- Rating
- 2
- Confidence
- 2
- Informativeness
- 2
- Presentation
- 2
- Soundness
- 3
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Paper summary
The paper studies whether the two agents’ complete single-cause intervention-response kernels, together with specified background averaging laws, identify a shared RCK response kernel. Under A1–A3, it constructs distinct kernels arbitrarily close to each compatible baseline satisfying those conditions, preserving both complete reports while changing some joint-intervention distributions. Under additive separability and finite first moments, the report means and known background laws identify the joint-intervention mean. Within this additive model, a specified or identified disturbance distribution also determines the full response kernel.
Critical strengths
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The local non-identification result goes beyond an isolated counterexample. The construction applies to every baseline satisfying A1–A3 and keeps sufficiently small perturbations in both directions valid. Preservation of the complete reports and arbitrary closeness to the baseline are both established explicitly.
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The paper clearly distinguishes identification of means, full distributions, and particular policy queries. It does not equate a nonunique kernel with ambiguity in every query, and it treats separability as an additional sufficient assumption.
Critical weaknesses
The local construction applies to every compatible baseline satisfying A1–A3 and goes beyond an isolated counterexample. My reservation concerns the significance of this extension. Non-identification of joint effects from separate interventions is established, and the paper adds a local characterization under explicit sufficient conditions. This is a useful clarification, but I am not fully convinced that the theoretical advance is substantial enough to support acceptance. My concern is about significance rather than correctness.
Questions for authors
Given the two complete report kernels and the known background laws, are there simple report-level conditions that certify the existence of a compatible baseline satisfying A1–A3? An illustration in the finite-state setting would help clarify how the sufficient conditions can be assessed without knowing the baseline.
3 comments
Follow-up after rebuttal
The added finite-state example and linear-programming certificate address my related question. My reservation about the extent of the contribution remains, so I retain my rating of 2.
Thank you for confirming that the finite-state example and linear-programming certificate address your question.
We see the significance in advancing RCK’s goal of causal communication through abstractions while full SCMs remain private. Our latest reply to RcEQ explains how the kernel results and the strengthened RCK constructions together establish the identification limits of this exchange and support progress towards operationalising RCK.
We appreciate your careful engagement and remain available for further questions or feedback.
Thank you for recognising the local construction of the theorem and for asking how its assumptions can be assessed from reports. We added a report-level certificate in Appendix C.1 and clarified the contribution in Section 4 and Appendix E (lines 1534-1561). All manuscript changes are highlighted in blue.
Critical weakness: significance beyond established joint-effect non-identification.
We agree that non-identification from separate interventions is established. Theorem 1 gives a more specific characterisation: on general measurable spaces, it constructs a report-preserving perturbation through every compatible baseline under A1-A3. Both signs of a sufficiently small perturbation remain valid. Restricting attention to nearby candidates therefore leaves the ambiguity, and the proof identifies joint-intervention probabilities that change while both complete reports remain fixed.
For the communication problem motivated by RCK, this distinguishes two requirements: translating available causal information consistently, and having enough information (from the sender or otherwise) to identify the recipient’s query. Our theorem addresses the latter within the stated kernel compatibility class; it does not establish that every perturbation preserves an arbitrary fixed collection of local SCMs and abstraction maps.
The broader motivation is that RCK could support cumulative causal reasoning across researchers or institutions while detailed mechanisms and data remain local. Our recovery result makes this concrete: under the additive model, report means determine relative shifts, so one identified joint-intervention outcome law fixes the full kernel (Section 5; Appendix D, Eq. (41)). With valid RCK maps and a sender value restricting to that law, one additional causal message can answer every joint-intervention query. Acquiring the law still requires additional causal evidence. We included these practical implications in Appendix E (lines 1654-1664).
Question: can the reports certify existence of a baseline satisfying A1-A3?
Yes: finite settings admit simple sufficient conditions. We expanded the existing binary witness in Appendix C.1. With equal background weights, write ri,sj for the two agents' reported success probabilities. First check their overall averages agree, then construct
\qquad p^{(0)}_{ij}=r_i+s_j-\bar p.$$ If every entry lies strictly between zero and one, this table and the cause backgrounds verify A1-A3. Its row and column averages reproduce the reports (A1); contrasts $(1,-1)$ on each cause are centred (A2); strictly positive success and failure probabilities across all cells provide a common nontrivial outcome component (A3). For example, $r=s=(0.3,0.5)$ gives $\bar p=0.4$ and $$p^{(0)}= \begin{pmatrix}0.2&0.4\\\\0.4&0.6\end{pmatrix}, \qquad p(t)=p^{(0)}+ t\begin{pmatrix}1&-1\\\\-1&1\end{pmatrix}, \quad |t|<0.2.$$ These are distinct valid joint-response tables with exactly the same complete binary-outcome reports. The certificate uses only the reports and the known background weights in Section 4. It certifies existence of a qualifying baseline; the constructed table need not be the true response. Failure of this construction is inconclusive, since another compatible baseline may satisfy A3. For larger finite spaces and unequal known weights, impose the report equations and probability normalisation in a linear programme, then maximise a common lower bound on the cell probabilities. A positive bound certifies A1-A3 when each cause has at least two positive-weight values and there are at least two outcome states. The bound can also be restricted to a cause rectangle with two positive-weight values per cause and at least two outcome states, reflecting local overlap. We added the binary certificate, numerical example and finite feasibility formulation to Appendix C.1, Eqs. (39)-(40). We remain available for further clarifications.