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Paper summary
GraphCamo studies a malicious participant in vertical federated graph learning who knows four target-class training nodes and controls its own features and local model. It uses personalized PageRank to select training nodes for perturbation and trains with reconstruction losses on clean and triggered features while leaving labels unchanged. At test time, it applies the learned perturbations throughout each victim's two-hop neighborhood. Experiments on four citation graphs and three encoders report an average attack success rate of 99.24%, with comparisons against seven attacks and four defenses.
Critical strengths
- Table 1 reports high attack success across twelve dataset and encoder combinations over five runs, with less variation than BVG in the reported results.
- Figure 6 and the tests across target classes support the contribution of the reconstruction losses and show that success is not confined to one target label.
Critical weaknesses
- The test attack in Appendix C.3 perturbs every node within two hops, whereas training selects a subset, but the numerical perturbation bound and affected node counts are not reported, making attack budgets difficult to compare.
- Table 1 lacks a no-attack accuracy baseline, and smaller changes between consecutive epochs do not establish that the attack is difficult to detect, leaving the accuracy-preservation and stealth claims insufficiently supported.
Questions for authors
- What perturbation bound and node counts are used during training and testing, and are these budgets matched across attacks?
- How much does attack success change if test-time perturbations use the same PageRank-based selection as training?
- What are the no-attack accuracy and the detection rates at a fixed false-positive rate for GraphCamo and the baselines?
- How do attack success and main-task accuracy change across defense strengths beyond the single settings in Appendix C.6?
3 comments
Thank you for the detailed response and the additional experiments. I appreciate the clearer description of the experimental settings and the effort to quantify the performance and utility trade-offs. These additions provide useful context for the concerns raised in my review.
Response to Reviewer Jzsg
Thank you for your encouraging response and for the thoughtful feedback you have provided throughout this discussion. We will incorporate the clarifications and additional experimental results guided by your suggestions into the final version of the paper. Your insightful questions and constructive suggestions clearly reflect your deep expertise in this field. This paper represents a summer of sustained effort, and your constructive engagement has been a great encouragement to us.
If our responses and additional evidence have adequately addressed your concerns, we would sincerely appreciate your consideration of a more favorable assessment. This is very important for us. Thank you again for your time.
Response to Reviewer Jzsg
Thank you for your careful reading and suggestions. Your questions helped us clarify the attack settings and identify where further evidence was needed.
Perturbation Budgets During Training and Testing
GraphCamo uses the same coordinate-wise L∞ bound during training and testing: ε=0.1 for GCN/Cora and GCN/CiteSeer, and 0.08 otherwise. Training uses four known target-class anchors and the middle 50% of PPR-ranked neighbors at each hop, without neighbor labels. Testing modifies one target and its full one- and two-hop neighborhoods. Across 12 equally weighted configurations, the mean numbers of nodes modified during training and testing are 24.83 and 16.37, respectively, or 0.528% and 0.421% of the graph. Observed maxima are 62 and 313. Four anchors thus describe label knowledge, not all modifications. These small modified-node fractions provide further evidence of GraphCamo's effectiveness with limited node modifications.
Consistency of PPR Selection Between Training and Testing
Keeping the model and trigger fixed, we apply the training-time middle-50% rule at test time. Mean ASR is 95.64%, versus the paper's full-neighborhood reference of 99.24%, while 9 of 12 configurations exceed 97%. The mean number of modified nodes falls from 16.38 to 9.11, a 44.35% reduction. Most configurations thus retain high attack effectiveness with fewer modifications. Training selection limits interference around fixed anchors. Full-neighborhood testing aims to cover message-passing paths around diverse targets and reduce dependence on their neighbor rankings.
No-Attack Accuracy and Localization at Controlled Empirical FPR
To assess normal-task utility, we compare MTA from supplementary no-attack training with the paper's untriggered GraphCamo MTA across four datasets and three models. Equally weighting the 12 configurations gives 69.04% for the no-attack models and 68.07% for GraphCamo, a mean decrease of only 0.97 percentage points. These close values indicate that GraphCamo retains most normal classification capability after learning the attack, with a small overall utility cost. At the configuration level, GraphCamo has higher MTA than the no-attack reference in four cases, showing that normal accuracy does not decline in every setting. The added no-attack reference directly quantifies this performance cost and supports GraphCamo's preservation of main-task utility within the evaluated scope.
For localization, we score uploaded representations using kNN distance, class-based Mahalanobis distance and Isolation Forest. Without an extra split, thresholds from untriggered scores cap empirical node FPR at 1% or 5% on that same set. Success requires nodes directly modified in that attack to constitute over half the post-attack alarm set. The three detectors' mean success rates are 7.93%, 10.86% and 8.57% at 1%, and 3.03%, 4.98% and 0.68% at 5%, respectively. They usually fail to produce alarms dominated by modified nodes, supporting limited localizability in this offline setting. This is not conventional target-node detection. The added detector results cover GraphCamo.
Sensitivity to Defense Strength
We test four strengths per defense, averaging equally across 12 configurations.
For ISO noise ratios of 0.05, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.4, ASR is 96.46%, 97.89%, 93.62% and 92.83%. MTA is 67.06%, 66.00%, 65.74% and 61.94%, respectively. Stronger noise weakens the attack but costs utility. ASR remains above 92% at the strongest setting.
For DP-SGD at the same noise ratios, ASR is 97.33%, 96.48%, 95.73% and 90.88%, while MTA is 65.25%, 63.50%, 62.08% and 60.54%. Both decline as noise increases, but the attack persists.
For GC retention fractions of 0.5, 0.2, 0.1 and 0.05, ASR is 97.65%, 95.83%, 96.81% and 92.66%. MTA is 67.23%, 65.98%, 64.83% and 64.50%. Stronger compression reduces utility without consistently blocking the attack.
For ANP thresholds of 0.0025, 0.005, 0.01 and 0.02, ASR is 99.76%, 93.60%, 99.91% and 99.65%. MTA is 46.55%, 44.86%, 34.16% and 24.52%. Pruning substantially harms utility without a consistent ASR reduction.
Results at the default settings are taken from the paper: 0.1 for ISO, DP-SGD and GC, and 0.01 for ANP.
Thank you for focusing the discussion on budget clarity, consistent node selection and the effects of stronger defenses. The added experiments make the associated performance and utility trade-offs more concrete. If this evidence addresses your experimental concerns, we hope it will strengthen your confidence in the work and support a more favorable assessment. We remain available to clarify any protocol details.