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- 3
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 3
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
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Paper summary
The manuscript introduces HIDE, a flow-matching framework for face de-identification. The authors' main argument is that existing methods usually bolt auxiliary constraints onto the generator to balance identity removal and attribute preservation, but pay little attention to whether the target identity is actually compatible with the source face's non-identity attributes; as a result, the training objective itself can be internally inconsistent. HIDE moves this issue to the target-construction stage. It first creates an FR anchor orthogonal to the source identity, then uses a lightweight target editor to edit that anchor on the hypersphere into a target compatible with the source attributes, and finally generates the de-identified image with target-guided conditional flow matching.
Critical strengths
1.Clear and meaningful conceptual contribution: This paper proposes the concept that “source-attribute compatibility” should be treated as a first-class requirement for target construction, rather than merely adding auxiliary losses on the generator side, directly addressing issues such as attribute drift, target appearance contamination, and mixed-identity ghosting in existing target-attraction/source-repulsion methods. 2.Solid experiments: The proposed method evaluates privacy on three datasets, nine baselines, and five FR models, and covers utility metrics such as FID, pose, gaze, age, gender, race, and expression. The ablation and target-space analyses also support the core claims well.
Critical weaknesses
None
Questions for authors
- The paper sets theta_max=70 but does not justify this choice. How was this value determined? It is recommended to provide additional explanation.
- In Table 1, the LFW ASR of DiffPrivacy and RP is significantly lower than that of other methods. Were these two baseline sufficiently tuned to achieve their best performance?
- In Table 1, different methods operate at very different privacy operating points, while utility metrics are computed under their respective default configurations. Directly comparing single-point utility may fail to disentangle “differences in privacy strength” from “differences in utility preservation capability.” The paper claims that HIDE achieves a better privacy–utility trade-off, but it does not adjust the baselines to the same privacy level before comparing utility. Therefore, it is recommended to add comparisons at matched privacy levels or report Pareto frontiers.
- Table 2 has already validated the effectiveness of online inverse training through ablation experiments, but the main text discusses these results only briefly. Since online inverse training is listed as one of the three main contributions, it is recommended to expand the main text to explain its specific gains, mechanism.
4 comments
Response to Reviewer Y5HQ (Part 2/2)
Q3. Privacy-Utility Trade-off
We thank the reviewer for highlighting the importance of comparing methods at comparable privacy levels. We agree that evaluating methods only at their default configurations does not fully characterize their privacy–utility trade-offs.
To address this concern, we conducted additional experiments in which we varied the anonymization strength of HIDE and competing methods that support this functionality during inference. The results, presented in the new Fig. 10 (Appendix A.5), allow us to compare utility preservation across different privacy operating points. They show that competing methods generally exhibit more pronounced attribute degradation as privacy increases, whereas HIDE maintains high utility even at stronger privacy levels. This supports our conclusion that HIDE achieves a more favorable privacy–utility trade-off, rather than merely benefiting from a particular operating point.
It is important to note that Table 1 uses the configurations recommended by the respective authors, which we consider the fairest basis for the primary comparison, since modifying these settings may lead to suboptimal performance. At these configurations, HIDE achieves both stronger privacy and superior overall utility preservation. Matching HIDE's privacy level would generally require competing methods to increase their anonymization strength, potentially leading to further utility degradation, as illustrated in Fig. 8. We would therefore like to retain Table 1 as the main comparison and provide the additional trade-off analysis in Appendix A.5.
Q4. Online Inverse Training
We thank the reviewer for recognizing the effectiveness of online inverse training. We have expanded the discussion in Sec. 3.3 and Sec. 4.2 to better explain its mechanism and contribution. Specifically, the inverse branch reconstructs the source image from an online-generated de-identified image while conditioning on the original source identity. This provides aligned reconstruction and identity supervision, encouraging the generator to follow the specified identity condition more effectively. As demonstrated in Table 2 and Fig. 6, inverse training primarily improves identity suppression, while introducing only minor changes in attribute preservation.
Summary of Our Response to Reviewer Y5HQ
Thank you again for the encouraging evaluation and constructive suggestions. We clarified the selection and practical effect of theta_max, provided the stronger RP configuration at 1024x1024, and added matched privacy–utility analyses across operating points. We also expanded the explanation of online inverse training and its role in strengthening identity suppression. We hope these clarifications and results address the requested points, and we would appreciate the reviewer’s reassessment of the overall recommendation in light of the rebuttal and revised manuscript.
Kind Follow-up on Our Response
Dear Reviewer Y5HQ,
Thank you again for your encouraging assessment and constructive suggestions.
As the discussion period is approaching its end, we would like to kindly follow up on our rebuttal. We hope our responses and the additional results have adequately addressed your questions. If any questions or concerns remain, we would greatly appreciate your feedback and would be happy to provide further clarification before the discussion period concludes.
Thank you again for your time and consideration.
Best regards,
The Authors
Response to Reviewer Y5HQ (Part 1/2)
We thank the reviewer for the thoughtful evaluation and encouraging feedback. We appreciate their recognition of our conceptual contribution in treating source-attribute compatibility as a fundamental requirement for identity target construction, as well as their positive assessment of our experimental evaluation and supporting ablation studies. Below, we address each question and provide the requested clarifications.
Q1. Choice of theta_max
Thank you for the question. The parameter θ_max controls the maximum angular displacement of the edited target from its initial anchor. Its purpose is to prevent excessive changes to the randomly sampled identity anchor while allowing sufficient flexibility to adapt it to the source facial attributes. We set θ_max = 70° as a relatively permissive upper bound, while the actual editing angle is learned and constrained by the identity and attribute objectives (Sec. 3.1).
It is important to note that the editor does not typically approach this bound. As shown in Sec. 4.1, the mean cosine similarity between the edited targets and their initial anchors is 0.93, corresponding to an angular separation of approximately 21°. This indicates that the learned edits are substantially smaller than the permitted maximum, suggesting that the method does not rely on large changes to the initial anchors. A discussion of how we selected θmax is provided in Fig. 11 (Appendix A.6).
Q2. Baseline Configuration
We thank the reviewer for pointing this out. Among the evaluated implementations, RP is the only method supporting different input resolutions. We initially evaluated it at 512x512 and have now added results at 1024x1024. This substantially improves performance, increasing LFW ASR at FAR 10^-2 from 13.4% to 96.2%, as the method can better exploit SD-XL prior knowledge. We now report results with both resolutions in the revised paper.
The original DiffPrivacy paper reports approximately 20 minutes of MSI optimization per image on an NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3090. For approximately 50,000 images, this would require an estimated 16,700 GPU-hours, excluding sampling. We therefore used the authors' supplied example MSI checkpoints from CelebA-HQ dataset without per-image optimization, retaining embedding scheduling and ArcFace-based identity repulsion during DDIM sampling. We clarified this evaluation in the revised paper.