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- Informativeness
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- Presentation
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Paper summary
The paper examines cooperation in repeated games where execution noise can flip an agent’s chosen action. It compares active-inference learners that infer latent intentions with learners that model executed outcomes directly, alongside approximate Bayes-adaptive and Q-learning baselines. The analysis covers Stag Hunt, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Chicken, and Pure Coordination.
Intent-conditioned AIF learners sometimes lose cooperation much more sharply than observation-conditioned learners, even against an unconditional cooperator. The authors find that learners can recognize a partner’s cooperative intent while remaining pessimistic about whether cooperation will continue. They suggest that this pessimism discourages cooperation, limiting the experience needed to revise it. Trajectory analyses and interventions test parts of this explanation.
Critical strengths
The unconditional-cooperator experiment provides a useful control. The learner loses cooperation even though its partner never deliberately defects and cooperation remains the better one-round response below the known noise threshold. The shared AIF settings, substantial seed counts, and fresh-seed replication support the reported difference between representations.
The trajectory analyses explain behavior that average cooperation rates would miss. Extracted response rules account for the observation-conditioned clusters, while some intent-conditioned runs alternate rapidly between actions. Reporting intended and executed actions separately is also helpful, particularly in Pure Coordination. I appreciate that the authors report mixed intervention results, including the limited recovery in Appendix F.8.
Critical weaknesses
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The cause of cooperation loss remains unclear. Lower cooperation itself reduces evidence about cooperative transitions, so the trajectory analyses do not establish the direction of causality. The information-value ablation addresses how cooperation starts, while the recovery intervention in Appendix F.8 improves predictions without reliably restoring cooperation at the primary noise level. The evidence therefore does not sufficiently distinguish a failure of intent modelling from effects of approximate learning or the planning objective.
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The contribution and broader significance need clearer justification. Prior AIF work already examines cooperation oscillations and exploration-dependent learning. Although the execution-noise comparison is interesting, the paper does not clearly establish what new insight transfers beyond the tested planners. A concrete motivating application would help explain which practical difficulty the model captures and how the findings should influence the design of cooperative agents.
Questions for authors
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What keeps the full planner from returning to cooperation in Appendix F.8? Could a controlled change to the cooperative-transition prediction separate its effect from changes in information incentives?
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Which results show cooperation breaking down after it has become established? How is a retaliatory cascade distinguished from persistent defection or self-generated alternation between C and D?
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What does the analysis establish beyond prior AIF accounts of oscillation and exploration-dependent cooperation? In what concrete coordination setting would the authors expect the same failure?
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Continuation of comment
[4] Demekas, Daphne, Conor Heins, and Brennan Klein. "An analytical model of active inference in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma." International Workshop on Active Inference. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023.
[5] Jaime Ruiz-Serra, Patrick Sweeney, and Michael S. Harré. 2025. Factorised Active Inference for Strategic Multi-Agent Interactions. In Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS '25). International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Richland, SC, 1793–1802.
If our responses address your concerns, we would be grateful if you would consider raising your score. We would be happy to continue this discussion on any remaining points.
Response to Reviewer BHD7
We thank the reviewer for the thorough review.
To address the weaknesses:
To address the questions.
On what keeps the planner from returning to cooperation. Our exploratory analysis in the appendix points to two main things. The forced evidence does improve the cooperative prediction, but the payoff advantage of cooperating stays negative. The added evidence also reduces the information bonus that supports cooperative exploration. The controlled change to the prediction that the reviewer suggests would separate these two effects. We have not run it but will note it in the paper as a natural next experiment.
On breakdown after cooperation has been established. Our results do not show this. In our samples, no run that was already cooperating early on later met our low-cooperation criterion (Appendix F). We will revise the wording and title that may obscure that.
On telling the behaviours apart. We look at the action sequences within the trajectories. Persistent defection is the low cluster. Self-generated alternation is the intermediate cluster, where the learner switches their action on most rounds while remaining confident that its partner intends to cooperate. Against an unconditional cooperator neither is ‘retaliation’ in the usual sense. The alternation mirrors a retaliatory cycle in traditional game theory, but the partner never actually retaliates, so it is entirely self-contained. For Tit-for-Tat and self-play we report cooperation rates and have not analysed response sequences, and we will state this in the revision.
On prior AIF accounts. The AIF work we cite studies conditions for cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma without execution noise [4], and models of opponents' internal states in iterated general-sum games under changing payoff structures [5]. What our analysis adds is the comparison under noise where the same planner has the noise channel either in its observation model or folded into its transition prior, against varying types of partners, and isolating the focal agent’s contribution to that interaction. If the reviewer has a specific account of oscillation in mind, we would be glad to position our work against it.
On a concrete setting. We would expect the same failure in a spatial Stag Hunt or level-based foraging under action noise, where agents must coordinate on a risky but rewarding option under a form of execution noise that corrupts movement. More generally it should arise where there are coordination outcomes of different value, a latent variable learned through a noisy channel, near-greedy action selection, and rewards on observed outcomes. We treat these as future work.