- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
Read review
Paper summary
This paper investigates whether high performance on CLADDER reflects genuine causal reasoning or shortcut learning from procedurally generated data. The authors identify predictive patterns in the generator, demonstrate that simple models can achieve strong performance, and evaluate LLMs through fine-tuning, information removal, token ablations, and transfer to CounterBench.
Critical strengths
The paper addresses an important problem in evaluating LLM reasoning capabilities. The analysis of CLADDER's generation process is particularly valuable, as it identifies concrete sources of answer predictability beyond simple linguistic patterns. The strong random forest baseline and information-removal experiments provide useful evidence that high benchmark accuracy alone is insufficient to establish causal reasoning ability.
Critical weaknesses
- There's a very strong claim "The most likely hypothesis for the strong performance of state-of-the-art LLMs on CLADDER is that they are exploiting superficial patterns learned from exposure to training data from the generator." However, after reading this paper, I find this claim is more like a deduction rather than a well-grounded conclusion. The paper convincingly shows that CLADDER contains shortcuts that simple models can exploit. However, this does not establish that high-performing LLMs actually rely on these shortcuts, much less that shortcut learning is their primary reasoning mechanism. For example, the random forest achieves 86.8% overall accuracy but only 48.6% on deterministic counterfactual questions, where reasoning models exceed 90%. This substantial difference remains unexplained.
- I don't quite understand the "Evaluations Confounded by Exposure" in Figure 1? May you elaborate?
- The analysis in 3.4 and 3.5 are still very shallow. Despite the visualization, they stay at the observation level without providing a mechanistic explanation. The authors remove information needed to solve causal questions but still evaluate models against the original answers. Above-chance accuracy may simply reflect remaining statistical patterns in the dataset. This does not necessarily mean the models are unable to perform causal reasoning when given complete information.
- The cross-benchmark results are difficult to interpret. While frontier LLMs perform near chance on CounterBench, a random forest trained on superficial CLADDER features achieves 79.1% accuracy. This suggests that some predictive patterns transfer across the two benchmarks, despite the authors' emphasis on generator-specific shortcuts. Moreover, CLADDER and CounterBench differ in their causal tasks and question formats, and the models are evaluated under different training conditions. The observed performance gap therefore does not clearly establish whether LLMs rely on memorized shortcuts, fail to generalize their causal reasoning, or struggle with the different task formulation. This distinction deserves more careful analysis. I think LLM's causal reasoning capability can't be discussed without studying the context you give to them, like harness.
Questions for authors
please check weakness
2 comments
Thanks for the response. I think most of my concerns haven't been clearly addressed, and I will keep my score.
Thank you for your thoughtful comments and detailed feedback.
You note that the evidence we provide “does not establish that high-performing LLMs actually rely on these shortcuts, much less that shortcut learning is their primary reasoning mechanism.” We agree, but that is not the point of the paper. Our primary point (lines 89-97) is that insufficient evidence exists for the explicit and implicit claims of many published papers (namely, that high performance on CLadder implies formal causal reasoning in LLMs). Instead, we point out that an alternative inference is equally plausible: Exposure to data drawn from a generator that embeds patterns that are superficial, learnable, and highly predictive. We show that this latter inference is plausible, though not definitively proven. This calls into question the claims of dozens of papers.
You note that you don't quite understand the "Evaluations Confounded by Exposure" in Figure 1 and ask us to elaborate. We mean that possible exposure provides an alternative explanation for the performance that is often attributed to learning formal causal reasoning. Such alternative explanations are often labeled “confounds” in experimental design. We will update the text to make that clear. The CLadder generator and example datasets were released publicly before many of the models we evaluated were trained, which means that learning generator-specific patterns through exposure during training is an alternative explanation for later performance. We will clarify this in the figure and caption.
You note that “The analysis in 3.4 and 3.5 are still very shallow.” We agree that the analysis in 3.5 is merely suggestive. However, the analysis in 3.4 is far different. As we note in that section (329-330): “we remove key components of the queries that leave them unsolvable by formal causal reasoning, and we find that such ablations produce no substantial drop in LLM performance.” The experiments in Section 3.4 are based on the formal theory of identifiability that CLadder is based on and that clearly identifies which information is critical to correctly and uniquely answering causal queries. We show in this section that removing information that is absolutely essential for identifiability (assumptions, graph structure, and probability values) either has little effect on LLM accuracy on CLadder (in the case of assumptions and graph structure) or results in accuracy that is still substantially above random (probability values).
You note that “The cross-benchmark results are difficult to interpret.” We agree this section could benefit from some additional clarification, and we will make those changes. The most important point is that simple and highly-predictive features exist and are easy to find in both datasets, yet the models only perform well on one. We have updated Section 3.6 to show that simple patterns exist in both datasets, and that the models' performance does not transfer between them.
Consider the examples below from each dataset. The similarities in structure and wording make it clear why it is easy to find simple features that transfer between them, and also why it is so surprising when an LLM that can solve CLadder queries performs poorly on CounterBench.
Example CLadder query: Imagine a self-contained, hypothetical world with only the following conditions, and without any unmentioned factors or causal relationships: Rixq has a direct effect on zuph and xevu. Zuph has a direct effect on xevu. We know that rixq causes zuph. rixq and zuph causes xevu. Would an individual is not xevu if rixq instead of not rixq?
Example CounterBench query: Imagine a self-contained, hypothetical world with only the following conditions, and without any unmentioned factors or causal relationships: Ziklo has a direct effect on Blaf, Blaf has a direct effect on Trune, Trune has a direct effect on Vork, and Vork has a direct effect on Lumbo. We know that Ziklo causes Blaf, Blaf causes Trune, Trune causes Vork, and Vork causes Lumbo. Would Lumbo occur if not Ziklo instead of Ziklo?