- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
The paper proposes a battery-based defense against appliance inference from smart-meter data. A reinforcement learning policy selects appliance-like patterns to inject into aggregate power readings, guided by a self-supervised reconstruction model. Experiments on UK-DALE and REDD evaluate its effectiveness against multiple inference models, including adaptive attackers.
Critical strengths
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The paper addresses a practical privacy problem while respecting physical battery constraints.
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The experiments cover diverse attackers and two datasets, including adaptive attackers.
Critical weaknesses
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The experiments provide empirical support for the proxy, but its reliability and limitations remain unclear. The paper does not sufficiently explain when aggregate reconstruction error is a useful indicator of appliance-level privacy.
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The methodological advance over existing approaches is not clearly established. The paper should better distinguish the contribution of the proposed combination from that of its established components.
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The theoretical conclusions are conditional on alignment between the proxy and attack objectives. The paper does not establish whether this condition holds for the proposed framework, which limits the explanatory value of the theory.
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The component ablations do not fully rule out differences in perturbation strength as an explanation for the gains. Matching battery constraints alone does not establish that the methods use comparable perturbations.
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The REDD split description appears inconsistent with the main results and needs clarification. The paper also does not clearly explain how differences in final battery charge are accounted for in the cost comparison.
Questions for authors
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The experiments show that the proxy can be useful, but its limitations are less clear. When might a higher aggregate reconstruction error fail to indicate better appliance-level privacy?
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The method combines a reconstruction model, reinforcement learning, and an appliance signature library. Could you clarify the main methodological advance over prior battery-based privacy defenses?
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The theory assumes alignment between the proxy and attack objectives. What evidence suggests that this assumption holds in your experiments?
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Could differences in perturbation strength partly explain the gains? The methods share battery limits, but it is unclear whether they actually introduce comparable perturbations.
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Does the defense make appliance usage inherently more ambiguous, or mainly shift the input away from the attackers’ training distribution? What do the retraining results tell us about this distinction?
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Could you clarify the REDD training and test dates, which appear inconsistent across sections? Also, does the cost comparison account for differences in the battery’s final charge?
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What is the attacker assumed to know about the defense? In particular, do the adaptive-attacker experiments assume knowledge of the signature library and control policy, or only access to defended training data?
We thank reviewer 3vqB.
W1 & Q1
Where the proxy holds and where it fails. Holds: along 100 policy updates, changes in probe reward correlate positively with the error of all six held-out attackers (pooled ρ = 0.43 / 0.45 for RMSE / F1). The proxy is informative when perturbations change aggregate features used for appliance inference; changes unrelated to appliance events are not expected to reduce privacy. Fails: privacy is measured as a real attacker's degradation, so an attacker that already fails on undefended data has little left to lose. The lowest correlations are such pairs: CO / FHMM model discrete on/off states and miss the near-continuous fridge-freezer even without defense (RMSE 79 / 77 W vs. 73 W for a constant), and DAE barely detects the microwave (raw F1 0.31). On REDD, the only 6 / 30 RMSE decreases are CO / FHMM on Light and Sockets (raw F1 0.01–0.40), with no significant F1 rise. Revision: new "Scope of the proxy" paragraph in Sec. 4.
W2 & Q2
Main advance: label-free probe reward and signature actions. Prior battery defenses (DDQL, TCN, PLS) act per minute in a flat action space with smoothness, MI or load-leveling rewards. We change both: (i) reward: reconstruction error of a fixed self-supervised probe, needing no labels or attacker; (ii) action: an appliance signature executed by a hierarchical controller under battery constraints. Each part contributes (Table 3, RMSE / F1): flat + conventional 63.8 / 47.1%, signature + conventional 80.5 / 59.6%, flat + probe 87.6 / 64.8%, both 107.1 / 79.3%. Against PLS-DDPG directly (App. F.3, Table 19) we are competitive (F1: 5 better, 2 worse, 17 n.s.) with 30% less throughput and 3.7× less training time. Revision: Sec. 1 lists (i)–(ii) as the contribution, building on a standard battery model and PPO.
W3 & Q3
Empirical evidence for A1. We examine the alignment suggested by A1 along policy updates: 21 training checkpoints × 5 seeds, six fixed held-out attackers, 24 cases. Spearman ρ between Δprobe reward and Δattacker loss over 100 updates is positive for all six attackers: for RMSE 0.33–0.44 on the four neural attackers and 0.19 / 0.18 on CO / FHMM; for F1 0.37–0.46 except DAE (0.16); pooled 0.43 / 0.45 (p < 10⁻⁵). Over the first 20 episodes RMSE / F1 degradation rises from 44.9% / 33.1% to 102.6% / 76.9%. Revision: Sec. 4 states A1 as a sufficient condition and adds the ρ table; App. B.6 is rewritten as "Proxy–Attacker Alignment along Policy Updates"; the abstract and contribution (3) are narrowed to match.
W4 & Q4
Gains are not explained by larger perturbations. All variants share the same feasible set; within it, how much of the budget to use is part of the learned policy, so equal constraints are the operationally fair comparison. Our perturbation is also structured against NILM attackers rather than made as large as possible; to rule out perturbation strength, we report actual throughput and perturbation. Ours reaches 113.9% / 78.2% (RMSE / F1) at 5.63 kWh/day and 472 W. Random library signatures at the same throughput reach only 74.6% / 38.0% despite a 25% larger perturbation (p ≤ 0.002). At matched throughput and perturbation (5.73 kWh/day, 485 W), the perturbation-energy reward reaches 97.3% / 71.3%, 16.6 / 6.9 points below ours, and its final policy needs a 28% larger perturbation for a similar effect (p = 0.73 / 0.82); PLS-DDPG uses an 83% larger one with a lower F1 reduction. Revision: new "Perturbation magnitude" paragraph and Table 10 in Sec. 6; App. B.7.
W5 & Q6
Dates fixed; cost compared at equal terminal energy. (1) REDD House 2: train 2011-04-19 – 04-28, main test 04-29, extra held-out 04-30; UK-DALE House 1: train 2013-03-19 – 03-28, test 03-18; no overlap. (2) Settling each method's end-of-day SoC back to 50% at the off-peak tariff, ours costs −£0.38/day (−£0.19 with recharge degradation), the lowest of all methods. Revision: App. E.1 corrected; new App. A.3 and a "Total (adj.)" column in Table 2.
Q5
Protection persists after attacker retraining. Retraining on labelled defended data lets attackers adapt to the defended distribution. Mean F1 is 0.723 unprotected, 0.161 fixed, 0.284 (scratch) and 0.265 (fine-tuned): retraining recovers only 0.12 F1, 12–32% of the loss per architecture, and no architecture exceeds 0.325 mean F1. The defense stays effective even after attackers adapt to labelled defended data, consistent with signature decoys that are hard to tell from genuine appliance events. Revision: Table 9 now reports per-architecture results and recovery rates.
Q7
Attackers never access the library or policy. Fixed attackers (Tables 1–2) have clean training data only. Adaptive attackers (Table 9) additionally train on the deployed defender's output on the 10 training days with appliance labels. Neither has the signature library or the policy parameters; they see them only through labelled defended data. Revision: threat model added to Sec. 3.