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Paper summary
AML-view is a synthetic dataset generator to enable anti-money-laundering research. It creates people, companies, ownership links, bank accounts, customer records, and payments. It then produces a separate view for each bank, showing that bank’s transactions and limiting information about other banks’ customers. The authors check population statistics, compare the information available in different datasets, evaluate detection models, and report a study with four AML practitioners.
The paper offers a potentially useful research resource. However, its results mainly show that the generated population matches selected statistical targets and that some synthetic cases contain recognizable laundering patterns. They provide less evidence that the full transaction system behaves like a real financial system.
Critical strengths
The richer investigation data (compared to previous work) could support useful research. Linking customer records, households, ownership, and payments under explicit bank visibility rules could enable studies that transaction-only datasets cannot support. Releasing these elements together (along with the generator) is a meaningful potential contribution.
Critical weaknesses
- There is not enough evidence that the transactions and labels are realistic
The strong calibration results concern population and company statistics that were used to build the population. Matching them does not show that payment amounts, timing, counterparties, and ownership links interact realistically. The rules in Appendix C are plausible, but the evaluation does not sufficiently check the resulting financial behavior against independent references. Several ownership and laundering settings are design choices. Positive labels also depend strongly on a chosen rule: accounts spend illicit funds first, and a payment is positive if at least 25% of its value is illicit.
The practitioner study also does not validate these mechanisms. It tests selected case files, and the paper does not adequately explain case selection or how written answers were scored.
- Much of the modeling already exists, and the importance of the added features is not clear
The paper includes a financial world, tracking illicit funds, and separate bank views. AMLWorld and AMLGentex already describe substantial parts of this approach. The paper acknowledges some of this overlap but its statement that no existing release provides multiple bank views of one shared world is too broad. The clearest remaining contribution is richer investigation information and explicit rules for hiding private information about other banks’ customers. However, the work does not establish how important that extra coverage is.
Questions for authors
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What independent evidence shows that the generated payments and ownership relationships behave realistically, beyond matching population statistics?
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Are global and local models tested on exactly the same transactions and time intervals? How do their training data differ, and how are the out-of-window positive transactions handled?
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What important research task becomes possible with AML-view that the closest existing releases cannot support? Which result demonstrates this?
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How were practitioner cases selected and written answers scored? Were the scorers blinded to case origin and information condition, and was agreement between scorers assessed?
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Do Investigator’s strong detection results hold at the original laundering prevalence after removing possible shortcuts in the synthetic data, and what explains its success given the difficulty of real-world AML?
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How many generator parameters are set by the authors rather than estimated from data, how were they selected, and how sensitive are the detection results to those choices?
8 comments
Response to Reviewer r9Gz (2/8): W2, overlap with existing releases and importance of the added features
We appreciate the reviewer's recognition of the richer investigation data, and we agree that the original novelty claim was too broad. AML-view builds on existing work: it extends the flow tracking of AMLWorld (Altman et al., 2023), and AMLGentex already provides per-institution transaction networks (Östman et al., 2025). We have narrowed the claim in Section 1 to: "To our knowledge, no existing synthetic AML release derives institution-specific views of one shared world in which the observing institution holds customer records for its own clients and only transactional and public information for external counterparties."
AML-view also differs from AMLWorld and AMLGentex in what the world contains, not only in what a bank's view removes. AMLWorld simulates persons, firms and banks, but most of these entities are not exposed in the released data: Table 1 marks no person, firm, household, ownership, customer-profile or PEP information for it. AMLGentex assigns an age and an income to each account, but no person entity links several accounts, and no KYC record is released (Table 6). AML-view releases the records an investigation uses: persons and households, firms with their ownership links and beneficial owners, and, for each party, a KYC profile with a risk rating, PEP status, adverse-media hits and identity verification. These parties are calibrated against French population and firm statistics (35 checks, Section 4.2), and the laundering activity comes from 38 documented scenarios, each traced to its source (Section 3.2). AML-view therefore releases all 13 investigation axes, against 5 for AMLWorld and 5 for AMLGentex (Table 5). The local view then decides which of these records each bank holds: full records for its own customers, and only transfers and public registry facts for external counterparties.
AML-view thus contributes three capabilities that, taken together, no evaluated release provides:
- A shared financial world. Every institution view is a projection of one world of persons, firms, ownership links, accounts and payments, so global and local results can be compared on the same events (Figure 3a).
- Asymmetric institution-specific observability. A bank holds full records on its own customers and sees external counterparties only through their transfers and public registry facts (Section 3.4).
- Investigation records linked to transaction flows. KYC, beneficial ownership, PEP status, adverse media and identity verification are attached to the parties behind each transfer (Section 3.3).
Response to Reviewer r9Gz (3/8): W2, how much each capability matters
We agree that the submission did not establish how much this additional coverage matters. We therefore added new experiments that measure the value of each capability.
Investigation records. We ran a per-block ablation with Investigator, our supervised reference (a gradient-boosted model on the features of the two endpoint accounts and of the transaction), in the causal regime over five seeds. Starting from transaction features only (0.514 AUROC), behavior, KYC and ownership each add signal (+0.098, +0.083 and +0.048 AUROC), while identity adds almost nothing (+0.001). All blocks together reach 0.629, a gain of 0.115 (Section 4.3; Appendix H.6, Table 43).
Asymmetric observability. We decomposed the observation gap, defined as global minus institution-local AUROC, using an intermediate view that keeps the bank-visible transactions but the global attributes of every account (worlds of 1M transactions, original prevalence, causal regime, five seeds). For Investigator, unseen transactions account for 0.050 of the 0.056 gap and withheld customer records for an additional 0.006 (Appendix H.4, Table 41). Applying the same operator to AMLWorld reproduces the edge effect, with Investigator dropping from 0.897 to 0.833 (Appendix H.5, Table 42), but the attribute part can be measured only on AML-view.
Investigation by practitioners. Pattern recovery, the share of judgments on suspicious cases in which the written answer identifies the specific laundering behavior, rises from 50.0% (9/18 judgments) with transactions only to 68.8% (11/16) with the customer file and 76.5% (13/17) with the investigation records (Section 5).
Thus, the added records carry detection signal, and among the evaluated releases the cost of withheld customer records can be measured only on AML-view. For detection, this cost is within seed-to-seed variation, whereas investigation is sensitive to these records, a finding that rests on a small practitioner panel. In the revised paper, we report the coverage comparison in Section 4.1, the decomposition and the per-block ablation in Section 4.3, and the detailed protocols and results in Appendix H.4 to H.6.
Response to Reviewer r9Gz (1/8): W1, realism of transactions and labels
We thank the reviewer for the careful review and for recognizing the value of releasing linked investigation records with the generator.
We agree that the calibration checks measure agreement with the targets used to construct the population, not realism beyond them, and Section 4.2 states this. The remaining design choices are declared in Section 3.1 and Appendix F.5, and the labeling rule is specified in Appendix D.3. Ownership is only partly a design choice: the ownership thresholds follow legal sources and the transfer rates follow published statistics (Tables 31 and 32). The submission, however, did not check the resulting financial behavior against independent references, and it did not explain how practitioner cases were selected and scored. We therefore added four analyses.
Fidelity checks beyond calibration targets. Over five seeds (details in Q1), log transaction amounts are close to those of AMLWorld (Kolmogorov–Smirnov distance, KS, of 0.030, where 0 means identical distributions). As a descriptive check, the first-digit frequencies have a mean absolute deviation of 0.008 from Benford's law, below the 0.012 acceptability threshold. AMLWorld is itself synthetic, so this comparison measures agreement with another synthetic benchmark, not with real payments.
Ownership structure. AML-view ownership groups contain 2.35 legal units on average, compared with about 3.5 in French enterprise groups (Insee, 2019). Ownership group size is one of three properties that do not match their references, together with the in-degree tail (exponent 3.5 to 4.5, compared with 1.43 on Rabobank accounts) and per-account monthly activity (KS 0.437). We report all three as limitations.
Label sensitivity. We varied the materiality threshold τ (the minimum illicit share for a transfer to be labeled as laundering) and the spending rule (whether an account spends its illicit or its legitimate funds first). Under the released illicit-first rule, prevalence stays between 0.11% and 0.16%, and the global ranking of the detectors remains broadly similar for τ from 0.05 to 0.75 (Spearman rank correlation between 0.82 and 1.00 with the ranking at the default τ = 0.25). At τ = 0.25, switching to proportional spending reduces positive-label prevalence from 0.131% to 0.031% and the share of positives produced by propagation from 76.6% to 7.4%. The spending rule is therefore the influential choice, and we state it as a limitation.
Practitioner study. A clustered re-analysis (see Q4) gives a provenance accuracy of 0.458 (95% CI [0.283, 0.658]), which does not establish indistinguishability. A measure that needs no scorer, the share of judgments on suspicious cases that the practitioner did not dismiss (escalation answered yes or not enough information, both of which lead a bank to escalate the case), rises with context: 55.6% with transactions only (T, 10/18), 64.7% with the customer file added (TC, 11/17) and 70.6% with the investigation records added (TIC, 12/17), compared with 40.0% on legitimate controls (10/25).
Together, these results make explicit which properties of AML-view agree with external references and which do not. In the revised paper, we have added a paragraph "Fidelity beyond calibration targets" to Section 4.2, with the full checks in Appendix C (Table 8). We now describe τ and the spending rule in Section 3.2, with the sensitivity analysis in Appendix I (Table 45), report case selection, the non-blinded scorer and the clustered re-analysis in Section 5 and Appendix J.6, and list the three mismatched properties as limitations in Section 6.