- Rating
- 3(+1)
- Confidence
- 4
- Informativeness
- 1
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 1
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Paper summary
This paper proposes CCCV, an inference-time defense against clean-label backdoor attacks in vertical federated learning. The key observation is a training–inference context shift: during training the trigger always appears alongside target-class representations from the other clients, but at inference it is attached to non-target samples, so the triggered sub-embedding no longer fits its cross-client context. To catch this, the server trains a lightweight local label estimator for each client and a conditional normalizing flow that models p(z^(k) | z^(−k)), strengthened with a cross-class contrastive loss. At inference, samples whose local predictions disagree with the global prediction are passed to the flows. These samples are flagged if their summed conditional NLL margins over class-specific reference thresholds exceed a set level. Detected samples are then used to identify the malicious clients via a recurring-pattern memory, and the prediction is recovered by masking those clients’ embeddings. The method needs no trusted clean data and doesn’t change the original VFL training. Experiments on five image and tabular datasets against three attacks show much higher detection precision, while keeping ASR low and accuracy close to the undefended model.
Critical strengths
- It's insightful to categorize backdoor attacks in VFL into three types.
- Sufficient ablation study.
- Detection precision and F1 improve substantially over prior defenses across five datasets and three attacks, while ASR stays low and clean accuracy is preserved. No trusted clean data is needed.
Critical weaknesses
Strong Weakness:
- The paper's motivation for requiring auxiliary trusted data is commonly shown in previous works, such as SPMC [1]
- There is no support for the author's claim that clean-label backdoor poisoning induces a training-inference shift in cross-client context. It would be better to provide a mathematical proof or experiment.
- What's the difference between SPMC and the conditional distribution that is the paper's claim? SPMC also uses the margin contribution to detect malicious clients, and the author also uses he conditional distribution to capture unusual actions.
- The attack setting is outdated. I suggest including more fresh attack strategies.
- Table 1 shows a comparison of CCCV with other defenses. However, I notice that in CIFAR-10 and CINIC-10, all the values on ASR are not the best. Could the author explain this phenomenon?
Minor Weakness:
- It would be better to show some VFL cases in real scenarios in the introduction section.
- Notes in Line 449-450 and Line 465-466 are format error (either added in the table caption or use a smaller font size).
[1] SPMC: Self-Purifying Federated Backdoor Defense via Margin Contribution, ICML'25.
Questions for authors
See the weakness above.
5 comments
Further Question
- Regarding W1, as I mentioned, the need for auxiliary trusted data has been a common theme in previous research; therefore, the authors should consider including methods that do not require such data in their comparison, as simply presenting this as the paper’s contribution is insufficient.
- Regarding W4, the techniques you mentioned—such as FILTER (2026), CONFIRM, and GBD—are all advanced defensive measures; however, the attack methods described in the paper—VILLAIN (2023), BadVFL (2024), and Optimal Trigger Strategy (2023)—are all two years behind current research.
Response to Reviewer Fh6m’s Follow-up Questions
We thank the reviewer for the constructive and prompt follow-up.
Response to Q1:
We thank the reviewer for highlighting the importance of comparisons with methods that do not require auxiliary trusted data. Our existing defense baselines already include several methods that do not require auxiliary trusted data, including FILTER, VFLIP, and GBD. As shown in Tables 1 and 2, CCCV achieves substantially higher detection precision and F1 scores than these methods across five datasets and three attacks, while maintaining competitive classification accuracy and effective attack mitigation.
Importantly, we would like to clarify that the primary contribution of CCCV is high-precision backdoor detection through explicit cross-client conditional density estimation, while eliminating the need for auxiliary trusted data is an additional practical advantage of our framework.
Response to Q2:
Our original attack baselines, including VILLAIN, BadVFL, and Optimal Trigger, are aligned with those adopted by recent VFL defense studies. This selection ensures direct comparability with existing defenses under consistent experimental settings. To further strengthen our evaluation and address the reviewer’s concerns, we have additionally incorporated three recent VFL backdoor attacks (Appendix B.4, Tables B10–B11):
- LFBA [1] improves target-class sample identification through gradient-guided label inference and selective sample switching. Our threat model already assumes full label knowledge, covering the label-access capability that LFBA seeks to obtain.
- IASR [2] improves input-space poisoning through gradient-guided trigger optimization and magnitude regularization.
- LAEO [2] optimizes malicious embeddings in the latent space while enforcing proximity to benign target-class representations.
Across all five datasets, the three recent attacks achieve 94%–100% ASR without defense, demonstrating their effectiveness. Nevertheless, CCCV consistently reduces their ASRs to below 6.5%, while maintaining detection precision of 82.35%–100% and recall above 95%.
Actually, these recent advances primarily focus on improving label inference and particular modules. While these techniques enhance particular components of backdoor construction, they do not explicitly address cross-client conditional consistency. In particular, the fundamental training–inference shift persists, and these improvements do not necessarily eliminate the cross-client conditional inconsistency exploited by CCCV.
Furthermore, we consider a stronger defense-aware adaptive attack (Appendix B.3) that explicitly optimizes conditional compatibility to evade CCCV. Across five attack strengths, CCCV reduces the adaptive attack's ASR to at most 6%, while maintaining precision above 95% and recall of at least 92%. Our theoretical analysis in Appendix B.2 further supports this observation by establishing, under the stated assumptions, a relationship between increasing target-class confidence and a larger lower bound on expected cross-client conditional inconsistency.
In summary, we sincerely appreciate the reviewer's valuable feedback. We hope these clarifications and additional experimental results address your concerns, and we would be happy to further clarify or address any remaining concerns or follow-up questions you may have.
[1] Label-free backdoor attacks in vertical federated learning. 2025.
[2] Silent Poisoning: A Stealthy and Unified Dual-Space Framework for VFL Backdoor Attacks. 2026.
Feedback for Reviewer Fh6m
Thank you for your valuable comments. We will respond to each comment and question in the following.
Response to W1:
We thank the reviewer for highlighting SPMC, an important recent backdoor defense method for horizontal federated learning (HFL). We have now included and discussed SPMC in the Introduction section. However, SPMC is designed for HFL, whereas our work focuses on vertical federated learning (VFL).
Specifically, in HFL, each client maintains a complete model architecture and communicates model updates to the server. In contrast, in VFL, each client maintains only a partial model and produces intermediate embeddings from its local features. These embeddings are then transmitted to the server, where they are concatenated and processed by a classifier to generate predictions. This fundamental architectural difference leads to distinct threat models and defense mechanisms.
We agree that the reliance on auxiliary trusted data has been extensively investigated in previous HFL studies. However, this requirement remains a challenge in VFL settings. For example, UBD requires clean validation data for latent-trigger synthesis and model purification. Therefore, reducing the dependence on trusted auxiliary data remains an important consideration in the design of VFL backdoor defenses.
Response to W2:
Figure B1 and Appendix B.1 provide direct empirical evidence for this training–inference shift. Figure B1 compares the conditional inconsistency score Γ=∑k−logp(z(k)∣z−(k)) for training-time reference examples (gray), benign inference examples (blue), and backdoor inference examples (red). Across five datasets and three attacks, the backdoor inference distribution shifts markedly away from the training-time reference distribution. During training, triggered representations are observed with target-class contexts, whereas at inference, the same trigger is combined with non-target representations from benign clients. The resulting increase in conditional inconsistency directly supports the claimed cross-client context shift.
Response to W3:
Basically, SPMC and CCCV differ in three fundamental respects.
Response to W4:
We respectfully clarify that the evaluated attacks remain recent and representative VFL backdoor attacks. Our experiments include VILLAIN, BadVFL, and the SplitNN-specific Optimal Trigger attack, which cover representative trigger and poisoning mechanisms. These attacks remain standard evaluation choices in recent VFL defense research. For example, FILTER (2026) evaluates VILLAIN, BadVFL, and Optimal Trigger under closely related VFL settings. The same attacks are also considered by recent defenses, including CONFIRM, GBD, and Ma et al. (2026). Therefore, our attack selection follows current evaluation practice in the VFL backdoor-defense literature.
Response to W5:
CCCV focuses on high-precision backdoor defense while maintaining comparable defense effectiveness.
In contrast, more aggressive detection strategies may achieve lower ASR by flagging and modifying a larger number of inputs, including benign ones. Table 2 illustrates this trade-off. For example, under VILLAIN on CIFAR-10, VFLIP achieves a slightly lower ASR than CCCV (2% vs. 5%), but its detection precision is substantially lower (16.84% vs. 96.00%). Moreover, CCCV preserves higher clean accuracy (78.38% vs. 76.22%).
Therefore, the small difference in ASR comes at the cost of substantially more false positives and reduced model utility. CCCV prioritizes high detection precision while achieving the best F1 score across the evaluated attack-dataset combinations. Although more aggressive thresholds could further reduce ASR, they would compromise the precision and clean accuracy that motivate our method.
Response to minor weakness:
We thank the reviewer for these suggestions. We have added representative real-world VFL applications to the Introduction. We also corrected the formatting issues.