acceptodds
Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2027

When Do LLM Agents Settle? Memory-Mediated Potential Games

Abstract

Multi-agent systems increasingly revise persistent shared state such as memories, workboards, and partial solutions. Each worker owns the part it may rewrite and writes only what it judges better than the incumbent. Those judgments are imperfect, and the record used to evaluate a candidate may be stale. When must such revision settle? We study this in finite exact-potential games, where a worker's report of a candidate's improvement may differ from the truth by at most and a revision is accepted only when the reported gain exceeds a margin . We characterize the settling boundary: universal termination holds if and only if . Above the boundary, every accepted revision makes true progress of more than , so there is a finite move bound, and an exhaustive quiet scan gives a -approximate Nash guarantee. At equality, termination survives without a spread-based rate; below the boundary, even stationary reports can cycle with one player. Representation matters too, since reports generated by one fixed scalar score terminate for every positive margin in that single-player case. Within the scalar class, let workers update one at a time with pointwise scalar error at most . Each reads its own coordinate fresh and others coordinatewise, possibly from different rounds at most rounds old. If changing one opponent's action changes a worker's true cost by at most at every fixed own action, universal termination holds exactly when , even with partial scans or unfair schedules. Matching finite games cycle below it. Potential descent handles short delays; long delays need an argument that no worker returns to an action it left. Further results account for simultaneous writes, certify recorded paths and fresh endpoints, and separate a quiet scan from absorption under continued stochastic evaluation, where ties can move infinitely often almost surely. An appendix applies record-level checks to one language model's comparisons at fixed profiles.

Primary area:
learning theory
Keywords:
potential games, approximate equilibrium, noisy better-response dynamics, asynchronous updates, stale information, multi-agent coordination, LLM agents, algorithmic game theory

Reviews

Among:
Shape:
1234this paper, Bottom 27%
Figure 1. Mean review rating of the reviewed papers at ICLR 2027. This paper averages 2.00 over 3 reviews, above 27% of the others.
Reviewer_sFQcOpenReview ↗
Rating
3
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
3
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies termination in finite exact-potential games with noisy comparisons and stale reads. It derives an exact delay-dependent threshold with matching cycling constructions, and illustrates the setting through a workboard coverage game and fixed-profile LLM comparisons. The no-return argument extends the termination guarantee beyond the standard potential-descent bound, although the main text gives too little intuition for the saturated regime.

Critical strengths

The exact delay-dependent threshold is the strongest contribution. The no-return argument establishes termination in the saturated regime beyond the standard potential-descent bound, and matching cycling constructions establish tightness even with stationary scalar scores. Together, these results provide a sharp characterization of termination under the stated update protocol.

Critical weaknesses

The main text does not give the central result sufficient treatment. It devotes substantial space to basic guarantees and repeated scope qualifications, but gives only a brief account of the no-return argument and the matching construction. The intuition behind threshold saturation and the main idea of the lower-bound construction should be understandable from Section 6 without requiring readers to reconstruct the contribution from the appendix.

Questions for authors
  1. Could Section 6 explain the intuition behind threshold saturation and distinguish the role of scalar scores in the upper and lower bounds? The termination proof uses their implied comparison-error bound, while the cycling construction establishes tightness even for stationary scalar scores.

  2. As an empirical extension, could you repeatedly evaluate a zero-gain comparison? G1 already contains one: with worker 1 fixed at tag 2, worker 0 receives 7 from either tag 0 or tag 2. Checking whether a previously rejected move is later accepted would connect the fixed-profile study to the resampling results.

  3. In the supplementary ZIP, replay/prompts.py fixes the prompt margin at 0.5, while report_checks.py changes the cutoff on fixed reports, as Appendix M acknowledges. As a further empirical test, does the reduction in harmful acceptances persist when reports are re-elicited under each prompt margin?

Reviewer_URbiOpenReview ↗
Rating
1
Confidence
3
Informativeness
1
Presentation
1
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

The authors make a connection between agents editing parts of a shared workspace, and potential games. Specifically they consider a sort of potential game with approximately truthful updates and revisions that are accepted only above a threshold, and consider when we get termination or cycling behavior.

Critical strengths

There could be an interesting direction here and the results appear reasonable (if not super deep).

Critical weaknesses

The writing, at this point, is too poor. (I suspect LLM writing played a significant role in this, though the AI use paragraph does not make this clear and states that it was used for "editing and verification" -- nothing else is said, including nothing about what AI didn't do / the humans did. I would recommend being clearer, but in any case, my comment is about the quality of the writing wherever it came from.) The weakness is especially in the abstract and introduction. I kind of see the link between the motivating problem of updating shared state and potential games, but the presentation of it is too vague and handwavy, and I still don't understand the degree to which the paper is supposed to say things about potential games generally or specifically the motivating problem of shared workspace. Some of the results seem intuitively straightforward and not especially limited to the motivating problem. But very quickly we're deep in notation. In these days of an endless flood of papers, why should a reader care enough about this one to read it? A clear, detailed, motivating example at the beginning, that illustrates the issues at play and explains why we should care about these results, would help a great deal.

Questions for authors

No questions at this point -- the paper needs to be rewritten first.

Reviewer_oqu8OpenReview ↗
Rating
2
Confidence
2
Informativeness
2
Presentation
2
Soundness
2
Read review
Paper summary

This paper studies when agents repeatedly updating a shared state will eventually stop. The authors model this process using finite exact-potential games, where agents accept updates based on noisy improvement estimates. They first establish an exact termination threshold for bounded comparison errors, and then derive a delay-dependent threshold for scalar evaluations with stale reads. The paper also considers simultaneous updates, stochastic resampling, and approximate equilibrium guarantees.

Critical strengths

The paper provides an interesting theoretical analysis of convergence under noisy evaluations and stale information. In particular, Theorem H.7 establishes an exact delay-dependent termination threshold, using different arguments for short and long delays, together with matching constructions showing tightness. The paper also discusses several related settings, including simultaneous updates and stochastic resampling, which help clarify the differences between finite termination, approximate equilibrium guarantees, and eventual absorption.

Critical weaknesses
  1. The paper is motivated by understanding when LLM agents settle, but its theoretical analysis relies on finite exact-potential games with bounded evaluation errors and specific update protocols. Although Section 3 constructs a workboard game satisfying exact potentiality, this property follows from a deliberately designed reward structure rather than being established for existing LLM-agent systems. Consequently, it remains unclear how broadly the theoretical guarantees apply to practical LLM-agent systems.

  2. The paper presents many theoretical results, but their relative importance and connections are not sufficiently highlighted. For example, Theorem 4.2 seems relatively straightforward, following from classical potential-descent arguments, whereas the more interesting and technically substantial Theorem H.7 is mainly developed in the appendix. I think the paper would benefit from a clearer organization that emphasizes its main contributions and provides more discussion of their key insights.

Questions for authors
  1. Could the authors clarify how the exact-potential-game assumption can be justified or enforced in practical LLM-agent systems, beyond the constructed workboard example in Section 3?

  2. Would it be possible to provide a small-scale experiment showing actual agent-update trajectories under different acceptance margins or stale-read conditions? This would help illustrate how the main convergence results relate to LLM-agent behavior.

  3. Theorem 4.2 provides a bound on the number of accepted updates. Can the authors further discuss convergence speed in the stale-read setting of Theorem H.7, particularly how increasing the acceptance margin affects convergence speed and the quality of the terminal solution?

From OpenReview, CC BY 4.0. Authors as signed there; shown unedited.

Related papers

Loading the map…

Discussion (0)

Sign in to comment.