regularity assumptions (Result 1), while the adaptive-truncation framework introduces an interpretable bias–poison trade-off that produces fractional exponents (Result 2). The random-coordinate model and Poisson-process formulation enable explicit analysis of the contamination mechanism (Sec. 4.1–4.2). Particularly interesting is the non-commutativity of the high-dimensional and small-poisoning limits, which reveals how different statistical regimes can produce distinct scaling exponents (Result 9).
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The numerical simulations support the predicted exponents across multiple heavy-tail parameters and aspect ratios (Figs. 2–3). The LLM experiments cover multiple model sizes, training checkpoints, and two poisoning constructions (Figs. 1, 7–10). Additionally, the connection to finite-time spectral filtering is an interesting attempt to explain poisoning sensitivity through optimization dynamics (Sec. 5). The detailed Gauss–Newton spectral analysis and numerical reliability discussions are also appreciated (Appendix E).
Critical weaknesses
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The experiments insert poisoned data into the original clean corpus while maintaining matched total training-token budgets. Consequently, increasing the poisoning fraction also changes the effective amount of clean data processed during training. Since reducing clean-data exposure can itself degrade language-model performance, it is unclear how much of the observed scaling behavior is attributable to poisoning-specific effects. No clean-data dilution or benign data-mixing controls are provided. Moreover, the fitted fractional exponents are not compared against simpler analytic alternatives, such as linear-plus-quadratic models (Figs. 1, 7–8).
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The theoretical exponents are derived by optimizing poisoning-dependent truncation thresholds, while the empirical LLM exponents are fitted at fixed training checkpoints (Secs. 4.3–5). The proposed LLM mechanism similarly relies on a poisoning-dependent crossover horizon, but this relationship is not directly validated. Furthermore, the solvable model uses specialized assumptions, including coordinate-sparse features and poison labels that depend on the truncation threshold (Appendix A.2). The key theoretical quantities (\beta) and (\gamma) are not independently measured to verify whether they predict the observed LLM exponents. No direct evidence found in the manuscript.
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The experiments consider only gibberish and language-switching poisoning, both constructed using similar trigger-based formats (Appendix D). These settings do not adequately distinguish random noise, distribution shift, and targeted behavioral contamination. Interestingly, the two poisoning types exhibit different fitted exponents under comparable configurations (Figs. 7–8), but these differences are not systematically analyzed. It remains unclear whether the proposed scaling mechanism is general across contamination types or primarily characterizes the specific data constructions studied. Additional controlled comparisons would substantially strengthen the empirical interpretation.
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The scaling laws are primarily supported by fitting curves over observed poisoning-rate ranges, without systematic out-of-sample prediction experiments (Figs. 1, 7–8). Although the fitted exponents vary across model sizes, training stages, and poisoning types, the paper does not establish how reliably these variations can be predicted from measurable properties. Potential applications, such as estimating contamination levels or determining tolerable poisoning fractions, are not investigated. No direct evidence found in the manuscript. Additionally, the non-commuting-limits result raises questions about whether the empirical scaling relationships remain valid at much smaller poisoning rates (Sec. 5; Appendix A.8).
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The expansion in Eq. (128) appears to omit checkpoint-offset interaction terms without explicitly establishing their negligibility, while Result 21 would benefit from clearer sign conditions for the claimed interior optimum (Appendix B.5–B.6). The empirical exponent estimates also lack sufficient uncertainty analysis across independent training seeds and fitting ranges (Figs. 1, 7–8). Furthermore, the curvature-spectrum evidence is mainly based on a single model checkpoint (Fig. 4; Appendix E), and the reported training budget for the largest model appears inconsistent across Table 2 and Fig. 8(d). Finally, the Abstract and Introduction introduce several technical exponents before adequately motivating their relevance to the empirical observations.
Questions for authors
There are several questions and suggestions for the authors:
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I recommend adding clean-only runs with reduced token budgets and benign data-mixing controls under matched training conditions. These experiments would help quantify how much degradation arises from reduced clean-data exposure versus poisoned content. The authors should also compare the power-law fits against simpler analytic models and examine whether fractional exponents persist over smaller poisoning-rate intervals.
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The authors should clarify the relationship between fixed-checkpoint empirical exponents and the theoretical predictions based on optimized truncation or crossover horizons. Measuring the predicted crossover behavior across poisoning rates and training stages would be valuable. More importantly, independently estimating the clean-bias and poison-response exponents (\beta) and (\gamma), followed by a comparison between predicted and observed LLM scaling exponents, would provide much stronger evidence for the proposed mechanism.
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I suggest adding trigger-free versions of the existing poisoning methods, together with additional contamination types such as benign distribution shifts, random corruption, and targeted behavioral poisoning. The authors should systematically compare both scaling exponents and coefficients across these settings. Such experiments could help determine which properties of poisoned data are responsible for the observed degradation and whether the proposed scaling behavior generalizes across different contamination mechanisms.
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Beyond fitting existing curves, the authors could estimate scaling parameters using a subset of poisoning rates and predict degradation at held-out rates. It would also be valuable to investigate whether model size, training horizon, or measured spectral properties can predict scaling coefficients across configurations. Discussing potential applications and limitations, particularly contamination tolerance and poison-rate estimation, would clarify the broader significance of the theoretical results.
3 comments
Thank you for the detailed experiments and explanation. However, I still have some concerns about how to transfer the theoretical analysis to LLM data contamination in practice, even though the possibility of deriving fractional exponents from heavy tails and adaptive truncation is interesting and has its unique contribution. Personally, I would find the paper considerably more compelling if the authors took the initiative to explain what these theoretical insights enable us to think about differently, rather than leaving the reader to infer the practical implications. At present, I can see several possible connections to data filtering and contamination monitoring. Since I'm not an expert, it is difficult for me to determine which of these are genuinely supported by their analysis. This would not necessarily require a new set of application experiments, but articulating more clearly how a reader and potential researchers/engineers should translate existing insights into conclusions about handling actual pre-training data poisoning.
Thank you for engaging with the conversation.
Our theoretical results suggested the existence of a scaling law for pre-training data poisoning. This motivated us to perform experiments on LLMs and validate them. As with the standard scaling law for pre-training that tells us how the model's clean data performance scales with compute, it gives us predictive power as the poison rate varies, on how the model degrades on clean data. This is the central practical output of the current theoretical considerations. Due to computational limitations, we could not perform an extensive study on 10B or larger models, but we believe our scaling law would remain valid on a 70B model up to poisoning rates that are realistic, e.g., 0.01%, for backdoor attacks (our initial Fig. 5, 6 in the Appendix show that as model size grows, the scaling law becomes more robust at small poisoning fraction).
Thank you again for the review.
We thank the reviewer for the detailed review and the concrete list of questions.
W1/Q1 the poisoned schedule matched clean run. We trained these controls for 4 sizes (135M–1287M) and ε∈{0.074,0.167,0.333} https://anonymous.4open.science/r/pretrain-poisoning-6DE4/language_switching_1287M.png. At (1−ε)D a control has seen as many clean tokens as the poisoned run at D, at the same point of the schedule, giving the matched clean loss
Rcleanmatched((1−ε)D)=R0(D)+Rctl,ε((1−ε)D)−Rctl,0(D).
The paper's observable, Eq. (3), splits into dilution and a poison-specific part:
Δobs=eRε−R0−1,Δdil=eRcleanmatched−R0−1,Δps=Δobs−Δdil.
Our new figures are for language switching data poisoning and it plots Rε/Rcleanmatched−1=ln[1+Δps/(1+Δdil)]/Rcleanmatched≈Δps/Rcleanmatched against D/DH:
Q2 / W2, independent validation of the clean-bias and poison-response laws. Our new experiments validate it https://anonymous.4open.science/r/pretrain-poisoning-6DE4/1287M_delta_dil.png and https://anonymous.4open.science/r/pretrain-poisoning-6DE4/language_switching_1287M_delta_ps.png. In the local linear model, giving the clean data weight 1−ε is the clean run slowed to time (1−ε)T, so the dilution response scales with the clean bias B(T)∝T−β, and Δdil, which measures it directly, decays like the clean excess risk: Δdil∝T−κ with κ=β if the train–eval mismatch dominates, otherwise κ=2β. The poison-specific part is driven by the poison influence I(T)∝Tγ (Result 19): the linear part of Δps grows as Tγ (its train–eval-gap term) and its quadratic part as T2γ. Both behave as predicted: Δdil decays with training (by 20–37% from D/DH=0.4 to 1); Δps grows (by 15–77%). We will update Fig. 4 with these plots in a revised version of the paper and add explanation in Sec. 5. However, we do not extract numerical β and γ from the LLM runs, measuring them carefully is worthy of a full new paper like arxiv: 2607.21716. We request the reviewer to consider these as limitations.
W4/Q4. held-out prediction on 1287M model. the power law Δobs=Cεa fitted to the six fractions 0.074–0.333 predicts the five at 0.020–0.091 with rms error 0.169 in lnΔobs; Δobs=fε+gε2 gives 0.121 and the effective-data form Δobs=b[(1−ε)−k−1] 0.128. Our theoretical prediction of the current paper is the form Δobs=fε+gε2. The held-out prediction gets better with bigger model size, see Fig. 5, 6. Please see our reply to reviewer AiMd for a detailed theoretical explanation of this.
W3/Q3. different poison types. The two poison types are compared in Appendix D. A detailed experimental study of model degradation due to data poisoning is the content of arxiv 2510.03313. Although the scaling law point of view is our own, the current paper is a theory first paper and hence we have limited experimental studies compared to a full length experimental paper. We would be grateful to the reviewer if the theoretical value of our work is appreciated.
If you find our reply satisfactory, please raise your score. Thank you again.