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- Informativeness
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Paper summary
In this paper, a new method is proposed called Geometric Critical Point Screening (GCPS). My understanding is the purpose of this method is that it is a form of model extraction. Weights from a network are recovered layer by layer using the proposed technique. Empirically the method is tested on a public checkpoint, MNIST and CIFAR-10 models. The main strength of this method is that it requires 2x less queries and operates in less time.
Critical strengths
I like the way the introduction spaces the development of this work chronologically into paragraph with corresponding years given. It makes the intro easy to follow.
The experimental results are presented in tables clearly.
Critical weaknesses
There are two major issues with the work:
Issue #1: As this work deals with model extraction, I would consider it a subfield of adversarial machine learning. The authors are free to correct me if this assumption is wrong. If this assumption is correct, a major flaw in the paper is that setup is extremely poorly defined. There is no adversarial threat model to speak of. This is unacceptable for any kind of machine learning security paper. Specifically, section 2 does not clearly define the powers of the attackers or the defender. This is critical because if this is a model extraction attack, right out of the gate the practical scenario is unclear.
#Issue 2: Experimental Issues. In this paper, really only one measurement is important in my opinion, the number of queries. The time it takes to do one query is entirely hardware dependent because a query is based on the model, whose inference time will be based on the GPU being utilized. Therefore, it does not seem to be very honest to report a 1.85x query speed up because the results will change when the hardware changes. Query count on the other hand is hardware independent so it will not change. I would prefer the authors DO NOT falsely advertise query time speed up in the abstract and move these results to the supplementary material.
A second issue is that the authors only compare with ONE other method (called Liu or Liu’s). Maybe I overlooked it in the writing, but I am not really sure what the justification is for only including ONE other model extraction technique. I am not an expert in this domain, but as there are an abundance of ML techniques and algorithms available, it is suspicious (e.g. hints at cherry picking) when only one other technique is used. It would be great if the authors could address this or if time permits, possibly include comparisons to other techniques.
Minor points:
=I do not understand why a random assortment of words is italicized in proposition 1.
=There is no figure that overviews the setup or illustrates your method. It makes thing much harder to follow. I would strongly suggest including an overview figure at the start of the paper to make a nice snapshot available to the reader. Remember not everyone who read your work (this reviewer included) are experts in your domain.
=I was very confused by section 4.5 concepts. Is it possible for you to elaborate more on that section, or possibly point the readers to an appendix section where you give more information? The current description is completely inadequate.
Questions for authors
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Can you improve the writing to include an adversarial threat model, put in a figure that overviews the setup and fix the setup writing?
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Can you either have a better analysis or justification about why only one other technique is compared to yours? Can you also improve the experiments according to the comments I made in the weaknesses section?
Response to Reviewer XkQj
Q1. Are the threat model and the information available during the experiments clearly specified? Section 2 and Appendix A.3.1 define the threat model. The model owner retains the parameters and exposes raw FP64 outputs through a prediction interface. The attacker knows the fully connected ReLU architecture, can query the model with arbitrary real-valued input vectors, and seeks to recover its parameters. Section 2 also specifies the use of ground truth for sign recovery, the auxiliary ground-truth information used by the native procedure, and the two prefix protocols. Under the ground-truth-prefix protocol, the correct prefix is supplied at each layer. Under the end-to-end protocol, each stage receives the parameters recovered in preceding stages. The query-efficiency results correspond to the assistance protocol specified for each experiment. Q2. Does the reported factor of 1.85 conflate query savings with runtime speedup? Table 2 in Section 4.3 reports query count and local runtime separately for the two methods under consistent experimental settings. For each metric, the ratio is the baseline value divided by the value for our method. In Table 2, the query-count ratio is 244,026,401 / 132,197,083 ≈ 1.85, and the corresponding local runtime ratio is 1.04. In Table 3 of Section 4.4, the query-count ratio is 1.94 and the local runtime ratio is 2.00. Thus, the factors of 1.85 and 1.94 quantify query savings, while 1.04× and 2.00× are the corresponding observed runtime speedups. As specified in Section 4.1 and Appendix D.1, query count is the primary efficiency metric. Local runtime is a secondary metric that includes both prediction and recovery computations. Q3. Why did you choose Liu et al. as the direct experimental baseline? The framework of Liu et al. directly matches our experimental setting in its deep ReLU architecture, raw-output interface, layerwise parameter recovery objective, and eight-hidden-layer configuration. Section 1 describes how their framework handles rank deficiency in deeper layers, cross-layer interference, merging, and precision refinement. Section 4.1 and Appendix D.1 identify the public checkpoint and research code used in our experiments. We retain their cross-region clustering and completion procedures while modifying candidate screening and local measurement. This baseline therefore allows us to measure the query savings from those changes within the existing deep-network extraction framework. Tables 2 and 3 report the comparisons under the ground-truth-prefix and recovered-prefix protocols, respectively. Q4. Where can readers find an overview of the method and an explanation of Section 4.5? Figure 1 on page 3 illustrates the L1 midpoint test and the L2 collinearity test. Section 3 presents the full pipeline, covering screening, refinement and coordinate alignment, local measurement using the prefix, repair and completion, and output-layer fitting. Section 4.5 explains the relationship between query cost and local runtime and directs readers to the supporting records. Appendix D.1 defines the accounting rules. Appendix D.5 explains how to regenerate the tables and audit the recovered parameters. Appendix D.8 documents the execution branches taken and the stages from which recovery resumed. Together, these records allow readers to trace the reported query savings to the procedures actually executed. Q5. What do the italics in Proposition 1 signify? The italics are the typesetting convention used for the body of a proposition. The mathematical conditions are stated in the hypotheses of Proposition 1 and in Equation (2) of Section 3.1. Under those conditions, the points at which a common hyperplane intersects equally spaced parallel sampling lines satisfy the midpoint identity.