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Paper summary
This work studies cooperation among LLM agents through two mechanisms: external incentive alignment via contracts and internal group alignment via proposed we-frames. The authors evaluate these mechanisms in classical matrix social dilemmas in a repeated common-pool-resource environment, GovSimContract. Five LLMs are tested under no-contract, natural-language-contract, and code-contract regimes.
Critical strengths
- writing is easy to follow, it also provides prompts, contract examples, construction details, model/sampling information, and code, seeds for reproduction..
- the qualitative contract-failure analysis is interesting.
Critical weaknesses
My main concerns are the novelty of this work.
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The contract-impossibility result is very close to existing contractibility/observability results. Haupt et al. [3] already formalize contracts in multi-agent systems in terms of contractible observations, prove socially optimal implementation when deviations are observable and the contract space is rich enough, and prove that more informative contractible features weakly improve equilibrium welfare. They even experimentally degrade the probability of detecting contractible behavior and show welfare falls as observability worsens.
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Empirically:
- CoopEval[1] already evaluates contracts alongside other mechanisms in LLM social dilemmas and finds contracting to be one of the most effective mechanisms for achieving cooperation.
- Wyse et al. [2] also studies LLM agents that negotiate their own contracts and explicitly compares representations ranging from natural-language contracts to contracts compiled into executable code.
- The empirical cooperation gap does not measure the theoretical cooperation gap. Experimentally, the paper defines cooperation gap as the welfare difference between two prompting conditions while holding the contract regime fixed. But the theoretical impossibility concerns something different: whether the first-best welfare profile can be implemented by a contract given limited observability.
[1] Tewolde, E., Zhang, X., Piedrahita, D. G., Conitzer, V., & Jin, Z. (2026). Coopeval: Benchmarking cooperation-sustaining mechanisms and llm agents in social dilemmas. arXiv preprint arXiv:2604.15267.
[2] Wyse, T., Bustos, K., Volkova, Y., & Kleiman-Weiner, M. (2026). Commitment To Cooperation With Self-Negotiated Contracts. arXiv preprint arXiv:2607.22750.
[3] Haupt, A. A., Christoffersen, P. J., Damani, M., & Hadfield-Menell, D. (2022). Formal Contracts Mitigate Social Dilemmas in Multi-Agent RL. arXiv preprint arXiv:2208.10469.
Questions for authors
- Can you clarify what is theoretically new relative to classical moral hazard/incomplete-contract results and prior work on contractible observability?
- Can you add a communication-matched baseline to isolate the effect of contracts from negotiation and cheap talk?
- Can you experimentally test the theorem by directly varying whether the relevant effort/action is observable to the contract?
Discussion Summary
Dear AC and Reviewers,
As the discussion period is ending, we kindly ask you to check our responses if you haven't already.
We hope they address the remaining concerns.
Summary of the Strengths
We would like to thank the reviewers for their valuable feedback, and we appreciate the positive assessment of the contributions of our work in the following points:
z8we“Theoretical and empirical contributions to an important problem of multi-agent cooperation.”Vr6L“The article considers a nice problem, namely, how to encourage LLMs to cooperate” ,yXMm“With the development of LLM-based multi-agent systems, understanding how to coordinate agents with potentially conflicting objectives and avoid collective inefficiency caused by individual rationality is an important research problem.”r1st“writing is easy to follow”,z8we“The paper is well-written and easy to read.”,yXMmPresentation 3: Clear and easy to follow.yXMm“These observations provide useful insights into coordination challenges in multi-agent systems.”Vr6L“The article presents several experiments using LLMs from different families”,R1st“the qualitative contract-failure analysis is interesting.”Z8we“Comparing the framing-based approaches and contract-based approaches is a valuable angle.”Vr6Lsays “The considered problem is a well fit for ICLR” .Rebuttal Actions
To address all the points from the reviewers, we have taken action to improve both the empirical strength and presentation of our work:
Vr6L,yXMm). We restructured the introduction and research questions to make them more explicit as requested; we marked modifications in blue.r1st,yXMm). In the same 4×4 games, we made effort observable to the contract (Appendix G.2).r1st). In a cheap-talk condition, players exchange as many messages as in contract negotiation, but nothing is binding (Appendix G.4).z8we). We ran the frames with pairs of models of different capability (GPT-5.6 Terra, Luna and Sol) and of different families (GPT-5.4 with DeepSeek-V4-Flash).z8we,yXMm). We compared the underspecified team-reasoning prompt with an explicit-objective prompt (Figure 10).r1st). We compared our work with Haupt et al., CoopEval and Wyse et al., and added a measure closer to the theoretical gap in the rebuttal.All additional experiments are consistent with the claims in the main paper.
Thank you for all the time and effort in reviewing our work.
Best regards,
The Authors