acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

B-L-V: Where Reasoning Breaks Down in Large Language Models

Abstract

Large language models (LLMs) achieve strong performance on reasoning benchmarks, yet the sources of their failures remain opaque: accuracy and process reward models can tell us whether an answer is correct, but not where or why reasoning goes wrong. We observe that human reasoning relies on three functionally separable operations—the retrieval of task-relevant knowledge, the rule-based transformation of that knowledge into a conclusion, and the metacognitive verification of the resulting output—and that cognitive science shows these operations fail independently and in systematic, predictable ways. B-L-V turns this tripartite structure into a diagnostic lens for machine reasoning. It decomposes the standard answer of every task into Belief (the knowledge a solution presupposes), Logic (the derivation steps that yield a conclusion), and Value (the output requirements and verification a correct answer must satisfy), yielding a fixed, model-independent reference. Any model's free-form answer is then read against this reference, and each failure is attributed to the primary component where reasoning broke down. Across mathematics, commonsense, and value identification, B-L-V reveals that reasoning failures are not homogeneous: some stem from inaccessible knowledge, some from broken derivation, and some from neglected verification, with different models exhibiting different dominant failure loci—patterns that outcome-based metrics structurally cannot expose. B-L-V thus provides component-level, actionable, and reproducible diagnosis of where LLM reasoning breaks down.

Primary area:
foundation or frontier models, including LLMs
Keywords:
Large Language Models, Reasoning Failure Diagnosis, Error Attribution, Interpretable Evaluation, Cognitive Foundations

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 10%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 1.67 over 3 reviews, above 10% of the others.
Reviewer_B1rvOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper proposes B-L-V, a cognitively inspired decomposition for diagnosing LLM reasoning failures. The framework decomposes a task’s standard answer into Belief, Logic, and Value components. Belief represents the knowledge and premises needed for a solution; Logic represents the inference steps; and Value represents output requirements and verification constraints. Model outputs are then compared with this reference decomposition and assigned a primary failure locus. The paper evaluates B-L-V on TruthfulQA, TAL-SCQ5K, and SemEval-2023 Task 4, using Qwen2.5 models at 1.5B, 3B, and 7B scales. It compares direct answering, chain-of-thought prompting, and B-L-V prompting. The reported results show that the B-L-V prompt often improves task accuracy, particularly on TruthfulQA and the mathematical reasoning benchmark.

Critical strengths
  1. The paper addresses an important question beyond final-answer accuracy: where and why does reasoning fail?
  2. The Belief-Logic-Value decomposition is intuitive and easy to communicate, and the use of a fixed model-independent reference is a useful idea for making analyses comparable across models.
Critical weaknesses
  1. The paper does not directly validate its main claim that errors can be reliably attributed to B, L, or V.
  2. The performance gain from B-L-V prompting is confounded with a stronger and longer structured reasoning prompt. There is no length-matched generic checklist baseline or component ablation.
  3. The datasets are assumed to isolate B, L, and V respectively, but this assumption is debatable. Truthfulness errors are not necessarily purely knowledge errors, mathematical errors are not necessarily purely logic errors, and the “Value” construct differs between answer verification and human-value classification.
  4. The annotation reliability methodology is insufficiently clear. Since free-form annotations are embedded and clustered before computing Fleiss’ Kappa, more details are needed about clustering, label alignment, and what agreement the metric actually measures.
Questions for authors
  1. Can the authors conduct a direct human study in which independent annotators assign B/L/V failure labels to model outputs and report attribution agreement?
  2. Can the authors include a length-matched structured-prompt baseline with generic headings or a shuffled taxonomy?
  3. Can the authors ablate B-only, L-only, V-only, B+L, and B+L+V prompting?
Reviewer_dDrBOpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
3
Informativeness
2
Presentation
3
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The paper proposes a new, cognitive science motivated diagnostic framework, B-L-V, for analyzing large language model (LLM) reasoning failures through three components: B (Belief): how the model retrieves and uses the relevant knowledge, facts, and premises; L (Logic): how the model conducts inference using inference rules; and V (Value): how the model satisfies and verifies the output requirements. This framework is based on the observation that human reasoning relies on these three functionally separable operations: the retrieval of task-relevant knowledge, the rule-based transformation of that knowledge into a conclusion, and the metacognitive verification of the resulting output. It turns this tripartite structure into a diagnostic lens for machine reasoning, yielding a fixed, model-independent reference. It then attributes a failure to the earliest component in the B-L-V pipeline that compromises the solution.

The framework is evaluated on three different datasets with emphasis on B, L and V respectively. Experiments compare Baseline, chain-of-thought (CoT), and B-L-V prompting across Qwen2.5 models of different parameters. The paper reports improvements on TruthfulQA and mathematical reasoning, as well as improvements on value identification for the larger models and claims that B-L-V provides a useful diagnostic perspective that conventional outcome-based accuracy cannot offer.

Critical strengths

S1. The overview of the related work is up-to-date and comprehensive.

S2. The separation of the failure modes into three aspects: B-L-V (Belief-Logic-Value) is insightful, novel, and useful for failure/bug analysis and model improvements. Although some other studies may have more fine-grained categories, the separation of the evaluation into three categories makes the evaluation more actionable (but there are also concerns on it).

S3. The design of the failure analysis methods looks interesting but there are also concerns on it.

S4. The evaluation covers three kinds of datasets: truthfulness, mathematical reasoning, and value identification and demonstrates its nontrivial performance over the baselines.

S5. The paper shows and discusses its limitations, which gives a relative complete picture of the new design.

Critical weaknesses

W1: The authors frame the work as a diagnostic tool for identifying where reasoning breaks down in models, but do not actually provide any analysis on how current models fail at these levels and to what degree. Rather, they use the framework in curated settings whether they claim to know certain components will fail (e.g., Belief errors for TruthfulQA; this claim is not necessarily true) in order to verify that their prompting strategy helps. It would have been much more interesting to see a more in-depth analysis on the types of knowledge or beliefs which models fail more at recalling/updating, or the interactions/dependencies between the failure modes. Also, knowing that an LLM has made a "Logic" error, for example, isn't very informative, so not sure how helpful this framework would be.

W2. The "Value" component is framed as capturing the metacognitive monitoring capabilities of the model, but the evaluation of it only captures answer accuracy, which is not an assessment of metacognition.

W3. The formalization of "Logic" and even "Belief" feels very tightly targeted towards Recall and Algorithmic problems (e.g., QA, MathQA), which is an extremely limited representation of reasoning. Thus, their framing as a general framework for diagnosing reasoning failures feels quite misaligned with their actual design and experiments.

W4. It is pretty hard to clearly distinguish the three categories clearly in many cases. The protocol in this paper is to set up an ordering rule as follows: attribute each observed error to its primary locus, the earliest component in the B → L → V pipeline whose breakdown compromises the solution, rather than requiring mutually exclusive categories. It then claims that the diagnostic power of B-L-V lies in identifying this primary locus, not in claiming that errors fall into disjoint categories. However, it is pretty hard to convince readers or prove logically/theoretically that such an assignment order is always correct. It seems the experiments did not conduct clear reasoning or separation test to show this ordering principle is largely or always correct. I think some more careful “separation test” could be needed to convince readers.

W5. Logic reasoning intermingles with B and V in some cases, which is especially complicated when using LLMs since some facts can almost automatically trigger some logic reasoning without notice. For example, if you know Jack (a special entity) is a person, the features of a person (a general entity) will automatically inherit without conducting explicit logic reasoning but mathematically, it needs general-to-specific logic reasoning. Similarly, logical reasoning will also intermingle with value validation as well. Some more discussion on this could be needed. Otherwise, the B → L → V pipeline could be hardly reasoned as a convincing principle.

W6. For similar reasoning, it is hard to convince readers the way to partition the datasets based on the B-L-V framework in the test, such as TruthfulQA as primarily a Belief test, TAL-SCQ5K as a Logic test, and SemEval as a Value test since many failure modes are intermingled together. Maybe one may need some experts to do careful annotations in order to convince error reasoning is accurate.

W7. Some previous work may have concrete error taxonomy. It could be good to outline the relationship between B-L-V framework and error taxonomy so that some previous error analysis works can be transformed or cross-checked with this new framework. It seems the previously discussed error taxonomy and the new B-L-V framework may not easily fit each other. Some discussions could be needed.

Questions for authors

I believe if the authors can successfully address the four weaknesses presented in the last section, it may convince me to re-examine the issues and solidness on the contributions of the paper.

Also, I would like to see some general discussions on the pros and cons on different (or alternative) categories of errors from the view of both implementations and error understanding.

1 comment
Reviewer_dDrBOpenReview ↗

I will keep my score unchanged

I checked other reviewers' comments and feel my judgement is in general consistent with others. The author does not give any rebuttal so far. I will keep my "weak rejection" score as is.

Reviewer_G2owOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
2
Soundness
1
Read review
Paper summary

This paper breaks down reasoning into belief, logic, and value (B-L-V) and aims to identify the reasoning errors by seeing which of these three components failed when an LLM response failed. For each question, they break down the standard answer into these three categories so that they have a fixed ground truth and never show it to the model. Then they would query the model and have annotators compare each models’ generated answer to this reference ground truth and decide on which component it went wrong. Whichever component that does not match the fixed reference is considered to be the main reason why the answer is incorrect. They conduct a validation, in order to show the B-L-V split captures real reasoning structure and is not a mere prompting strategy, by prompting the model to decompose itself to B-L-V parts without seeing the reference. They found different models fail in different dominant ways; all of which are findings that accuracy scores can't capture and that is the core argument of the paper. They evaluate this by prompting three Qwen 2.5 models (1.5B, 3B, and 7B) three different ways: directly with no instructions (Baseline), with chain of thought (CoT), and with B-L-V. They test this on TruthfulQA for belief questions, TAL-SCQ5K for math and logic questions, and SemEval-2023 Task 4 for value identification, so that each dataset targets one of the three components. B-L-V improves results at every model size on TruthfulQA and math questions, with the largest gains on the smallest model, which ends up outperforming the 7B baseline. On value identification questions, B-L-V improves the 3B and 7B models but hurts the 1.5B model, which the authors attribute to the small model losing its ability to guess many labels and get lucky hits.

Critical strengths

The paper focuses on a specific angle of finding why models make errors rather than only looking at accuracy. Having the reason why an answer is incorrect is an indicator of how we can fix the model and make next steps actionable rather than just knowing whether an answer is right or not.

Another strength in this paper is their approach of making the reference and not showing the models. This makes them reusable and allows direct cross-model comparison of failure profiles.

Also the validation experiment where the model articulates its own B-L-V without the reference is very valuable since it supports the claim that the structure is functional and not just a prompting trick.

The main figure is clear and useful.

Critical weaknesses

In lines 127-128, you mention the concepts of hallucination and illusion, but it only includes references for hallucinations [1]. Missing reference for illusion.

In lines 141-142, you should also cite the main CoT paper [2].

In section 2.2, some methods and their functionalities are compared, but they are not all equal methods with the same inputs and outputs, with different processes. They are adjacent to each other, and you criticized the adjacencies and framed B-L-V as a better option in comparison to those. But the comparison is not valid because the functionalities and expected outputs of those functions are varied. For example CoT and its variants were never meant to label anything but they're getting criticized for not labeling on line 145 whereas B-L-V does. But that's a comparison between mismatched categories.

In Section 3.2, you assign overlapping errors to the earliest failed component but this might not be the case all the time. For example, using a wrong formula can mean two things: one is that the model did not know the correct formula (Belief), or the second is that it knew the formula but applied it incorrectly (Logic).

In lines 165-168, the reference is based on the standard solution, but it is not clear how it handles problems that have multiple correct solutions and does not consider this an error

It has been established across the paper that the B-L-V decomposes the standard ground truth answer. But in 3.3 on lines 214- 215, it is mentioned that every question is decomposed into B, L, and V from the question alone and without any reference or model answer. This is an ambiguity in ideas here. You should clarify what annotators see; if the gold answer is withheld, then how is the correctness of the decomposition verified?

In Section 3.4, you mentioned that, in the diagnosis condition, the model strictly only answers, does not get B-L-V instructions, and that the analyzer is the part that labels each failure as a B, L, or V. For models to understand which part of the B-L-V they failed on, they need reliable diagnosis. But in sections 4.3 and 4.4 almost all results are on prompting, not diagnosis. If you want to back up the claim in the abstract that ”different models exhibit different dominant failure loci,” then you should report the distribution of B/L/V failures per model and dataset under the diagnostic condition.

In Section 4.2, the B-L-V prompt includes more guidance than the CoT prompt. For example, adding instructions to check calculations and follow the output requirements to a normal CoT prompt can also improve accuracy. Without comparing against a baseline with similar instructions and generation budgets, it is not clear whether the improvement comes from B-L-V itself or simply from the additional guidance.

In section 4.1, you claim that, given a task, one component of B/L/V will fail and that will expose the reason for the failed answer and that reasoning failures are heterogeneous. But in section 4.3, instead of measuring the failure modes within each dataset, there are multiple datasets, and each is assigned to a component in advance. For example, in Section 4.3.3, Value refers to human values expressed in arguments, while in Section 3.1, Value means verification and output requirements. A model could incorrectly identify a human value because of wrong knowledge or inference, even if it follows the output requirements. It is not clear why this dataset specifically measures the Value component. You should report the distribution of B/L/V attributions within each dataset and verify that failures are in fact attributed to either B, L, or V. Despite the discrepancies in sections 4.1 and 4.3, sections 4.4 and the Conclusion present the findings as results. So 4.1 calls it an empirical question, 4.3 answers it by assumption, and 4.4 and Conclusion present it as a result.

In Section 4.1, the selected SemEval examples have 2-8 correct labels, but in Section 4.3.3 the model is asked to return only 1-4 labels.

[1] Ziwei Ji, Nayeon Lee, Rita Frieske, Tiezheng Yu, Dan Su, Yan Xu, Etsuko Ishii, Ye Jin Bang, Andrea Madotto, and Pascale Fung. Survey of hallucination in natural language generation. ACM Computing Surveys, 55(12):248:1–248:38, 2023. [2] Wei, Jason, et al. "Chain-of-thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models." Advances in neural information processing systems 35 (2022): 24824-24837.

Questions for authors

Some questions are mentioned in the weaknesses; other than those: In Section 3.2, how do you distinguish between errors that could belong to more than one component?

In Section 3.3, you should clarify what annotators see. If the gold answer is withheld, then how is the correctness of the decomposition verified?

In Section 3.3, can you report the inter-annotator agreement?

In section 3.4, who is the analyzer that reads the model outputs against the reference decomposition? Is it human or LLM or both?

In Section 4.2, can you compare B-L-V with a CoT baseline with a similar setting?

In Section 4.3.3, how are examples with more than four correct labels handled?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

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