- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper investigates how backdoor attacks affect the input-space loss curvature of neural networks, measured through the eigenvalue spectrum of the input Hessian. Its central goal is to understand whether observed curvature changes are intrinsic signatures of backdoors or consequences of other factors, such as prediction confidence, model architecture, and loss functions. By studying three backdoor mechanisms- data poisoning, additive architectural backdoors, and multiplicative architectural backdoors- on ResNet classifiers with ReLU and SiLU activations, the theoretical findings are well supported: Input-Hessian curvature is not a universal or uniquely identifiable signature of backdoors.
Critical strengths
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The paper applies the Hessian decomposition to backdoored networks, showing that locally affine models have R=0, whereas nonlinear models can exhibit substantial residual curvature.
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The authors show that additive architectural backdoors preserve zero residual curvature under local affinity, while multiplicative backdoors can introduce an indefinite, rank-at-most-two curvature correction, producing qualitatively different Hessian spectra.
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Experiments on CIFAR-10 and additional image-classification settings confirm that ReLU backdoors often exhibit confidence-driven curvature collapse, whereas smooth activations and multiplicative backdoors can retain or introduce substantial curvature. This strengthens confidence in the paper's central conclusions and supports its value as a foundational analysis of input-loss curvature.
Critical weaknesses
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The empirical evaluation mainly considers image classifiers with relatively simple backdoor mechanisms. However, it is unclear whether the findings extend to more advanced, stealthier backdoor triggers beyond simple patch triggers and to modern architectures such as Transformers.
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Although the paper shows that input curvature is not necessarily a backdoor-specific signature, it does not establish whether the proposed decomposition provides some insights for backdoor detection or attribution.
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Although the paper attributes curvature collapse under successful backdoors mainly to prediction confidence, it does not systematically compare confidently correct predictions on clean inputs with confidently incorrect, backdoor-target predictions on triggered inputs under matched confidence levels. Such a comparison, ideally including paired clean/triggered inputs and separate analyses of the (G) and (R) terms, would help establish whether the observed curvature changes are specific to backdoor activation or reflect general properties of high-confidence predictions. Without these controls, the empirical evidence for the proposed mechanistic interpretation remains somewhat incomplete.
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The abstract is somewhat overly mathematical, which reduces its accessibility and clarity. In addition, the introduction could benefit from a more coherent motivation and narrative. It begins with a general discussion of the input-Hessian spectrum before establishing its relevance to backdoored neural networks, making the transition to the paper's central research question somewhat abrupt.
Questions for authors
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3 comments
Thank you for the detailed responses and clarifications. I appreciate the authors' efforts to address my concerns. I understand the intended scope of the work and agree that extending the experiments to more sophisticated backdoors and Transformer architectures could be left for future research. The clarification regarding the practical implications of the proposed decomposition is also helpful, and the suggested revisions to the abstract should improve its accessibility. However, my main concern regarding the empirical validation remains insufficiently addressed. While the theoretical analysis establishes a relationship between prediction confidence and input curvature, and Figure 3 provides evidence of the label dependence of the residual term, these results do not fully replace the requested confidence-matched comparison between clean and triggered inputs. Concretely, even at matched prediction confidence, differences in the model Jacobian and output distribution may lead to different curvature behavior. Such a controlled comparison, ideally with separate analyses of the G and R terms, would help establish whether the observed curvature changes are primarily driven by prediction confidence or reflect additional effects associated with backdoor activation. I therefore encourage the authors to strengthen the empirical validation or explicitly acknowledge this limitation in their conclusions.
Thank you for your continued engagement in this discussion.
We agree that the paper would benefit from including these plots. While space constraints prevent us from including them in the main text, we would be happy to include them in the appendix.
Specifically, we propose including plots of the eigenvalues of H, G, and R across different confidence bands, considering both piecewise-affine and non-piecewise-affine models, as well as different types of backdoors.
Please let us know if there are any additional aspects of your comments that you feel this proposal does not address.
Extra Work
Thank you for taking the time and energy to review this work, the comments provided will substantially improve this work.
Extra Experiment
Thank you for the suggestion, we agree that the paper would benefit from this type of confidence matched experiment.
From the theoretical results, we can establish that when using CE loss, the G term is label-independent, and the curvature approaches zero as prediction confidence increases (Corollary 3). This applies to both confidently correct and incorrect predictions. This type of experiment would be particularly informative when R is not zero due to its dependence on the evaluation label. We investigate the separate contributions from G/R in some of the experiments. For example, in Figure 3, we evaluate the same triggered images under clean and backdoor labels to demonstrate the label-dependence in R. Further, in Section 4.3 we compare paired clean/triggered inputs and separate G and R.
Abstract
We will edit the abstract to replace some complicated mathematical phrases with more understandable versions. We propose the following replacements:
New: that loss curvature collapses as prediction confidence increases.
New: We further show that locally affine additive backdoors only change G, whereas multiplicative composition introduces an R term with two eigenvalues (one positive and one negative).
Please do let us know if there are further changes that would like us to make to the abstract to improve its clarity.
Introduction
Regarding the comments on the introduction, we have tried to write something that gives the necessary background in both parameter and input Hessians and their uses, as well as backdoors in neural networks, followed by recent literature on backdoor signatures in input Hessians, ending with our research question and what we contribute. We’d be grateful if the reviewer could expand upon which part they consider to be abrupt so that we can make changes to their satisfaction.