- Rating
- 4(+2)
- Confidence
- 4(+1)
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 3
- Soundness
- 2
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Paper summary
This paper introduces ManipToM, a benchmark designed to evaluate the ToM capabilities of LLMs in psychological manipulation scenarios. It focuses on whether models can distinguish a manipulator's hidden intentions from the target's understanding and track the evolving mental states of different participants. The authors define 16 manipulation mechanisms across three dimensions—cognitive, affective, and identity—and construct a dataset of 645 dialogues and 13,734 questions through controlled three-agent interactions involving hidden information and counterfactual scenarios. The benchmark evaluates three aspects of ToM: explicit mental-state understanding, dynamic mental-state tracking, and applied reasoning for behavioral prediction.
The authors employ a multi-stage automated validation pipeline to ensure the quality of the generated dialogues and questions, and evaluate nine LLMs under standard and CoT prompting settings. Experimental results show that models perform relatively well on explicit mental-state questions but struggle with dynamic mental-state tracking and behavioral prediction, particularly when determining whether a target's decision would change under counterfactual conditions. Furthermore, CoT prompting provides limited overall improvement, suggesting that strong performance in static mental-state understanding does not reliably translate into dynamic reasoning and behavioral prediction.
Critical strengths
Valuable research problem and systematic benchmark design. This paper extends ToM evaluation to psychological manipulation scenarios involving hidden intentions and information asymmetry, addressing the limitations of existing benchmarks that primarily focus on cooperative or neutral interactions. By incorporating 16 manipulation mechanisms, three-agent dialogues, and counterfactual scenarios, ManipToM provides a comprehensive framework for evaluating explicit mental-state understanding, dynamic tracking, and behavioral prediction in complex social interactions.
Comprehensive evaluation and insightful error analysis. The authors evaluate nine LLMs and reveal a substantial performance gap between static mental-state understanding and dynamic reasoning. Their analysis further identifies systematic errors, including confusion between participants' mental states, difficulties in counterfactual prediction, and limited improvements from chain-of-thought prompting. These findings provide useful insights into the limitations of current LLMs' ToM capabilities and highlight directions for future research.
Critical weaknesses
Limited independent validation of dataset quality and mental-state annotations. The dialogues, mental-state records, and questions are primarily generated by LLMs, with quality control also relying heavily on LLM-based validation. The paper lacks systematic human evaluation of annotation reliability. Moreover, the ground-truth mental states are derived directly from simulated agents' self-reports, without sufficient verification that these states can be reliably inferred from the dialogues. This raises concerns about the benchmark's validity and the generalizability of its findings to real-world social interactions.
Confounding factors in the counterfactual evaluation design. The authors construct counterfactual scenarios by allowing the target to access previously hidden information and regenerating the subsequent dialogue. However, due to the stochastic nature of dialogue generation, changes in behavioral outcomes may result from either the altered information or generation randomness. Without a control experiment that isolates these factors, it is difficult to determine whether model performance on counterfactual tasks genuinely reflects its ability to reason about the effects of information changes on behavior. This undermines the reliability of the counterfactual evaluation results.
Questions for authors
The discussion of prior manipulation-detection work could better account for approaches that explicitly infer conversational intentions, including intent-aware prompting for mental manipulation detection and intent-driven multi-agent analysis of manipulation in courtroom dialogues. Could the authors clarify how ManipToM relates to these approaches, particularly what additional capabilities its dynamic and second-order mental-state evaluations assess?
6 comments
Response to Reviewer N1V8 (2/3)
[W3] Confounding factors in the counterfactual evaluation design.[...] due to the stochastic nature of dialogue generation, changes in behavioral outcomes may result from either the altered information or generation randomness. [W3] Confounding factors in the counterfactual evaluation design.
We tested how sensitive the counterfactual reference answers and evaluation results are to generation and judging randomness. We fixed the factual story, Scenes 1 and 2, and T’s access to Scene 2, then regenerated Scene 3 and re-judged its ending using the same pipeline. Of the 645 stories, 596 have an adjudicated counterfactual ending. We completed this check for 595 stories; one could not be regenerated because of an API content filter.
(1) The counterfactual endings were mostly stable. For each story, we compared the original ending with up to four newly generated endings. A new ending was counted only when both outcome judges agreed on whether T complied or refused. Once three endings had the same outcome, we took that as the majority and stopped, because further reruns could not change the result.
The original ending matched the majority in 94.8% of the checked stories. Stability varies across groups: agreement is 84.3% for complied-to-refused stories and 64.3% for refused-to-complied stories. The high overall agreement also reflects the large and stable refused-to-refused group.
(2) Relabeling leaves the main evaluation findings unchanged. We replaced the reference endings for the 595 checked stories with their majority endings, changing 31 labels. The story blocked by the content filter retained its original label.
Results are balanced accuracy (%) averaged over nine models. The counterfactual and flip scores are evaluated on the 596 stories. All three scores change by less than one percentage point, and flip detection remains close to chance.
The counterfactual endings were mostly stable, and the remaining variation had little effect on model scores. These results suggest that generation and judging randomness has limited impact on our reported findings. We will add this experiment and the majority-based results for each model to the appendix.
Response to Reviewer N1V8 (3/3)
[Q1] Could the authors clarify how ManipToM relates to intent-aware manipulation-detection approaches, particularly what additional capabilities its dynamic and second-order mental-state evaluations assess?
These approaches use intention reasoning to detect and analyze manipulation; ManipToM directly evaluates models’ understanding of mental states across participants and over time. Intent-Aware Prompting [R3] infers speakers’ intentions to improve manipulation detection. CLAIM [R4] combines intent inference with multi-agent analysis to detect manipulation, identify the primary manipulator, and classify the techniques used.
A correct manipulation label does not establish that a model understands each participant’s perspective. For example, a model may recognize M’s hidden goal but incorrectly assume that T recognizes it too. ManipToM’s second-order questions test what one character believes about another’s mental state. Its dynamic questions test whether and how beliefs, desires, intentions, and emotions change during the conversation, including when they remain unchanged. A model may correctly detect manipulation yet miss a change in T’s beliefs or desires.
ManipToM provides separate reference answers for these judgments, revealing errors in perspective-taking and mental-state tracking that detection accuracy alone cannot expose. We will clarify this distinction and discuss both approaches in the revised related work.
We thank the reviewer for the insightful comments. We hope our clarifications and additional analyses have addressed the concerns, and would greatly appreciate the reviewer considering a higher rating in light of ManipToM’s contribution to evaluating ToM reasoning in psychological manipulation.
Reference
[R1] W. Ickes, L. Stinson, V. Bissonnette, and S. Garcia. “Naturalistic social cognition: Empathic accuracy in mixed-sex dyads.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(4):730–742, 1990.
[R2] K. Shinoda et al. “ToMATO: Verbalizing the mental states of role-playing LLMs for benchmarking theory of mind.” AAAI, 2025.
[R3] J. Ma et al. “Detecting Conversational Mental Manipulation with Intent-Aware Prompting.” COLING, 2025.
[R4] D. Sheshanarayana, T. Magar, A. Mittal, and N. Chaplot. “CLAIM: An Intent-Driven Multi-Agent Framework for Analyzing Manipulation in Courtroom Dialogues.” SICon, 2025.
Response to Reviewer N1V8 (1/3)
Thank you for pointing this out. We have conducted a human study on the two annotation steps that define the ground truths: the change labels of the shift adjudicator (Figure3, Section 4.2), which decide whether a character's mental state changed and thus set the correct answers of the dynamic questions, and the outcome labels of the outcome judges (Figure 3, Section 4.1), which decide whether T complied or refused in the factual ending and thus set the correct answers of the outcome questions in the applied questions. Twelve raters independently annotated 15 stories, with four raters per story (120 change labels and 15 outcomes). Raters saw the same dialogue as the LLM, including the private thoughts, followed the same rules, and were blinded to our labels.
(1) Our labels agree with the human majority.
LabelOutcomeChangeAgreement100.082.1κ1.000.64
The table gives the agreement (%) between our label and the majority vote of the raters, with Cohen's κ. It covers the items that have a majority: all 15 outcomes and 95 of the 120 change labels; the other 25 change labels were 2 vs. 2 ties.
(2) The explicit–dynamic gap remains under human-based scoring. We rescored the nine models with the human-majority label in place of ours. This covers 61 of the 120 change labels: the study sampled labels before the final audit, and the questions built from the other 59 were later removed by the item auditor (Figure3, Section 4.2), so no model answers exist for them.
ScoringDynamic, our labelsDynamic, human majority, ties keep our labelDynamic, human majority, ties keep human labelExplicit, same 15 storiesAccuracy47.746.346.885.8
Results are accuracy (%) averaged over nine models; all dynamic rows use the same 61 questions.
The human study therefore provides independent support for our annotations, and the explicit–dynamic gap remains under human-based scoring on the evaluated sample. We will add a summary to Section 4.2 and the full results to the appendix.
Our pipeline explicitly checks whether mental-state changes are supported by the dialogue and whether each question has a unique correct answer. The shift adjudicator and item auditor agents apply these checks before questions enter the benchmark (Figure 3, Section 4.2 and Appendix A3).
(1) Reported states provide a reference for evaluating mental-state understanding. In psychology experiments on empathic accuracy [R1], participants report what they were thinking and feeling during an interaction. Researchers use these reports to assess how accurately another person understood them. ToMATO [R2], a ToM benchmark, uses mental states verbalized by role-playing LLMs as reference answers. Similarly, ManipToM records each character’s mental states as the interaction unfolds (Section 3.3), then uses these records to construct questions.
(2) Our pipeline checks dialogue support and answer clarity. As described in Appendix A3:
Together, these checks are designed to make the questions answerable from the dialogue with a clear, unique answer. Table 7 reports that the item auditor rejected 4,097 dynamic candidates; 54.4% of dynamic candidates were retained after all filtering steps.