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Paper summary
This paper introduces MOSAIC, an attack framework that splits a malicious operation across intent, code logic, and target configuration artifacts for runtime reassembly via normal multi-agent collaboration, exposing the limitations of local safety inspections against cross-artifact malicious compositions.
Critical strengths
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The paper astutely identifies that the very mechanisms modern MAS frameworks rely on to enhance engineering capabilities, paradoxically create a structural blind spot for safety defenses.
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The paper organizes code parameterization, configuration decoupling, and software-engineering task camouflage into an executable attack pipeline, leveraging ASCR for automated shard generation, auditing, and iterative refinement.
Critical weaknesses
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The paper attributes its high ASR to the premise that the complete malicious operation never surfaces in any single agent's context. However, the comparisons in Tables 1–2 simultaneously change the engineering narrative, code organization, parameter placement, and payload presentation, making it impossible to distinguish whether the gains arise from cross-agent information isolation or simply from code parameterization and semantic camouflage. Table 4 only reports offline detection rates from a GPT-4o judge rather than the end-to-end ASR of these variants, and it lacks a controlled comparison of the exact same generated artifacts across single-agent systems, fully shared-view MAS, and local-view MAS.
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The paper misstates several key differences from prior work, making it difficult to judge its incremental contribution. Appendix B.1 claims that MAS-CFH requires runtime intervention, though its threat model also covers passive attacks via untrusted webpages or files without intercepting inter-agent messages. It also wrongly states that DemonAgent relies on model fine-tuning, rather than tool poisoning and runtime decoding. Furthermore, DrAttack, which directly addresses malicious prompt decomposition and reconstruction, is misidentified as HOUYI and never properly compared. Closer to the core idea, Collaborative Shadows already splits malicious primitives across agents and reconstructs the full attack after collaborative execution. MOSAIC does take a different route by using camouflaged external files and standard workflow execution instead of poisoned tools and custom assembly steps. Still, leaving out this closely related paper—and not testing what the intent–logic–target split actually adds beyond changing the attacker's capabilities—undermines the claim of introducing a new attack paradigm.
Questions for authors
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How much of the ASR gain comes specifically from cross-agent information isolation when identical artifacts, tools, and budgets are used across single-agent, shared-view MAS, and local-view MAS settings?
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What are the end-to-end ASRs of the Table 4 ablations, and do they support the conclusions drawn from offline detection rates?
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How do corrected descriptions of MAS-CFH and DemonAgent affect the claimed threat-model advantage, and what distinct contribution does MOSAIC offer over Collaborative Shadows and DrAttack?
2 comments
Official Comment II
W2 & Q3. Corrections to prior work and the distinct contribution of MOSAIC
We thank the reviewer for the valuable feedback. We will correct these descriptions and revise the corresponding threat-model comparison.
Differences in Attack Models and Mechanisms
Attack Model. MOSAIC operates under a passive, single-entry, gray-box threat model. The adversary only provides an initial task entry and pre-positions referenced external artifacts, without modifying agents, poisoning tool implementations or responses at runtime, or controlling inter-agent communication. This requires fewer attacker capabilities than DemonAgent and Collaborative Shadows, which rely on tool poisoning, attacker-controlled triggering, and dedicated backdoor reconstruction mechanisms. In contrast, MOSAIC has a comparable attacker capability to the passive artifact-injection setting of MAS-CFH.
Distinction from MAS-CFH. MOSAIC's contribution over MAS-CFH is therefore not a weaker threat model, but a fundamentally different attack mechanism under comparable attacker capabilities. MAS-CFH injects malicious instructions through external artifacts to hijack the MAS workflow. MOSAIC instead functionally decomposes an executable payload into intent, logic, and target artifacts aligned with different workflow roles and local inspection scopes. The unmodified MAS autonomously retrieves, processes, and composes these artifacts through its normal workflow, realizing the malicious operation during execution without dedicated reconstruction or runtime intervention.
Experimental Evidence. This distinction is reflected in our defense evaluation. Under the same MAS, backbone, and LlamaFirewall configuration, MAS-CFH achieves only 11.1% ASR, whereas MOSAIC retains 77.8% ASR. This 66.7 percentage point difference demonstrates that workflow-aligned payload sharding can substantially weaken local defenses even when the attacker has comparable control over external artifacts.
Thus, MOSAIC's novelty lies in exploiting the mismatch between workflow-level functional composition and the information available to local safety inspections, rather than assuming stronger attacker capabilities.
Fundamental Differences from DrAttack and Collaborative Shadows.
DrAttack assumes that the attacker is the user who directly submits a decomposed malicious prompt to a single LLM. The victim model reconstructs the original request through in-context learning. It does not involve an external artifact attacker or payload reassembly through a multi-agent workflow.
Collaborative Shadows assumes that the attacker poisons tool outputs and submits a global trigger instruction. Encrypted backdoor fragments are distributed into agents' memories. As described in Section 3.4, the attacker subsequently accesses these memories, extracts and reconstructs the backdoor, and initiates its execution. Thus, the attack relies on attacker-controlled triggering and post-task assembly rather than autonomous reconstruction through the MAS's normal workflow.
In contrast, MOSAIC introduces payload sharding in a distinct threat setting: an external adversary decomposes an executable payload into role-consistent intent, logic, and target artifacts aligned with different stages of a multi-agent workflow. The attacker only supplies an initial task artifact and pre-positions referenced resources, without controlling subsequent agent interactions. The unmodified MAS autonomously retrieves, processes, and composes these artifacts through its normal workflow, ultimately realizing the malicious operation during execution. No attacker-controlled memory access, explicit payload reconstruction, or external assembly procedure is required.
Official Comment I
We thank the reviewer for the detailed feedback. We further clarify the distinct contributions of payload construction and cross-agent information isolation, and expand the comparison with closely related attacks.
MOSAIC combines two complementary mechanisms: ASCR constructs locally inconspicuous artifacts, while the MAS workflow distributes and composes these artifacts through different information views. Our existing experiments examine these mechanisms from two perspectives.
First, Table 4 isolates the contributions of ASCR's three stages. Removing target decoupling increases joint detection from 25.9% to 55.6%. Removing the cover context and refinement loop increases detection to 51.9% and 48.1%, respectively. These results demonstrate the contribution of the three stages to artifact-level stealth.
Second, Section 5.6 evaluates different inspection scopes. LlamaFirewall leaves MOSAIC with 77.8% ASR, whereas an LLM Joint Auditor receiving all three shards reduces ASR to 63.0%. The comparison illustrates how combining information across artifacts exposes signals that are less apparent under restricted inspection.
To isolate the contribution of cross-agent information visibility, we conduct a controlled experiment using GPT-5.4 and the same RedCode evaluation instances. We compare three settings: Local-view MAS, Shared-view MAS, and Single Agent. The two MAS settings use AutoGen Selector, with information visibility as the primary experimental variable.
Local-view MAS achieves 94.1% ASR, outperforming Shared-view MAS by 12.6 percentage points under the same multi-agent architecture. This result provides direct evidence that restricted cross-agent information visibility contributes to MOSAIC's effectiveness, beyond the artifact construction and semantic camouflage provided by ASCR.
The Single Agent setting achieves 92.5% ASR, further demonstrating that ASCR-generated artifacts remain effective outside the local-view multi-agent configuration. Together, these results highlight two complementary aspects of MOSAIC: the effectiveness of artifact-level payload construction and the additional advantage associated with restricted information visibility in multi-agent workflows.
To further quantify the contribution of each ASCR component, we extend the ablation study in Table 4 with end-to-end attack success rates under the same evaluation setting.
All three components contribute to end-to-end attack effectiveness. These results establish a consistent relationship between artifact-level stealth and end-to-end attack success: removing each ASCR component increases detectability and reduces ASR. Together with the controlled information-visibility experiment, the results demonstrate the complementary contributions of payload construction and cross-agent information separation to MOSAIC's effectiveness.