- Rating
- 2(+1)
- Confidence
- 3
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
The paper addresses an important and relatively underexplored problem, whether automated prompt optimization (APO) algorithms can inadvertently memorize and expose private training examples in their optimized prompts. It shows the empirical demonstration of private training-data leakage and develops a practical auditing framework and mitigation strategies. However, the paper lacks rigorous differential privacy protection and has low novelty of the mitigation techniques.
Critical strengths
S1. Generally speaking, the paper did a reasonable well evaluation, experiments on two APO algorithms, ProTeGi and GEPA, using Enron emails and LongLaMP-3 product reviews. The results suggest the proposed techniques are practical alternatives or complements to computationally expensive formal differential privacy approaches.
Critical weaknesses
W1. The caption of Figure 4 states "The PM+PA strategy, which uses the privacy-preserving mutator meta-prompt plus the privacy-preserving autorater feedback yields the best empirical epsilon of 0 with minimal impact on the test score". However, as shown in Equation 6, a lower bound of zero does not imply that the true privacy loss is zero, or even small.
W2. The three mitigation strategies (remove PII from training examples, instruct the mutator not to copy private information, instruct the autorater not to include private information in its feedback) are conceptually simple and the paper does not propose a new privacy-aware optimization objective or a principled mechanism for controlling leakage.
W3. The paper lacks experimental comparisons with established privacy-preserving APO methods, particularly DP-OPT.
Questions for authors
W1 and W3 in the above weakness section.
Thank you for the clarifications and revisions. The explicit threat model helps address my concern about the problem formulation, and I appreciate the efforts to improve the presentation. However, my concerns about the empirical scope and mitigation evaluation remain.
First, the optimizer-independent applicability of the audit does not establish the generality of the empirical findings. Second, the computational cost and feasibility analysis of DP-OPT is useful, but it does not establish the relative privacy-utility performance of the proposed interventions.
Overall, I appreciate the clarifications, but the response does not sufficiently resolve these substantive concerns. I therefore maintain my current overall assessment.